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Abstract 
This paper looks at the role of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) in its examination of regional trade agreements (RTAs) between 1996 and 
2010. The rapid proliferation of RTAs led to concerns about the weakening of the 
multilateral trading system (MTS); it was feared that the rapid growth in the 
number of bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs), such as free trade 
areas (FTAs) and custom unions (CUs) could pose substantial threats to the 
multilateral trade system (MTS). This fear led to the creation of the CRTA by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in February 1996, for the examination of RTAs 
to ascertain their compatibility to the MTS and their conformity to WTO rules. 
Furthermore, this paper also explores the legal and systemic difficulties faced by 
the CRTA in the execution of its mandated duties.  Nonetheless, the rapid 
proliferation of RTAs intensified the debate on the merits of RTAs to the MTS, this 
study, is also a contribution to that debate - the trade creation and trade diversion 
effects of RTAs, by showing how RTAs could displace trade with non-member 
nations, while at the same time boosting trade among its own members. Under the 
auspices of the WTO, as a rule, the CRTA was to devote a single formal meeting for 
the consideration of each RTA notified to the WTO, formed under the provisions 
of the general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) Article XXIV and the general 
agreement on trade in (GATS) Article V. The focus of this paper is the role of the 
CRTA in its examination of RTAs created under the legal provisions and 
interpretation of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1. Introduction: 
This introductory chapter explores the role, nature and evolution of the committee 
system from a comparative perspective. In addition, it studies the link between 
parliamentary committees and the committee on Regional Trade Agreements 
(CRTA) under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) committee 
system.   Although different committee systems vary enormously from each other, a 
basic understanding of the origin of the committee system may be helpful to 
understanding the origin of the WTO’s CRTA.  Furthermore, studying the role of 
parliamentary committees could help in gaining a clearer understanding of the role 
of the CRTA in the multilateral trade system. 
1.2. The Concept of Organization: 
The Reference Dictionary variously defines organisation as a business or 
administrative concern united and constructed for a purpose 
(www.dictionary.com).  Furthermore, organisation could be defined as the act of 
organising or the state of being organised.  In fact, an organisation could be 
identified by an arranged structure or unit; an order or system; method, a body of 
administrative officials, such as a political party or a government department or 
an agency for example.  It could also include, a group of persons organised for 
some end or work or association, such as a non-profit organisation. 
In my view, an organisation could simply be defined as a concise system of 
interaction between different entities, individuals or groups. Most of the 
important international global organisations we have today came into existence 
after the First and Second World Wars.  Notwithstanding, these organisations 
could be classified into three main categories: 
 10 
a.) International nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) - These organisations 
include many international charitable organisations such Oxfam, Catholic Relief 
Services, CARE International (Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere) 
and the Ford Foundation. 
b.) International non-profit organisations – Such organisation includes among 
others the World Organisation of the Scout Movement, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and doctors without borders (Médecins Sans 
Frontières). 
c.) Intergovernmental organisation – Sometimes referred to as international 
governmental organisations (IGOs).  This includes the United Nations (UN), the 
WTO, the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Before the First and Second 
World Wars, there were very few powerful international global organizations as 
the ones we have today such as the UN. 
1.3. Committees as Organizational Structure: 
A committee is an established arm of an organisation made up of two or more 
persons, appointed or elected to accomplish a specific objective.  It is sometimes 
accorded specific jurisdiction, powers and authority.  Committees are formally 
established by an organisation for specific reasons and purpose, it may be given 
powers and authority to take decision or put forth recommendations on certain 
matters concerning the organisation.  
According to Handy (1999), the organisational idea is that a group or team 
of talents and resources should be applied to a project, problem or task.  In that 
way, each task gets the treatment it requires – it does not have to be standardised 
across the organisation.  The groups can also be changed, disbanded or increased 
 11 
as the task changes.  There are various forms of committees in an organisational 
structure, the main ones include: 
a.) Standing Committees: These are permanent committees. The CRTA is an 
example of a standing committee at the WTO. 
b.) Ad hoc Committees: They are Temporary committees. An Ad hoc committee is 
usually constituted for a special purpose or objective and dissolved immediately 
after that objective is achieved.  
c.) Executive Committees: Executive committees are usually given designated 
powers and authority to make final decisions on matters concerning an 
organisation, institution or a party. 
d.) Advisory Committees: Advisory committees are generally given limited 
authority and power; as a result, they can only make recommendations towards 
resolution of problems. Most large organisations operate through committee 
structures, ranging from governmental institutions, charities and other 
nongovernmental organisations as mentioned earlier.  This includes organisations 
such as national parliaments and renowned international organisations like the 
UN and the WTO. This system has proven to be the best way to run such 
organisations.  Since different committees are given special functions, powers and 
sometimes a specific jurisdiction to take care of. In certain cases, a committee is 
only responsible for a specific issue, such as the CRTA in the WTO committee 
system. The CRTA is only responsible for the examination of RTAs, while other 
committee are responsible for other issues within the WTO. Organisational theory 
is not as old as bureaucracy; it is considerably a new theory in terms of 
bureaucracy since Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Karl Marx were all writing 
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about bureaucracy and authority in different societies before organisation theory 
was known by its present name. 
1.4. Bureaucracy in Organisations:  
Bureaucracy could be defined as administration by appointed government or 
career officials, popularly known as bureaucrats.  A bureaucrat is a person who 
works in an office or a bureau.  This word normally relates to administrative office 
work or duty with laid down rules and regulations.  A bureaucrat is commonly 
used to refer to a government administrative official or an administrative officer 
of a renowned international organisation.  
Furthermore, the Reference Dictionary also defines bureaucracy as 
excessive multiplication of, and concentration of power in, administrative bureaus 
or administrators or as administration characterised by excessive red tape and 
routine (www.dictionary.com). Bureaucracy could also be defined as excessive 
red tape and routines, which are the common features of most government 
agencies, administrative offices of large companies and organisations, such as the 
Ford Foundation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the UN and even 
the WTO and many others.  Nonetheless, whenever one talks about bureaucracy, 
Max Weber (1864-1920) comes to mind.  This is simply because Weber was the 
very first scholar to classify social authority into three different categories.  
According to Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) bureaucracy acquired a 
pejorative meaning in modern usage among the public and the media alike; For 
example, when people come up against red tape and obstruction in any aspect of 
organisational life. They explained that Weber’s view was in direct opposite of this 
development within the society; that for Weber bureaucracy was the most 
efficient form of social organisation precisely because it was so coldly logical and 
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did not allow personal relations and feelings to get in the way of achieving goals.  
However, many people are truly frustrated to have to follow what appear to be 
illogical rules that could result in them experiencing considerable delays.  
Within a bureaucracy, people do what managers, civil servants or 
University lecturers, and others in official positions and authority tell them to do. 
Not because they think that these individuals have a natural right to give 
directions or because they possess some divine powers.  But because people 
acknowledge that their exercise of power and authority is legitimate and 
supported by two distinct factors (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004).  There should 
be a demonstrably logical relevance of the requests, directions and instructions 
from these individuals to the people.  
As suggested by Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) the commands of these 
individuals must seem rational by being justified through their relevance to the 
task of bureaucracy, and ultimately to its objectives.  And a shared belief in the 
norms and rules of the bureaucracy which have been arrived at rationally (not 
based on traditional or personal whim) and which possess a law–like character 
(Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004). 
In Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy, he laid emphasis on the fact that 
modern state institutions were based on rational-legal authority.  He contributed 
enormously in establishing the constituent nature of bureaucracy and the power 
and rational behind a bureaucracy, looking at the different forms of authority he 
delineated one can see very clearly Weber mind-set in the way our society 
functions today.  
i.) Charismatic Authority: This is often seen in situations where visionary 
leadership tends to be inspirational. Most often it is related to extraordinary 
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characteristics of an individual. In Weber’s thinking such leaders inspire new 
social movements and are often considered to be divinely ordained and imbue 
with supernatural powers, like prophets of religion. 
ii.) Traditional Authority: Mostly found in traditional societies. Legitimacy of 
authority comes from sanctity or respect of tradition. Leadership and ascension to 
power is often through heredity, such as in a Monarchy. 
iii.) Rational-Legal Authority: Known as Legitimate authority, it is the most 
important of the three types of authority; due to the rationalisation of modern 
society, legitimate authority predominates.  Legitimacy of authority is derived 
from legal order and enacted laws, often this is found in modern civilised societies 
or nations. (Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004).  Many large organisations such as 
the UN and the WTO are bureaucratic in operation and in nature.  I feel strongly 
that there is no other way such large organisations could operate effectively and 
properly without the apparent bureaucracy in the way they are managed or 
function. 
1.5. The Characteristics of Bureaucracy: 
The characteristics of bureaucracy are wide and diverse. Nonetheless, a defining 
characteristic of every bureaucratic structure is its rules (Buchanan and 
Huczynski, 2004). Bureaucracy is a very present element in many of our 
organisational structures today, most specifically in international and public 
institutions. Even some large private concerns nowadays are becoming more 
bureaucratic in their manner of operation; some of these companies tend to 
operate complex administrative units, for instance Microsoft, America on Line 
(AOL) and Apple, just to name a few.  Bureaucracy has many identifiable 
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characteristics, some of which include the following. (Buchanan and Huczynski, 
2004) 
• Stable and official structure of authority and power 
• Explicit and comprehensive hierarchy of authority (commonly known as 
pecking order) 
• Written records are kept over a long period of time 
• Specialised training and expertise, in staffing and recruitment of staff 
• Official duties and institutional protocol comes first. 
• Established and comprehensive system of rules are used for operation 
• Work is career employment 
• Managers are separate from “owners” of the organisations 
• Managers are free to allocate and relocate resources 
1.6. The Characteristics of Weberian Bureaucracy: 
 Based on Max Weber’s writing, in the Theory of Social and Economic 
Organisation, one could distinguish six characteristics of bureaucracy. These 
characteristics are popularly called the characteristics of Weberian bureaucracy 
(Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004). 
a.) Job Specialisation: Jobs are broken down into simple, routine and well-defined 
tasks. Clear definition of authority and responsibility are legitimated as official 
rules.  
b.) Authority Hierarchy:  Positions are in a hierarchy of authority, with each 
position under the authority of a higher one.  There is a clear chain of command 
and workers clearly know to whom they are responsible. 
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c.) Employment and Career: All personnel are selected and promoted based on 
their technical qualifications and offered a full-time career. 
d.) Recording: Administrative acts and decisions are recorded in writing.  Records 
keeping provide an organisational memory and continuity over time. 
e.) Rules and Procedures: All employees are subject to rules and procedures that 
ensure reliable, predictable behaviour. 
f.) Impersonality: Procedures and rules are impersonal, and apply to managerial 
and non-managerial employees alike. As per Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) 
Weber’s description of bureaucracy is known as the ‘Ideal Type’, since it is not 
meant to describe any existing organisation. His description is a representation of 
a model or a checklist against which to compare and assess real organisations in 
society.  They explained that Weber believed organisations based on legitimate 
authority would be more efficient than those ones based on either traditional or 
charismatic authority and argued that it is because continuity in real or legitimate 
organisations is very much related to formal structures and positions within it, 
rather than to a person who may leave or die. Buchanan and Huczynski (2004) 
also suggested that not every formal organisation would possess all these 
characteristics identified by Weber.  Stating that if more of these characteristics 
are found in an organisation, the more that organisation approximates to the ‘ideal 
type’ of organisation Weber had in mind.  It is worth noting that many aspects of 
Weber’s model of bureaucracy reflected the organisational circumstances at the 
time in which he was writing, particularly in the early twentieth century 
(Buchanan and Huczynski, 2004). Today organisations such as the WTO operate 
on similar structures.  In fact, the WTO operates on a committee system and the 
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CRTA is one of many committees at the WTO. The CRTA is in-charge of the 
examination of RTAs. 
1.7. The role of a Committee: 
One of the major roles of a committee system is to encourage power sharing. The 
authority and power of decision making of an organisation, congress or 
parliament could be shared through a committee system.  Different committees 
could be authorised to investigate issues that fall within its competence.  In the 
case of governments, parliamentary committees could hold inquiries on behalf of 
the parliament or congress as need arises, and then make recommendations to the 
congress or parliament.  
In many countries, so many legislations have been proposed or initiated 
through various committees because this is one of the central roles of the 
committee system.  In a parliamentary democracy, committees play an important 
role in terms of accountability by government officials.  If there were issues arising 
from governance, a committee would take charge of the investigation. And 
ministers could be asked to appear before the said committee.  This is also true 
with the US congress, where officials are often summoned to appear before 
congressional committees in case there are questions to be answered by them. 
The committee system in organisation and governance creates the 
possibility of significant involvement of states and non-states actors in the 
activities of an organisation or government.  For instance, the public could partake 
in what is going on in a government or in an organisation by appearing before a 
committee to give evidence in relation to matters being investigated by the said 
committee.  Members of the public could also petition a committee to investigate 
any matter they deem worthy of investigation.  
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1.7.1. The role of the Committee system in the US Congress: 
In the United States of America (US) after each congressional election, newly 
elected representatives of political parties, who have been elected as 
Congressmen and women, and even Senators are assigned to congressional 
standing committees.  It was during the first US congress of the 2nd of April 1789 
that the first ever US congressional Select committee was established. This 
committee functioned for five years. It was commissioned for the preparation and 
reporting of the standing rules and order for proceedings in the House of 
Congress. When this first Congressional Select-Committee finished it work and 
submitted its report to the House of Congress, it was dissolved.  But since then the 
US congress has relied very heavily on the committee system to function both 
effectively and efficiently. 
Before a congressman or woman is assigned to any congressional standing 
committee, his or her own wishes are first and foremost taken into consideration. 
Notwithstanding, in most cases the need of committee is first and foremost 
ascertained; in terms of the personality of congressmen and women, regional 
affiliations and sometimes even party connections before any assign to a standing 
committee is made.  Most congressmen and women only serve on one or two 
committees because of the large number of members of the House of 
Representatives, which stands at 435.  However, one of the main differences 
between members of the House of Representatives and the senate is that members 
of the Senate do serve on several committees and sub-committees.   
It is worth noting that in the US congress, assignment to a Committee is one 
of the most important steps for the future work of a newly elected congressman 
or woman in the US congress.  In some cases, appointment to a committee is 
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carried out or arranged in such a way as to allow committee member’s ample time 
to carry out their duties to serve their constituencies adequately.  It is not unusual 
in the US congress for some congressmen and women to lobby to be assigned to 
powerful committees such as Foreign Relations, Judiciary, or the House Ways and 
Means committees. These positions enable some congressmen and women to 
exercise considerable power and authority in leadership and governance. And 
congressmen and women in these positions are more likely to generate media 
attention and are often in contact with the present leader of the country – 
President 
The Importance of Committees in the US congress and senate cannot be 
underestimated; in fact, most government actions in the US are investigated by 
special committees, set-up by the congress or the senate.  For example, in 1993 a 
special committee was set-up to investigate the Waco religious cult tragedy in 
Texas.  In the US, most bills often start and terminate their lives in committees, it 
does not matter whether these bills are passed into law or are put aside. But all 
bills must be scrutinized in a committee of the US congress.  
Furthermore, the setting of the US congressional committee system has 
enabled accountability of governance in the US.  Often hearings from the public 
and non-state actors such as lobby groups and bureaucrats from many state 
agencies are heard in committees and subcommittees of the US congress.  
Statistically, annually, about 8,000 bills go through the US congressional 
committees.  However, less than 10% of the bills tabled in committees proceed to 
the floor of the congress to be considered to pass into law. In fact, committees help 
in the organisation of the very most important duties of the congress.  There are 
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in total four types of committees at the US congress, namely Standing, Select, Joint 
and Conference committees: 
a.) Congressional Standing Committees:   
These are undoubtedly the most important committees of the US congress; 
because it is in standing committees that majority of US laws are proposed, 
debated, shaped into laws.  The duties of the standing committee are not limited 
to one congress period, but could be stretched from one congress period to 
another.  Some investigations are conducted in a standing committee.  For 
instance, the US Senate Banking Committee's was put in charge of investigations 
of President Bill Clinton's White water real estate investment scandal. 
b.) Congressional Select Committees:  
These are temporal committees, which are established for a specific purpose, 
usually for the investigation of a specific matter.  These committees are often 
established for a limited time frame.  Congressional Select Committees do not draft 
legislations.  Often, committees such as the Congressional Select Committee are 
put in charge of certain investigations. Indeed, it was a Congressional Select 
Committee that investigated the assassinations of Reverend Martin Luther King, 
Jr and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the 35th president of the USA, who was born on 
the 29th of May 1917 and assassinated on the 22nd of November 1963.  
Some Congressional Select Committees could stay for so many years, and 
some end up producing legislations, examples of Congressional Select committees 
would include the Select Committees on and the Select Committee on Indian 
Affairs. In fact, some long standing congressional Select Committees are 
eventually transformed into standing committees.  Generally, most Congressional 
Standing committees like the Standing House Committee on Small Business; these 
 21 
Standing committees operate their own websites and monthly journals, which 
they distribute to the public; this is means by which they disseminate information 
to the electorates.  
In the US Congressional Select-Committee is also sometimes referred to as 
a special committee.  This is because such congressional committees are 
occasionally established for the performance of a specific duty or responsibility, 
which goes above and beyond the authority or power of other committees such as 
a standing committee. The US Congressional committee system has been evolving 
for so many years, the nature of these committees have nevertheless been similar 
over the century with very slight differences in function, operation and duration 
of existence. Most often, the lifespan of a select committee depends on the 
completion of its assignment.  
However, some select committee could be given other assignments on the 
expiration of one, thus keeping it in operation for a very long time; in which case, 
it could then be reclassified as a congressional standing committee. Both houses 
of congress – the House of Representative and Senate have clear and good 
examples of Congressional Select Committees on Intelligence, and these 
committees are now a permanent feature of both houses of congress. In the 20th 
century some select committee were simply called special committees, this 
includes the Senate Special Committee on Aging, others are named without the 
word select on them, for instance the Senate Indian Affairs Committee is also a 
select committee. 
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c.) Congressional Joint Committees:  
The purpose of this sort of committee is in line with the purpose of the 
Congressional Select-committees.  The difference between these committees and 
others is that they are made up of both members of the House and the Senate.  
These committees are established to help direct public interest and attention on 
major issues affecting the nation, and to conduct business between the two 
houses.  Some, joint committees are created to handle specific matters, such as 
supervising the Library of Congress; for instance, a congressional select 
committee was established for the investigation of the assassination of Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr. the civil right activist. 
d.) Congressional Conference Committees:  
These are committee are created for specific purposes. For example, if the US 
House of congress and the senate wants to reconcile differences arising from 
different versions of a bill a conference committee will be established. This 
committee is usually made up of members of both houses who originally worked 
on the bill in question. Once the congressional conference committee arrives at a 
consensus on their matter of differences the revised bill is then returned to both 
the senate and the House for approval. 
1.7.2. The Role of the Committee System in the UK’s House of Commons: 
In the UK’s parliamentary committee system, parliamentary committees 
established by the UK parliament are often composed of few members of 
parliament, selected and appointed to handle specific areas of interest, and to take 
control of matters arising from the parliamentary democratic process such as 
public inquires and parliamentary reviews.  The committee system of doing 
business in large organisations such as the parliament was first introduced in the 
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UK’s parliamentary system - Westminster. It all began through the 
recommendations of the committee process to a Parliamentary Select Committee 
established in 1976; Nonetheless, the UK’s departmental committee system came 
into existence in the year 1979, following the recommendations set in the Select 
Committee’s report a year before.   
The report recommended the establishment of different Select Committees 
to take charge of all main departments of government, with sweeping powers and 
very broad terms of reference.  These recommendations also stated that selected 
Committees should be given clear powers and authority for the appointment of 
special advisers, as the committees deem necessary.  In addition, it also suggested 
the independence of UK parliamentary party whips in the selection and the 
appointment of members of Select Committees. In the year 1980, the newly 
established select committees started work, these committees were fourteen in 
total. 
Committee systems based on the British model (Westminster specifically) 
operates in Australia and New Zealand. The existence and use of Select 
committees in the parliaments of Australia and New Zealand is based solely on 
their history with the UK.  
The UK parliamentary committees play a very important role in the life and 
work of the UK parliamentary system. These committees are responsible for the 
collection of evidence from witnesses when need be, they are also involved in 
conducting parliamentary inquires and in charge of scrutinizing government 
legislations.  In terms of meetings, most UK parliamentary committees meet 
weekly or fortnightly. In fact, most of the work conducted by the UK’s House of 
Commons is done through different committees. Committees play a central role in 
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the efficient and proper functioning of the UK House of commons. The UK’s 
parliamentary committee system is divided into three kinds of committees, 
namely: committees of the whole house, special committees and standing 
committees.  In fact, at a point in history, the whole House committee handled all 
bills but this process was amended after 1968 when the committee system of the 
UK’s parliament was reformed.  
Furthermore, after the year 1968, most bills were being scrutinized in 
parliamentary standing committees.  It is worth noting that in the UK’s 
parliamentary system standing committees’ is in fact the true essence of the 
current committee system. The UK’s standing committees have three distinct 
functions, which could be classified as legislative, investigative and financial. The 
UK’s Parliamentary Standing Order allows for the establishment of a maximum of 
18 standing committees, which have specific area of coverage in the parliamentary 
democracy.  There is also the existence of three joint standing committees made 
up of members from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords, which 
is in of charge scrutinizing government legislations made through Act of 
Parliament. 
The duties of the Parliamentary Standing Committees are very vast, they 
include the scrutinizing of bills, government departments estimate and public 
inquiries commissioned by the government or the parliament.  The fact that the 
Parliamentary Standing Committees deal with such matters of importance on 
behalf of the parliament helps to lessen the volume and magnitude of floor debates 
in parliament. Furthermore, the authority of UK’s Parliamentary Standing 
Committees includes the creation of sub-committees, hiring and firing of Experts, 
and the interrogation of witnesses in the case of an investigation.  However, the 
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Parliamentary Standing Committees do not have any powers to take or effect any 
decision, they can only make recommendations to the House of Parliament.  As a 
matter of fact, all parliamentary committees report their findings directly to the 
House of Parliament.  
Before money is voted out to any government department, the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts scrutinizes the proposed departmental 
expenditure presented in detail and reports it finding, conclusion and 
recommendations to the House of Parliament. This helps the House of Parliament 
exercises adequate financial control on government expenditure and on the 
financial activities of government departments.  Exercising financial control over 
government departments does not end only with scrutinizing government 
expenditure proposals but it goes further than that.  
In addition, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts also 
examines public expenditure records after the expenditure have been incurred; 
this helps maintain accountability, checks and balances. In carrying out this 
specific duty, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts is in fact assisting in the 
audit of public departments, which is normally the duty of the Auditor General.  In 
the situation that the Standing Committee on Public Accounts notices any 
irregularities, it will inform the House of Parliament and start an investigation and 
interview witnesses and later make known its findings to the House of Parliament. 
Traditionally, the Auditor General makes an annual report to parliament every 
year 
One minor issue of importance and tradition concerning the UK’s 
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts is that its chairman is 
traditionally from the main opposition party in parliament, for instance, if the 
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Conservative Party were in power, the Chair of the Standing Committee on Public 
Accounts would be a member of the Parliamentary Labour Party.  In addition, in 
the UK’s parliamentary system there is also the work of parliamentary special 
committees. Parliamentary special committees are often established on an ad hoc 
basis, and these are generally made up of a maximum of 15 members of the UK of 
parliament. 
1.7.3. The role of Committees in the European Union: 
Like most big organisations, the European Union (EU) operates using the 
committee system.  In the EU, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament 
work through various committees.  In these committees, member states of the EU 
and EU institutions interact to find solutions to problems plaguing the union.  The 
committee system of the EU is made up of Standing committees and Comitology 
committees. The committee system of the EU works in the form of democratic 
deliberation.  The deliberations in these committees are a means to seek for 
agreement on matters of interest to member states and EU institutions. However, 
the EU committees do not function like those of national parliaments, such as the 
UK parliament or committees in the US congress. 
The EU’s parliamentary Standing Committee takes into consideration 
private and public sector interest and adequately employs technical expertise in 
its working with available resource for the resolution of problems.  It provides a 
forum for the coordination of EU institutions, acting as effective and efficient 
liaison between the European Council, the Commission and the Parliament. 
Furthermore, Comitology committees of the EU committee system are in-
charge of the adoption and implementation of EU laws.  Comitology committees 
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are not a common feature in the committee system but they have been used very 
broadly in the EU committee system. 
1.8. The World Trade Organisation (WTO):  
The WTO came into existence in the year 1995. Although the WTO came into 
existence, as a successor to the GATT treaty, the GATT treaty is still the umbrella 
treaty of the GATT. The WTO is an organisation that countries could join, with a 
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, it is quite different from the GATT, which 
was just a treaty with provisional applications (Grimwade, 1996). 
According to Article XII of the WTO Agreement, any state or customs 
territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies is eligible to 
accede to the WTO on terms agreed between it and WTO Members.  However, 
Article XII of the WTO Agreement states that accession to the WTO will be “on 
terms to be agreed” between the acceding government and the WTO. Accession to 
the WTO is essentially a process of negotiation, which is quite different from the 
process of accession of any other international organisation, such as the IMF. 
Access to organization such as the IMF is largely an automatic process; there are 
no elaborate negotiations involved. 
 The accession process of the WTO commences with the submission of a 
formal written request for accession by the applicant government. The General 
Council of the WTO normally considers this formal request. A Working Party is 
established by the General Council to examine the accession request. After the 
examination of the request by the Working Party, the findings are then submitted 
to the General Council for approval. Nonetheless, the Working Party is open to all 
member countries of the WTO, each accession Working Party decisions is taken 
by consensus. Once the General Council of Ministerial Conference (GCMC) 
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approves the accession request, the applicant is then at liberty to sign the Protocol 
of Accession; stating that it accepts the approved. The ‘accessions-package’ must 
be ratified by the national parliament of applicant nations for it to become binding. 
The National parliament of applicant nations should normally ratify the 
‘accession-package’ not later than three months from the date the Protocol of 
Accession was signed. And thirty days after the applicant government notifies the 
WTO Secretariat that it has completed its ratification procedures; the applicant 
government becomes a full Member of the WTO. 
In addition to national governments ascending to WTO membership, there 
are some countries and even international intergovernmental organisations 
granted observer statuses at the WTO. But apart from the Vatican, all other 
countries exercising their rights as observers must begin accession negotiations 
at the WTO within five years of gaining observer status. There are also certain 
international intergovernmental organizations are granted full observer status to 
WTO bodies.  
International intergovernmental organizations granted observer statuses, 
on the CRTA includes the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations Conference on trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank. The Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) is the only international intergovernmental organizations 
exercising an ad hoc observer status rights at the WTO. It is also worth noting that 
about 31 countries and governments and 6 international intergovernmental 
organizations are exercising observer status at the WTO, as at December 2010. 
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Through the GATT/WTO, multilateralism was very well positioned to be the 
driving force of world trade than RTAs.  This seems to be the very much the case 
during the late 1940 to the early 1990s, because more and more nations joined 
the GATT and its successor the WTO. During this period multilateralism grew in 
strength and prominence. According to Lester and Mercurio, (2009) RTAs 
however, gained significant momentum in later years partly because of the failed 
WTO negotiations of the Seattle Ministerial Conference of 1999, and it rapid 
proliferation became very controversial. Before this period, it was very rare for 
major trading powers to negotiate and sign bilateral trade agreements. But 
following the failure of the WTO’s Seattle Ministerial Conference, there was an 
immediate overwhelming tendency for nations, both big and small to negotiate 
multiple RTAs. 
Lister and Mercurio (2008) suggested that some of the RTAs negotiated 
during this period were pluralistic in nature (they were negotiated between more 
than two nations). Since most of these RTAs did not necessarily include mainly 
nations in specific geographic regions, their establishment created lots of 
complications to WTO regulatory system. These complications were very visible 
in terms of implementation, in relation to other multilateral trade agreements 
already in existence.  
Bhagwati and others have argued that the desirability and purpose of RTAs 
in the face of multilateral trade negotiations is highly controversial. Before the 
beginning of the global economic and financial crisis in this century, the apparent 
success of the EU as a regional, political and socio-economic integration model, 
has given full credibility to RTAs. For so many years Europe enjoyed considerable 
degree of economic prosperity and political stability through the EU project. 
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However, the rapid proliferation of RTAs, its apparent contradictory nature to free 
trade created significant controversies especially during this period of global 
economic crisis. The onus for the WTO has always been to ascertain, if RTAs are 
indeed compatible to the MTS.  The willingness of the WTO to correct the trade 
problems emanating from RTAs proliferation, led to the creation and 
establishment of the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA).  
1.8.1. The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements: (CRTA);  
To ensure consistency in the examination of RTAs, the General Council of the WTO 
established the CRTA, on the 6th of February 1996. Under its terms of reference, 
the CRTA was mandated, inter alia, to carry out the examination of RTAs in 
accordance with the procedures and terms of reference adopted by the WTO’s 
Council for Trade in Goods (CTG), the Council for Trade in Services (CTS) and the 
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), including any agreements for which 
the examination was being carried out in the working parties arragement prior to 
the establishment of the CRTA.  
Before the establishment of the CRTA in February 1996, the examination 
of RTAs by GATT/WTO was carried out by individual working parties in 
accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and on the 
interpretation of the Understanding of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994. The 
background history of the CRTA is very vast; its conceptual origin goes as far back 
to the GATT days, when RTAs were being examined in individual working parties; 
by GATT Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties of the GATT treaty were very 
much aware of the serious consequences that could arise for the multilateral trade 
system (MST) from the proliferation and multiplication of RTAs. As a result, they 
decided that Contracting Parties of GATT would examine RTAs in Individual 
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Working Parties, to ensure RTAs’ conformity to GATT/WTO rules. Yet the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT did not envisage the intrinsic and serious 
consequences RTAs could create for the MTS. 
According to Pomfret, the period between 1947 and 1994 is popularly 
known as the GATT era by many policy-makers. Pomfret acknowledges that this 
period was distinguished by a huge dismantling of conventional trade barriers, 
such as tariffs, quota and exchange controls. He explains that there were 
widespread agreements not to replace these conventional trade barriers with 
equivalent protectionist measures developing at the time. Although tariff and 
quotas remained widespread at the time, many grey area measures also 
developed to compensate for tariff reduction made by many nations.  
By the early 1990s, world trade was considerably freer than it had ever 
been before this period. The significance here is that the lower the trade barriers, 
the less scope there is for discriminatory application. This was an encouragement 
for the proliferation of RTAs (Pomfret, 1997). The problem with RTAs during this 
period is that many nations were very eager and comfortable to negotiate new 
trade agreements with one another. Even in situations where these nations are 
members of existing RTAs. In most cases, complex issues were created for existing 
multilateral trade agreements, especially, where one or more nations to an RTA 
are member nations of the WTO. This brings to light what Bhagwati describes as 
the existence of spaghetti bowl of RTAs, criss-crossing each other (Bhagwati, 
1995). 
The CRTA was established by the WTO, via the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations. And the principal duties of the CRTA were to examine individual 
RTAs. In addition to examining individual RTAs, another very important duty of 
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the Committee is to consider the systemic implications of RTAs for the multilateral 
trading system and the relationship between them. The CRTA was created also 
with the mandate to take up the work and functions of the CTG and the duties of 
the CTD  
Crawford and Laird (2001) suggested that, the rapid growth in the number 
of RTAs has led to concern about the weakening of the MTS. It is possible that the 
apparent fear of the weakening of the MTS through the proliferation of RTAs 
necessitated the creation of the CRTA by the WTO. 
1.8.2. The Link between Parliamentary Committees and WTO’s CRTA: 
Parliamentary committees predate the WTO committee system, thus the CRTA is 
tailored in a similar way to most parliamentary committees.  Parliamentary 
committees play certain important roles in the process of governance of any 
nation, just as the CRTA also plays an important role in the WTO governance in 
matters relating to RTAs. Parliamentary committee roles involve representation, 
a process whereby parliamentary representatives link citizens with the 
government; and legislation, this is a process where parliamentary 
representatives initiate and/or amend legislations. Furthermore, they also 
perform legislative duties, which involve voting on new legislations, thereby 
making decisions to reject or accept laws proposed by government executives.  
  This logic of committees is not unique to national parliamentary settings, 
because large private firms, public institutions, political parties and even social 
clubs operate via committees.  Committees seem to be the most efficient means to 
delegate tasks rather than having every member of the organisation actively 
engaged in decision-making. This is some ways in similarity to what happens in 
the CRTA, where Contracting-Parties (WTO representatives of member nations) 
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sit on the CRTA for the examination of RTAs and make recommendations to the 
WTO. 
Committee models such as the CRTA are widely used now days by many 
large institutions because of the advantages of bringing in the management of such 
establishments. The pooling of knowledge and experience could lead to profound 
deliberations by a group of people assembled as a committee helping to explore 
an issue appropriately. The reasoning behind a committee could hinge on the 
premise that when several individuals study and deliberate an issue in a critical 
manner, there is more chance that every facet of the issue would be explored 
thoroughly.  The CRTA uses this same model in its examination of RTAs, specific 
issues related to the consistency to WTO rules and conformity to the MTS are 
examined under the CRTA process and decisions and recommendations made 
concerning each RTA by the Contracting-Parties. 
Notwithstanding, there are also certain disadvantages of the parliamentary 
committees or parliamentary committee system, which is mirrored in the way the 
CRTA functions, as part of the WTO committee system.  Parliamentary 
committees, just like the WTO’s CRTA suffers from indecision, which is one of the 
greatest weaknesses of most committee structures.  The decision-making process 
of a committee takes longer that when decisions are taken by individuals, most 
often members of a committee tend to indulge in lengthy discussions before 
decisions are reached.  Most often decisions taken by consensus or a simple 
majority vote. However, with the CRTA decisions on the examination of RTAs are 
done by consensus.  With parliamentary committee, just like with the CRTA, no 
individual can be held responsible for any decision made because responsibility is 
shared or diffused. Members of a parliamentary committee or CRTA members are 
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not individually responsible for any wrong decision made by the committee or at 
the CRTA. Since, no member is held responsible for any one thing.  Most 
parliamentary committees serve as an advisory body to help the government 
make appropriate decisions, through their advice. The CRTA is not different from 
these committees, since it makes recommendations to the WTO on the RTAs it has 
examined.  
 
1.9. Conclusion:  
Using qualitative research methodology, this chapter has explored the origin, nature 
and evolution of committees, to explain the source of the WTO’s CRTA. Furthermore, 
it also explored the concept of organisations to provide a clear understanding of 
what happens within some large organisations and institutions, such as national 
parliaments. 
 In addition, it studied the importance of organisational structure and their 
relevance in decision making. Thereby offering a vivid appraisal of the CRTA and the 
way the WTO operates through its committee system. And it also explored the origin 
and source of the concept of bureaucracy and studied the links between the CRTA 
and parliamentary committees. 
 Finally, the findings of this chapter points to the bureaucratic difficulties 
involved in decision making in large organizations through the committee system.  
has brought to light how difficult it is to make effective decisions in large 
organisations and institutions, which are plagued by bureaucratic norms.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2.1. Introduction: 
Chapter 2 explores the methodology used in this study and it looks at other research 
methodologies that could have been used. Furthermore, it explores the chosen 
research method and other research approaches that could have been selected.  In 
addition, it looks at various methods of literature search, how data was collected and 
analysed, and discusses the lacuna in literature on the CRTA. The CRTA as an organ 
of the WTO committee system has been rather ignored. As a result, a random 
literature search on the CRTA, reveals mainly scanty literatures.  
 
2.2. Research Methodology: 
To attempt to answer the initial research question of this work, it was important 
to undertake a literature review of relevant and available literature relating to the 
CRTA. Literature review is defined as a comprehensive study, interpretation and 
analysis of literature that relates to a specific topic.  This literature review was an 
essential primary step that was undertaken aimed at summarising relevant 
literature on the CRTA, to try and develop a clear insight on the research topic and 
to help identify gaps in literature within this area of research. 
2.3. Literature Search: 
The very first step that was employed was to develop a systematic search strategy 
with the aim to identify and locate the most relevant literature on the CRTA.  The 
decision to use a systematic approach was to prevent a random and disorganised 
literature search.  Another advantage of employing a systematic literature search 
approach was to ensure that all relevant and available literature on the CRTA 
would be identified.  As a result, a hierarchy of literature relating to the CRTA was 
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established to identify the most appropriate literature available.  Any literature in 
which the CRTA was specifically given attention was classified as primary 
material, while other literature not relating specifically or directly to the CRTA, 
such as literature on the WTO or RTAs were considered as secondary materials to 
the research. This classification of literature in this manner is not consistent with 
conventional primary and secondary research classification, which relates to 
original work for primary research and secondary research relating to reviews 
and non-original works. However, to keep my literature search organised, this 
terminology had to be applied in the context of my literature search on the CRTA. 
The importance of searching, reading and analysing literature on the WTO and 
RTAs is to get a clear and useful insight and background on the CRTA. 
Using key words and literature search terms, such as CRTA, WTO, RTAs, 
MFN, GATT, GATS, Article XXIV, Interim agreements, multilateral trade system, 
free trade, trade liberalisation, tariff concessions, substantially all trade, Customs 
Unions, Free trade areas, Common Markets and bilateral trade agreements helped 
to facilitate literature search. Through this strategy an inclusion and exclusion 
criteria was developed based on key words and search terms. Literature search 
only included topic areas related to the CRTA and its work and other areas not 
directly or indirectly relating CRTA were excluded from the literature search.  
The development of inclusion and exclusion criteria was important to 
ensure and maintain focus on the subject matter – the role of the CRTA and its 
relevant areas. Thereby making the search strategy relevant, valid and concrete, 
since inclusion and exclusion search strategy can help to ensure that the literature 
that would be discovered or found could directly or indirectly help to address the 
research questions.  To ensure that the information gathered was relevant and up-
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to-date as possible, a decision was made to limit the search period, by only 
searching for literature in relation to the role of the CRTA between 1996 and 2010. 
Initially, an online electronic search of literatures on the CRTA, WTO, RTAs, 
GATT, GTAs and Interim Agreements was carried out. The following databases and 
search engines were used ATHENS, British National Library, University of East 
London Library, Google and Google Scholar. There was considerable success from 
Google search and Google Scholar search the search engine came up with lots of 
book titles, articles and Journals for my research area.  However, only reputable 
journals that are peer reviewed were considered. Searching Techniques such as 
Boolean Logic and truncation were employed in searching for literature on the 
role of the CRTA, using key words and search terms. These searching techniques 
allowed for the use of Boolean operators that includes AND, OR and NOT in 
combination of search terms.   
In using the Boolean logic, AND was used to restrict the literature search to 
a specific area; for instance, CRTA and RTAs; WTO and CRTA; RTAs and WTO. 
Whilst OR were used to widen the search area a little bit (Boole, 2003).  
Furthermore, to ensure that all relevant variations of the search were retrieved, 
truncation techniques were employed.  This involved entering the asterisk symbol 
(*) after the search terms, thus allowing for different endings of the search term 
to be found, for instance ‘Regional Trade Agreement*’, this allowed for the 
identification of literature relating to Regional Trade Agreement and Regional 
Trade Agreements.  
Another technique employed for literature search for this work in addition 
to electronic searches was hand search, ‘snowballing’ technique.  Snowballing 
literature search technique involved identifying key articles, journals and books 
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on the CRTA and related topics and afterwards looking through their reference list 
or bibliography to select relevant references or bibliography to explore. This 
technique helped to reveal and identify lots of relevant and related literature on 
the CRTA for further exploration. 
2.4. Data Collection:  
A certain number of abstracts from literature found on the CRTA, the WTO and 
RTAs were reviewed.  After this review was completed, 20 of them, (including 
articles, journals and books) were initially selected for basic review, after the basic 
review, they were further narrowed down to 18 for in-depth critical appraisal and 
analysis.  The limitation of this process is that some articles might have been 
missed if the search term or keywords were not found in the title.  However, this 
was undertaken to create focus on my research area – the CRTA and to search for 
articles directly related to the CRTA.  
Literature relating to all RTAs involving developed countries that were 
notified to WTO and supposed to be subjected to the CRTA’s examination 
procedure between 1996 and 2010 were collected and analysed.  Other literature 
relating to RTAs negotiated and concluded by WTO members and entered into-
force between 1996 and 2010 was also collected and analysed. There was no in-
depth study on RTAs concluded only among developing countries under the 
Enabling Clause that are notified to the Committee on Trade and Development 
(CTD) (Enabling Clause is an Exception to the Most Favour Nation Clause rule. 
(Note that RTAs concluded under enabling Clause were not taken into 
consideration by this study since it is not the duty of the CRTA to examine such 
RTAs.  As a result, this area has not been fully covered by this work, although it 
has been mentioned several times in the discussions and analyses 
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Furthermore, this research project made use of three important libraries in 
London namely: The Libraries of the University of East London, The London 
School of Economics, and that of the Advanced Legal Studies.  These libraries 
contained useful books, Journals and Articles, pertaining to this field of studies – 
the WTO, RTAs and the CRTA. So, many valuable materials in relation to the study 
of economics, trade and most aspects of world trade laws and RTAs have been 
accumulated over a very long period of time. As a result, these libraries were very 
valuable sources for data collection relating to this research project. However, 
many others online libraries and sources were also consulted, this included 
Athens, the websites of the WTO and the Libraries of the London Borough of 
Croydon. were the three main University libraries made use of in London.  
2.5. Data Analysis: 
Data collected on RTAs, the CRTA, and the WTO were studied and analysed, these 
included books, articles, publications by renown media houses, peer reviewed 
journals articles, GATT treaty, WTO legal texts, decisions on WTO case law, 
minutes of WTO meetings, WTO secretariat reports, minutes of the CRTA 
meetings, and a wide range of academic literature on the WTO between 1996 and 
2010. All documents and materials collected for this research project were 
examined, studied and analysed in line with well-established procedure for 
documentary analysis. The framework that was used included: 
a.) Time Frame: Documents collected were up-to-date and were dated between 
1996 and 2010.   
b.) Categorization: All documents were classified under their various categories, 
namely RTAs, CRTA and WTO and because they fitted appropriate to their various 
categories they were deemed relevant to this research project.  
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c.) Content Evaluation: The content of each document was examined to determine, 
if the materials therein were relevant to this research project or not.   
d.) Appropriateness: All documentary evidence was evaluated and re-evaluated to 
determine its suitability to this work.  All evidence was also analysed in 
accordance with the case study framework to provide answers to the research 
hypothesis of this work. 
e.) Genuineness: The genuineness of each document collected from all sources was 
checked, and crosschecked many times to ascertain their genuineness. It is worth 
noting here that most documents, if not all documents on the WTO website are 
deemed to be genuine. 
f.) Authenticity: The authenticity of documents on the WTO web site is not in doubt 
as previously mentioned under genuineness.  This is because the WTO is a 
renowned, genuine and authentic international organization.  Nonetheless, each 
document was still examined and analysed, for authenticity.  
g.) Thorough Examination: Thorough examination for the selection of necessary 
and relevant documentary evidence was carried out. In fact, the examination and 
analysis of documentary evidence were conducted based on the general outlook 
of the document, the author, the manner of presentation, and the WTO icon on the 
document, if any.  Each document was subjected to careful study and each one of 
them was examined before being accepted as evidence.  Information on these 
documents was analysed and elaborated upon in very clear details, with adequate 
descriptions and explanations (Yin, 2003). 
2.6. Choice of Research Methodology:  
In deciding what research methodology to use for this research, factors such as 
the nature of the topic under investigation, the availability of literature on the 
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CRTA, RTA, WTO and the research methodology commonly used in academic 
research in the law discipline were taken into consideration.  However, qualitative 
and quantitative research methodologies are the two most widely used research 
methodologies in most academic studies as a result it was vital to have a detailed 
understanding of both.  
2.6.1. Quantitative Research Methodology:  
Quantitative research could be defined as an objective, formal, and systematic 
process in which, information about a specific area of interest is obtained through 
the study and use of numerical data.  To ensure that the study could be replicated 
and applied to a much larger sample than that used during the studies. 
Quantitative research method places great emphases on transparency and 
accuracy in data collection. 
Quantitative research could be presented in various formats which, could 
be divided into four key forms as commonly used in sciences and medical 
disciplines namely: descriptive, correlational, quasi-experimental and 
experimental research.  However, some of the limitations of quantitative research 
approach are that it often seems to fail to take into consideration an individual’s 
unique ability to interpret their own experiences and construct their own 
meanings to the research undertaken.  As a result, of this limitation, some 
contenders have argued that quantitative research often seems to lack flexibility 
in its nature.  
2.6.2. Qualitative Research Methodology:  
Qualitative research could be described as a research that concentrates primarily 
on the ‘lived experiences’. Qualitative research allows for a more flexible research 
approach in terms of data collection, since data is usually in the form of words, 
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rather than numbers. Some have argued that often the findings and conclusions of 
qualitative research are often subjective because of lack scientific and statistical 
data.  
One of the major limitations of qualitative research is its accuracy and 
validity, since the research findings and conclusions are very much down to the 
researcher’s personal and individual interpretation.  As a result, the value, 
findings and interpretation of a qualitative research study are sometimes viewed 
with caution.  Furthermore, others have argued that in cases where qualitative 
research has depended on data collected from sampling, the research findings and 
conclusions cannot be generalised on the population, because qualitative research 
designs often suffer from small sample sizes of the total population under 
investigation.  
2.6.3. Mixed Methods Research Methodology:  
A ‘mixed method’ approach is the application of a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods in a study.  Some have argued that the main aim of 
this approach is to provide a certain degree of balance in the research.   Since a 
quantitative method would aim to provide a scientific aspect to the research, in 
which the findings could have the potential to be generalised on a larger sample.  
Whilst a qualitative method could help to provide depth, context and details to the 
research studies.  
Furthermore, others have also argued that combining quantitative and 
qualitative research methods together could help strengthen confidence in the 
validity of the research findings and its conclusions. However, one of the main 
limitations of a mixed method research approach is the complexity involved in the 
interpretation of the research findings. Nonetheless, to be able to combine 
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research methods together effectively, one needs the appropriate skills and a 
thorough understanding of both methods of research - quantitative and 
qualitative methods.  
2.6.4. The Chosen Approach:  
The decision to select a qualitative research approach was done after a detailed 
analysis of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches.  This decision 
was primarily informed through the availability of literature on the GATT treaty, 
RTAs and the WTO, which took a qualitative approach in their designs.  Moreover, 
a qualitative research approach is most suited for studies that are mostly 
descriptive in nature, with similarity to my own research project. And one of the 
main reasons for choosing a qualitative study is because a quality study is most 
likely to provide this search with in-depth information relevant and appropriate 
to answer the research questions.    
Armed with a qualitative research design, the decision to use Grounded 
Theory Approach (GTA) was made.  The concept of GTA is to discover theory from 
collected data, rather than attempting to make data collected to fit into specific 
theories. From the available literature on the CRTA, there was no theory in direct 
relation to the CRTA, the theory found within collected data relates to 
specialisation, comparative cost advantage, regionalisation, regionalism and new-
regionalism. Furthermore, there wasn’t any research directly relating to the CRTA 
as a research topic or specifically based on the CRTA as a research area.  
As a qualitative study of the role of the CTRA under the auspices of the WTO 
between the year 1996 and 2010, document and literature on the GATT/WTO, the 
CRTA, RTAs, including Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and Custom Unions (CUs) 
between 1996 and 2010 were collected and analysed.  In addition, related 
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documents on regional blocs and other bilateral trade agreements between 
nations of the world between 1996 and 2010 were also collected, studied and 
analysed.  
Because of the lacuna in literature on the CRTA, a specific and 
comprehensive literature review on the CRTA was not possible.   Because of this 
difficulty, this work instead explored literature and publications related to the 
CRTA; these included some literature on RTAs and the GATT/WTO committee 
system in general.   
Although this work is a qualitative study, however, statistical data on the 
CRTA, RTAs and the GATT/WTO between 1996 and 2010 was not ignored.  This 
includes data on the total number of RTAs notified to the WTO; Data on the total 
number of RTAs that were notified to the WTO and which underwent factual 
examination at the CRTA, and data on the total number of RTAs entered into-force 
between 1996 and 2010.  In analysing and describing changes in the creation and 
establishment of RTAs and the work of the CRTA between 1996 and 2010, 
statistical data was also used to present a clear and concise picture of this trend 
(Table of the Notification of RTAs in Appendix).  
2.6.5. Research Ethics:  
No ethical issues, considerations, or implications arose because of undertaking 
this research project.  From choosing the research topic to the gathering of data 
leading to the final draft of the research findings there were no ethical issues, since 
there was no fieldwork involved with this research project, or investigations 
involving human participants or animals.  However, in a situation where fieldwork 
was necessary such as interviews, survey or a pilot scheme involving human 
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participants or animals, each chosen research design and approach would have 
had its own unique ethical issues.  
2.7. Inter-Disciplinary Research Approach:  
In the early 90s authors such as Kenneth Abbot highlighted the importance and 
necessity for inter-disciplinary scholarships (Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 
1998).  This is partly because no academic discipline is isolated, as there is an 
existing correlation between different disciplines that makes isolated researches 
in any specific discipline incomplete, without incorporating resources from a 
related discipline or disciplines.  As noted by Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood 
(1998) “… Kenneth Abbott published an article exhorting international lawyers to 
read and master regime theory, arguing that it had multiple uses for the study of 
international law” (Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 1998, p367). Nonetheless, in 
this era, it seems legal scholarship (International Law) is moving away from just 
analysing provisions of treaties, towards an inter-disciplinary analysis of the law. 
This analysis is occurring both at the domestic and international level (Slaughter, 
Tulumello, and Wood, 1998). 
Furthermore, although Posner (1987) dealt with legal developments in the 
USA, it is still a good basis for the understanding of the dynamics of inter-
disciplinary scholarships. Posner (1987) suggested that the law discipline should 
not be regarded as an autonomous or an isolated discipline, as many law scholars 
would like it to be.  In warning advocates of this notion, Posner (1987) observed 
that although the economist and the statistician, not to mention the philosopher, 
the sociologist, the political scientist, the historian, the psychologist, the linguist, 
and the anthropologist may not be interested in the practice of law or the law 
discipline; however, this does not necessarily mean that the notion that the law 
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discipline is completely an autonomous discipline is right  
In addition, (Posner, 1987) went further to explain that: “This perverse or 
at best incomplete way of thinking about law was promptly assailed by Holmes, 
who pointed out that law is a tool for achieving social ends, so that to understand 
law requires an understanding of social conditions” (Posner, 1987, p762). Posner 
added that: “Holmes thought the future of legal studies belonged to the economist 
and statistician rather than the ‘black-letter’ man’’ (Posner, 1987, p762).  This is 
proving to be very true because some scholars now pursue inter-disciplinary 
scholarship research and some jobs nowadays involve the participation of a multi-
disciplinary team in the accomplishment of various tasks or operations.  Presently, 
knowledge and materials from other disciplines, such as international relations, 
are being applied in different related areas of international law. 
Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood (1998) have been able to carry this 
tradition to an international level, drawing on the international relations theory 
to bridge the divide between this discipline and law as a means of understanding 
how international law really evolves and works. The correlation between these 
two disciplines can be seen in the application of law in matters of international 
relations between nations, and in matters of trade negotiations.  The application 
of law in the interpretation of legal text of treaties is now of paramount 
importance to most policy makers.  On matters of international politics, 
international law is very useful; in fact, international law has become the yardstick 
for conflict resolutions both between nations and at the Security Council of the 
United Nations, because of constant reliance on diplomacy.  
Nonetheless, in relation to the GATT/WTO Committee system framework, 
the approach utilised by Kufuor in his book on the GATT/WTO Committee system 
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and governance follows the inter-disciplinary line of analysis.  Although, Kufuor’s 
work places the committee system in the context of the framework of GATT/WTO 
law, it also focuses on international politics and related areas.  This gave his work 
an inter-disciplinary outlook.  The Inter-disciplinary approach now seems to have 
evolved as one of the main conceptual applications in international trade law 
researches (Kufuor, 2004).  According to Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood (1998): 
“The new enthusiasm for inter-disciplinary collaboration may also be understood 
partially as the product of intellectual dynamics within each discipline” (Slaughter, 
Tulumello, and Wood, 1998, p371). 
In much the same light, in Kufuor’s book on the Institutional 
Transformation of Economic Committee of West Africa State (ECOWAS), the 
application of inter-disciplinary approach can be clearly identified in the very first 
chapter.  In this book, Kufuor applied the tools of rational choice institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism to explain and 
elaborate on the Revised ECOWAS Treaty; and the transformation of the 
institutions of ECOWAS and it system of operation (Kufuor, 2004). 
As earlier mentioned, so many functions and duties nowadays are 
increasingly making use of multi-disciplinary team participation in the 
accomplishment of many different tasks and the result in the application of inter-
disciplinary concept has been very successful. So, there is the encouragement for 
this to continue.  Currently, researches in many different disciplines are 
increasingly utilising concepts and principles from related disciplines to 
strengthen their research project and give it added value.  Thereby making things 
even clearer from all directions and dimensions, through inter-disciplinary 
strategy.  Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood  (1998) suggested that “…the American 
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Society of International Law and the Academic Council on the United Nations 
System sponsor joint summer works hops explicitly designed to bring young 
(International Relations) and (International Law) scholars together to explore the 
over-lap between their disciplines” (Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 1998, p367). 
One of the important benefits of inter-disciplinary research approach is 
that it could help conceptualise and contextualize research in its proper and 
related domain. Inter-disciplinary research strategy could also help to encourage 
multiple-disciplinary scholarships. Again, it could help to facilitate multi-
dimensional broad based research collaboration between different faculties or 
disciplines. If this trend continues, it may usher in a new multi-dimensional 
comprehensive investigative strategy that could incorporate so many related 
disciplines in an academic research project, which could facilitate revolutionary 
discoveries of appropriate solutions to difficult problems in different aspects of 
human endeavours (Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, 1998). 
Finally, this research has also made use of inter-disciplinary scholarship 
strategy, through the application of sociological, political, economics, and legal 
concepts in its analyses, explanations and clarification of the nature and origin of 
the committee system and their links to the WTO’s CRTA. 
2.8. Discussion on the Lacuna of Literature on the CRTA: 
Multilateral trade rules for international trade might have been created with the 
objectives of securing market access for the post Second World War recovering 
economies.  However, these were implemented to support continuous economic 
growth for allied nations. Following the introduction of these rules in 1947 as the 
GATT, it was very apparent that countries with easier access to other countries’ 
markets were capable to grow faster than others without such access.  This was 
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probably one of the main reasons why more and more independent states, 
including former colonies accepted the multilateral trade discipline; despite that 
these trade rules restricted their freedom to make unilateral decisions about 
trade.  Accepting these trade rules, therefore, allowed some countries with limited 
policymaking space to manoeuvre things the way they would have liked to do 
(Mikic, 2009).  
The multilateral trade system (MTS) is made up of a set of rules, which 
could help to promote international trade liberalisation.  This set of rules evolved 
from the GATT 1947 treaty. However, the creation of the WTO in 1995 as 
mentioned earlier, further enhanced the multilateral nature of the MTS rules.  
Thereby developing the MTS into a more complex trading system, which was to 
be managed and monitored by the WTO via the CRTA.  After the establishment of 
the WTO, the rapid proliferation of RTAs became the order of the day among 
GATT/WTO member nations (Mikic, 2009). 
However, one of the intended functions of the CRTA was to ascertain if 
RTAs were indeed compatible with the MTS or not.  The CRTA was supposed to 
examine and ascertain, if RTAs were indeed “Building blocks” or “Stumbling 
blocks” vis-à-vis the MTS (Bhagwati, 2008).  In addition, one of the other very 
important functions of the CRTA is to ensure transparency of RTAs; and to provide 
an opportunity for WTO member nations to evaluate, if RTAs are consistent with 
MTS rules (Bhagwati, 1992).  
According to Crawford and Laird (2001), in two previous annual reports 
on the CRTA, work on systemic issues has been based in part on issues arising in 
the examination of specific RTAs and on certain written contributions submitted 
by some WTO-delegations. Crawford and Laird also suggested that the work of the 
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CRTA has not been wholesome. They argued that there were lots of systemic 
issues arising from its work. However, Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) also 
suggested that to better clarify and simplify the work of the CRTA, there have been 
numerous attempts to identify these systemic issues arising from the 
interpretation and application of individual GATT/WTO provisions of GATT 
Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  In addition, further attempts were made by WTO 
members to try to explore possible systemic linkages between GATS Article V and 
GATT Article XXIV (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
Nonetheless, there seems to have been rather little scholarly interest in the 
CRTA or its work in general.  For instance, in the book: Regional Trade Agreements 
in the GATT/WTs by Mathis (2002) with a foreword written by Jagdish Bhagwati, 
an excellent book for the study of RTAs in the GATT/WTO arrangements; but this 
book however, ignored very important issues relating to the CRTA and its work.  
In fact, important issues such as the examination of RTAs at the CRTA and the 
publication of RTAs examination reports by WTO/CRTA were wholly ignored.  
Information provided in this book on the CRTA only centred on the difficulties 
faced by the CRTA in terms of systemic issues.  Just as in various past annual 
reports by Crawford and Laird, only systemic issues facing the CRTA were 
discussed (Mathis, 2002).  
In chapter 11 of Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO by Mathis 
(2002), titled Systemic Issues in the CRTA, specific systemic issues were examined 
without elaborating on the examination of RTAs at the CRTA or RTA examinations 
reports.  It seems that even some scholars and writers, who attempt to examine 
the work of the CRTA, largely ignore many important sections of the subject 
matter, which includes the examination of RTAs at the CRTA and the publication 
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of examination reports of RTA by WTO/CRTA. This could explain one of the main 
reasons for the gap in literature on the work of the CRTA (Mathis, 2002).  
Although, so much literature exists on the WTO and so much has been 
written on RTAs, there has been very little written on the CRTA or the WTO 
committee system in general.  The question now is: Why are there not many 
literary works or research on the CRTA or the WTO committee system?  The 
answer could probably be because of lack of interest in the work of the CRTA or 
partly because of the lack of authority and power in the mandate of the CRTA. 
In addition, one other reason that could be advanced for the gap in 
literature on the CRTA could be the existing impasse at the CRTA in relation to the 
examination of RTAs.  Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) suggested that this 
impasse at the CRTA, prevents the CRTA from doing its work on the examination 
of RTAs.  A thorough examination of RTAs and the publication of all examination 
report is very difficult because of this impasse.  In fact, it indirectly puts a halt on 
the work of the CRTA, thereby making the CRTA almost irrelevant and helping in 
creating a vacuum in literature on the role of the CRTA (Crawford and Fiorentino, 
2005).  
Furthermore, Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) also suggested that at the 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, WTO Members recognised that 
RTAs could play an important role in promoting trade liberalisation.  And they also 
recognized that RTAs could help in fostering economic development. As such they 
stressed the need for a harmonious relationship between the multilateral and 
regional processes.  On this basis, they stated that the ministers agreed to launch 
negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving the relevant disciplines and 
procedures under existing WTO provisions with a view to resolve the impasse in 
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the CRTA, exercise better control of RTAs dynamics, and minimize the risks 
related to the proliferation of RTAs (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005).  
Basically, the WTO committee system in general has been given limited 
literature coverage or rather largely ignored by scholars of world trade law.  Even 
those scholars who have written widely on RTAs and on the WTO committee 
system especially have not sufficiently and adequately explored the CRTA.  For 
example, Kufuor (2004) is one of the few comprehensive studies on the WTO 
committee system, his book titled: “World Trade Governance and Developing 
Countries: The GATT/WTO Code Committee System”. Kufuor seems to be one of 
the few authors who have diligently examined the GATT/WTO committee system 
and its governance (Kufuor, 2004).  
However, in the Transformation of the Economic Committee of West 
African States (ECOWAS) published in 2006, `Kufuor explored in detail the 
transformation of the institutional structure of ECOWAS, an RTA, but largely 
ignored the CRTA. This book only made mention of the fact that the CRTA is a part 
of the GATT/WTO’s committee system but never mentioned if the ECOWAS treaty 
was supposed be subjected to the examination process at the CRTA or not (Kufuor, 
2004).  
Although Kufuor’s books took a close look at the whole GATT/WTO 
committee system, it did not treat the CRTA as an important subject.  For example, 
Kufuor (2004) mainly explored in considerable detail the GATT/WTO committee 
system and its function from a general perspective, without exploring the 
examination of RTAs at the CRTA.  Instead Kufuor carefully examined how 
developing countries had been shaped and are being shaped by the GATT/WTO 
committee system. And investigated certain critical areas of importance to 
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developing countries such as antidumping, textiles and agriculture, which could 
have led to the CRTA being explored. But the CRTA was still over looked, although 
the CRTA is supposed to be one of the most important committees in the WTO 
committee system, considering the position of RTAs in multilateral trade 
liberalisation, there still seems to be a general lack of interest on the CRTA 
(Kufuor, 2004).  
Even some prominent authors on RTAs, such as Jagdish and Bhawagti have 
also systematically ignored the CRTA process for RTAs.  One may argue that the 
existing gap in literature on the CRTA may be partly or wholly because the CRTA 
has not been able to publish most of its works on RTAs. In addition, it might have 
also resulted because RTAs have now become an acceptable means for trade 
liberalisation for both developed and developing nations, making RTAs the norm 
in our global trade arena.  In effect, the role of the CRTA in the examination of RTAs 
is marginalised.  
Some have also argued that since certain regional integration groupings 
such as the EU are encouraging the establishment of RTAs in other regions of the 
world, the role of the CRTA is indirectly irrelevant.  While others believe the work 
of the CRTA is not taken seriously both by the WTO and some members of 
powerful RTAs who seem to rely on the existence of unregulated RTAs to further 
their individual economic agendas.   
Furthermore, De Lombaerde and Schulz (2009) suggested that the 
literature on regionalism is vast and covers different methodologies, approaches, 
aspects and dimensions of the phenomenon.  Hence, it is somewhat surprising to 
find that there is a research void concerning the role of the EU as an actor that 
promotes regionalisation and even RTAs.  De Lombaerde and Schulz suggestion 
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may probably be one of the main reasons why it seems scholars of RTAs may not 
be really interested in the CRTA because if a powerful institution such as the EU 
tends to encourage the proliferation of RTAs, there would be no reason why 
prominent authors on regional trade would advocate the relevance of the CRTA. 
In addition, De Lombaerde and Schulz (2009) also suggested that the EU 
and its Member States are indeed generally seen as natural supporters of regional 
integration initiatives worldwide. The European success in establishing a regional 
grouping, with effective institutions and decision-making rules has fuelled 
demands by other regions for political and financial assistance.  This has led the 
EU and its Members States to switch from pursuing a reactive approach to actively 
promoting and supporting regionalism worldwide. Since the EU seems to be in 
support of RTAs, this could have created a negative perception on the role of the 
CRTA that could have led to the lack of interest even from prominent scholars of 
regionalism. One other important reason for the lack of adequate literature on the 
CRTA is that even famous trade economist such as Bhagwati largely ignores this 
committee.  
 While to other scholars, RTAs could be the best and shortest means to 
achieving multilateral trade liberalisation rather than through lengthy and 
confusing multilateral negotiations at the WTO called ‘Rounds’ (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Professor Andre Sapir (a Belgian Economist) suggested that the founding fathers 
of the post-war trading system wisely chose non-discrimination as its central 
principle, but observed that in the last fifteen years they have witnessed an 
erosion in the trading system due to the proliferation of Preferential Trading 
Agreements. Explaining that Jagdish Bhagwati, the leading trade economist of our 
time, rang first the alarm bells about the resulting spaghetti bowl of 
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discriminatory rules and regulations in our trading system. And that in Bhagwati’s 
book - Termites in the trading system, he brilliantly used his wit and bluntness to 
describe the rise of PTAs and analyses why it has occurred and how it threatens 
the MTS (Bhagwati, 2008). Scholars such as Professor Andre Sapir, were aware of 
the difficulties faced by the MTS from the proliferation of RTAs, but did not 
envisage the role of the CRTA as important in bringing this proliferation to a halt.  
Furthermore, Richard Pomfret for example did not include any chapters on 
the CRTA in his book on RTAs: The Economics of Regional Trade Agreements 
published in the year 1997.  In this book, the CRTA was wholly ignored, 
notwithstanding the fact that this was a book on regional RTAs (Pomfret, 1997).  
Although this book was written in 1997, the CTRA was not discussed in any of its 
chapters, even though the CRTA was two years old at the time.  As earlier 
mentioned, some authors have largely ignored the WTO committee system, 
especially the CRTA, this may be partly because the CRTA was new and the 
proliferation of RTAs was considered a normal phenomenon and partly also 
because proliferation of RTAs seem to be encouraged by some advanced 
economies. 
And in ‘World Trade Organization, A GUIDE to the Framework for 
International Trade’, Bhagirath LaL Das talks elaborately on the WTO, but made 
no mention about the CTRA. Neither did he examine the broader GATT/WTO 
committee system. In a nutshell, the broader WTO committee system and the 
CRTA were virtually ignored. Although he made mention of the Committee on 
Trade and Development (CTD) and to elaborated on some important features of 
this committee, he virtually ignored the CRTA. A very significant proof that the 
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CRTA is not really regarded as being important in the minds of some authors of 
international business, when international trade is concern.  
Winters (1996) argued in favour of RTAs existing side by side with 
multilateral agreement. He emphatically stated that RTAs are like street gangs and 
went further to explain that: one may not like them, but if they are in one’s 
neighbourhood, it is safer to be in one of them. However, Nader (1993) was very 
blunt in his condemnation of RTAs, in his analysis, Nader suggested that multi-
national cooperation most often influence the outcome of most RTAs for their own 
interest – Solely to maximize profits. The implication of this is that these 
agreements are not successfully negotiated purely for trade liberalisation. The 
argument here is that RTAs are not always compatible to the MTS. However, 
according to Pomfret (1997), some scholars view the proliferation of RTAs as a 
challenge, while others consider RTAs a complement to the establishment of the 
WTO as the successor to GATT. 
Ethier (1998) specifically observed that new regionalism is in good part a 
direct result of the success of multilateral liberalisation, as well as being the means 
through which some newly independent countries enter the multilateral trading 
system, to compete among themselves for direct investment (Jagdish, 1992). This 
suggests that RTAs are a pathway to multilateral trade liberalisation, as such 
compatible with the MTS.  This analysis seems very true from the EU’s perspective.  
This theory however, could make the existence of the CRTA irrelevant.  In fact, 
authors such as Ethier (1998) have directly or indirectly contributed to the CRTA 
being partly or whole ignored, thus resulting to a lacuna in literature on the CRTA. 
Nonetheless, from the views of Viner (1950), Bhagwati (2008), Crawford 
and Laird (2001), Baldwin (1997), Ethier (1998), Lawrence (1999) and even 
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Winters (1996); one could conclude that some of these writers have in some way 
or another considered that RTAs could help facilitate multilateral trade 
liberalisation or could be made to complement the MTS, instead of being a 
mechanism for market protection.  Most of these authors to some extent feel RTAs 
could become building blocks rather than stumbling blocks to multilateral trade 
agreements, if certain rules and principles are properly put in place with the 
objective of fostering global trade. It is not surprising to see that none of them have 
written specifically about the CRTA. That is why this work is unique because it 
focuses specifically on the role of the CRTA under the auspices of the WTO. 
 
2.9. Conclusion:  
Chapter 2 has explored the choice of methodology for this work. It explored the 
nature of qualitative research and its limitation, and in addition to clarified why 
qualitative methodology was chosen as the best research methodology for this work. 
Furthermore, it also explored the different methodologies that could have 
been chosen or used for this study and their limitations, which includes quantitative 
and mixed-methods. In addition, it explored the trend and relevance of inter-
disciplinary research approach in the context of legal research. Nonetheless, one of 
the main reasons for choosing this research topic was clarified through discussions 
on the lacuna in literature on the CRTA.  
Finally, this chapter helped to refocus this work on the main element of the 
study, which is the role of the CRTA under the auspices of the WTO committee system, 
by explaining how the literature search was mainly focused on the CRTA and related 
topics, and how this was conducted. In addition, discussions on the gap in literature 
on the CRTA, brought to light the need for further research on this topic.   
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CHAPTER 3.   
3.1. Introduction: 
Chapter 3 explores the research question: How does the GATT/WTO treaty impact 
on the world trading system and on the role of the CRTA? It explores the development 
of our present-day world trading system, tracing its beginning from the Napoleonic 
era and the early trade treaties between nations, to the advent of negotiations 
leading to the creation of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) treaty.  
Furthermore, it also explores: The GATT, the concept of regionalisation, regionalism 
and new regionalism.  In addition to the Text of Article XXIV GATT 1994, the Text of 
GATS Article V, the interpretation of the Understanding of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, 
GATT Article XXIV through which RTAs are formed.  Finally, it looks at the 
ambiguities of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and its impact on the role of the CRTA. 
 
3.2. The World Trading System: 
The world trading system is the name many economists, scholars and trade policy-
makers use when referring to the global trading arena. In this present age, the 
world trading system is commonly and professionally referred to as the 
multilateral trading system (MTS).  The history of the world trading system, most 
specifically international trading agreements could be traced back in time to the 
era of bilateralism.   
After the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1799 - 1815) there was a steady 
development in inter-regional trade, and subsequently international trade also 
increased considerably leading to a sustained period of globalisation.  In fact, the 
period between 1870 and 1914 is often classified as a landmark period of the 
globalisation of the world economy in the 19th century.  During this period, there 
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were very few restrictions to trade, as a result, there was free movement of labour 
and capital.  
The movement of people and commodities within and between different 
continents was considerably unhindered by trade restrictions and barriers.  
However, in the very early stages of this period, the only apparent restriction on 
trade and the free flow of people and commodities was transportation.  Indeed, 
during the early stages of globalisation, the modern transportation system we 
have in place today was also in its early stages of development.   This was one of 
the major restrictions on trade, which reflected very much on the international 
trading prices of commodities as compared to domestic prices.  
This period of globalisation saw a steady increase and growth in the 
volume of international trade for many European countries.  It was observed that 
between the years of 1870 and 1913 the total amount of European International 
trade growth rate in percentage terms was 4.1% yearly, calculated on current 
values.  Although this growth rate was lower than that reported between 1830 
and 1870, which was at about 16.1% annually, but the difference is that the period 
between 1830 and 1870 constitutes a period of war - the era of Napoleonic wars.  
Also, some of the most important international trade deals during this era 
were geared towards war efforts, making trade during this period very different 
from trade in times of peace.  In relation to other peacetime international trade, 
such as peacetime prices of goods during 1990s, it shows a 6.8% annual European 
international trade growth rate. This percentage represents very high growth 
rates, specifically for countries such as Germany, Finland, Belgium and 
Switzerland.  In fact, the volume and value of international trade for these 
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countries were quiet high in the 1990s, due to relative considerable peace among 
nations (Maddison, 2001). 
Furthermore, after 1870 there was steady growth in global trade, 
accompanied by a considerable reduction in the price of commodities both in 
domestic and international markets.  This steady growth of global trade and price 
reduction after 1870 was because of many contributing factors.  Firstly, prices 
became stable and even lower than they were at the very early stages of 
globalisation during this period, due to improvement in the transportation system 
such as the availability of better and faster steam-liners that could carry more 
heavy quantities of commodities and reach international markets earlier than 
before.  
Improvements in transportation led to considerable reduction in 
transportation costs that reflected positively on price reduction for commodities. 
Secondly, the construction of the Suez Canal in 1869 also helped significantly in 
reducing the cost of transportation for people and commodities, through the 
reduction in the amount of time normally used to deliver goods to other 
international markets.  
However, internal transportation cost for many countries was still very 
high until the development of railway lines.  This method of transportation helped 
to further reduce the general cost of trading, through making the transportation 
of commodities and the movement of people cheaper and more affordable.  
Because of the constant improvement in the transportation system, the cost of 
shipping goods from New York in the USA to Liverpool in the United Kingdom fell 
from11.6% to 4.7% (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007).  It is worth noting that for many 
countries with vast territorial landscape such as Russian and the USA the advent 
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of the railway line transportation system was of specific importance for the 
movement of goods and people (Metzer, 1974).  
A lot of other factors have also contributed tremendously to the reduction 
of the prices of commodities and the stabilization of the global economy during 
the period between 1871 and 1914, such as the development of European Empires 
and kingdoms during this period, which guaranteed considerable peace, leading 
to a marked reduction in trading barriers among trading nations; resulting in a 
general reduction in the prices of commodities (Jacks, 2006).  Directly or 
Indirectly the inclusion of colonial territories into the currency union of colonial 
powers and the spread of the gold standard during this period might also have 
contributed in some ways or another to promote trade and reduce prices during 
this period in history.  
As suggested by Lester and Mercurio (2008), during the late nineteenth 
and the early twentieth century, bilateralism was clearly the dominant form of 
trade negotiations throughout the globe.  In fact, trading agreements were often 
negotiated on a bilateral basis between two different countries and these bilateral 
trade agreements covered specific areas of trade. But immediately after the 
Second World War, multilateralism and regionalism replaced bilateralism as the 
dominant approach to world trade.  Many trading agreements and negotiations 
involved mostly countries in specific region; many nations were at the time very 
reluctant to embrace multilateralism, due to the vast nature of multilateral 
negotiations and the cost involved. 
The period between 1919 and 1939 is commonly referred to as the epoch 
of de-globalisation.  This is reasonably correct because during this period, both 
international trade and international capital flow shrank considerably compared 
 62 
to the period before the start of the First World War.  Between 1919 and 1939, 
RTAs were not considered a threat to the MTS, because there was no existing 
multilateral trade regulatory system or arrangement. Neither did there exist any 
multilateral trade surveillance for RTAs.  This is partly due to the absence of a 
multilateral trade regulatory system and the non-existence of multilateral trade 
surveillance for RTAs.  The negotiation of RTAs was unregulated. RTAs negotiated 
during this period were not subject to any trade rules or regulations.  
However, it seems that most trade agreements negotiated during this 
period, were often for war purposes, partly because the world was not stable 
enough for global trade to prosper or for market expansion.  But immediately after 
the Second World War, the necessity for the development an effective MTS became 
necessary, because many allied nations, such as the USA, Britain and France were 
so desperate to improve the general economic welfare of their citizens, through 
trade negotiations with one another.  
Nonetheless, the possibility of a general reduction of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade seemed very unattractive to some developed and developing 
countries struggling to make sense of the real benefits of free trade agreements.  
Because protectionism was to them a safeguard to their markets being hijacked 
by producers and investors of more powerful and efficient economies.  Therefore, 
protectionism was a mechanism for market safeguard and stability; because of 
free trade at a preferential level was more acceptable to them.  
Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) suggested that the promotion of free trade 
at a preferential level may help developing economies implement domestic 
reforms that could enhance their ability to withstand competitive market 
pressures at a sustainable pace, thus facilitating their integration into the world 
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economy.  Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) also argued that the resulting effects 
of the implementation of domestic market reforms through the engagements in 
preferential free trade negotiations and agreements may benefit the multilateral 
process; by exerting leverage on developing economies and others for openness 
and competitive trade liberalisation in international trade relations.  
In addition, Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) also suggested that the 
development of a complex network of trade relationships and the existence of 
regulatory regimes that increasingly touch upon policy areas uncharted by 
multilateral trade agreements may place certain countries, especially developing 
economies, in a weaker position than under the multilateral trade framework.  For 
the MTS, the rapid proliferation of RTAs and other bilateral trade agreements are 
already undermining transparency and predictability in international trade 
relations, which are the pillars of the GATT/WTO system. This situation of 
uncertainty creeping gradually into global trade could ultimately alter global trade 
patterns with severe negative implications for the MTS and the WTO/CRTA  
3.3. The Concept of Regionalism: 
Early forms of human interactions, cooperation and trade were concentrated 
solely within specific geographic locations – centres for trade were littered in 
various hotspots across the globe.  Trade was mostly conducted between people 
within specific geographic locations - regions.  Interaction and trade between 
people of different regions was very limited, due to various reasons; notably, in 
many cases some regions did not even know the existence of other regions.  Trade 
during the very early stages of human civilization was regionalised; this was also 
partly due to other constraints such as a rudimentary transportation system in 
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existence at the time, the lack of proper means of communication and limited 
financial instruments to facilitate exchange of goods and services.  
Whenever regionalism is mentioned, the very first thing that impresses 
upon the minds of most people is ‘REGION’ – that is a geographic location. 
However, it seems many people are truly confused on what should really 
constitute a region per se.  A region could be defined as a geographic area distinct 
from all others in the overlapping territorial surface of the earth.  Many would 
agree that this definition looks rigid.  The main question of contention here is 
whether this rigid definition of region is still relevant in this age and time. Because 
with the continuous quest for internationalisation and the aggressive expansion 
of market access the notion of regionalism as per a fix geographic location 
becomes out-dated.  
The traditional concept of regionalism has been deeply plagued by certain 
underlining features of internationalisation, the expansion of market access and 
globalisation. In this modern era, regionalism constitutes any attempt to restrict 
trade within a specific group of nations, whether in the same region or not, 
through the means of certain arrangements, agreements or treaties.  In contrast, 
the old form of regionalism constituted the liberalisation of trade within a specific 
geographic location.  
As earlier mentioned, regionalisation occurred at a very early stage of 
human existence, due to ignorance and certain physical limitations, such as 
transport infrastructure.  However, regionalisation was never by design, whereas 
regionalism is by design.  Regionalism is a carefully crafted human decision, a 
deliberate process of economic and political integration within a specific 
geographic area.  According to Nieuwkerk, co-operation between countries in 
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specific geographic areas, whether in economic or security matters, is an ambition 
that resonates strongly in the minds of policymakers (Van Nieuwkerk, 2001).  
Two of some of the most important international trade theories that have 
been behind the concept of regionalism are the Ricardian and Heckscher–Ohlin 
models. Clearly, the Ricardian model of comparative cost advantage, states that 
specialisation and trade would benefit all nations. This concept by David Ricardo 
is widely accepted by many scholars. This is partly because David Ricardo based 
his concept on cost, specialisation, production and trade, which are generally 
regarded as very important elements in international trade. While the Heckscher–
Ohlin model is based on a general mathematical equilibrium of specialisation, 
production and trade with special emphases on the availability and use of factors 
of production. Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin of the Stockholm School of 
Economics developed this model to illustrate the fact that specialisation and trade 
would improve the welfare of many nations.  
Nonetheless, the Heckscher–Ohlin model is built on the foundation of 
Ricardo's own model but the main difference between these two models is that 
Heckscher–Ohlin model predicts clear patterns of increased benefits for all 
trading nations, through specialisation, production and trade. (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 1993).   However, these two models would not be explored in detail by this 
research project.  However, it is worth noting that since the year 1930, economists 
and policy-makers have considerably expanded these models to include tariff 
reduction and the elimination of other barriers to trade, in their attempt to 
support the formation and establishment of RTAs (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).  
Basically, some important trade experts hold the opinion that the Anglo-
French trade agreement of 1860 was the very first RTA in this modern era.  This 
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agreement stated that French protective duties were to be reduced to a maximum 
of 25 percent, achievable within five years of the agreement, and it also provided 
for the free entry of all French products except wines into Britain. 
One of the main points of interest about regionalism is that it liberalises 
trade amongst member nations.  It also encourages some sort of economic 
discrimination, through preferential treatments accorded to member states of a 
trading agreement. By allowing stronger internalisation of the gains from trade 
liberalisation, regionalism would likely facilitate free trade than when it was 
highly restricted to a specific geographic location (Winters, 1996).  
Some liberal thinkers, such as Adam Smith have always argued in favour of 
free trade. They believe that any trade agreement which could result in the 
reduction of trade barriers, especially in the form of general tariff reduction or the 
removal of non-tariff barriers would benefit the economies of both developed and 
developing countries.  This concept is based on the philosophy that the reduction 
or total elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers would help to encourage 
trade among member nations to an RTA.  An expanding market for goods and 
services through the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers is an important factor 
in economic development (Kufuor, 2005). 
The continuous evolution of the concept of regionalism within the EU 
context has made regionalism very complex and multi-dimensional in nature. The 
continuously conceptual variance and changing dynamics of regionalism, which 
now involves new-regionalism, inter-regionalism and trans-regionalism has 
created unimaginable difficulties to the WTO in terms of monitoring trade treaties 
and agreements.  These constant conceptual changes have made checking the 
consistency and compatibility of new-regional RTAs with the MST very complex 
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and difficult, because they do seem to overlap the original WTO rule by which 
RTAs are assessed. 
 3.3.1. New Regionalism: 
New-regionalism is a new form of regional cooperation that involves political, 
social and economic integration within a specific territory or region.  The belief in 
new-regionalism was strengthened by the post-cold war, new international 
economic order and certain academic ‘discovery’, which comprises some of the 
benefits of this new form of regionalism. New regionalism is simply a multi-
dimensional form of regional integration that includes economic, political, social, 
and cultural aspects, and in addition involving governments, states and non-state 
actors.  
The focus of new-regionalism appears to be on real political ambition and 
endeavour geared towards the establishment of a regional coherence and identity 
amongst member states of an agreement (Hettne, 2000). Certain RTAs such as 
ECOWAS, the South Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of South East 
Asia Nations (ASEAN), the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) have all tried to remodel their 
agreements and transformed their institutions in one way or another in response 
to pressures from new-regionalism ideology.  Other regional integration schemes 
have made meaningful changes to modernize their institutions to function just like 
institutions of the EU.  This is partly due to the apparent success of the application 
of new-regionalism ideology within the EU project (Kufuor, 2005). 
According to Soderbaum (2003) the term ‘new regionalism’ is now widely 
used in debates all over the world.  He argues that to understand more about what 
is ‘new’ in new regionalism, he suggested that one should be able to differentiate 
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between a variety of partly overlapping and partly competing distinctions and 
meanings of what is really involved in new regionalism.  Furthermore, he 
observed that many scholars and policy-makers simply refer to new regionalism 
as the current wave of regionalism because new regional seems to be always 
evolving. The prevailing school thinking is that new-regionalism gradually 
evolved from old form of regionalism with some fundamental differences and 
changes (Soderbaum, 2003).  
Nonetheless, there are both continuities and similarities between old and 
new regionalism, in such a way that when one studies contemporary regionalism, 
one tends to easily get the feeling of déjà vu.  One of the most fundamental features 
of new-regionalism is that it has worldwide recognition, some likability and it is 
also seen to be trendy.  Therefore, it could be construed that the simple reason 
why this form of regionalism is often labelled as ‘the new regionalism’ maybe 
partly because it does not confine itself only to formal inter-state regional 
organisations and institutions. Instead it includes a whole host of non-state actors 
and other multi-state institutions in its make-up, operation and in its decision-
making.  In new regionalism both state and non-state actors often come together 
in rather informal multi-actor coalitions (Soderbaum, 2003).   
Soderbaum (2003) also suggested that the resurrection and redefinition of 
regionalism are among the dominating trends in our international studies today. 
He defined new-regionalism as a range of formal and informal mid-level 
‘triangular’ relationship among not only states actors but also non-state actors, 
notably civil societies and private companies. He also observed that the 
relationship between these various groups is a central feature of new-regionalism.  
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The supranational aspect of new-regionalism can be vividly observed in the 
expansion, widening and deepening of the economic and political integration 
scheme of the EU.  According to Hay (1966) Supra-nationalism is a political 
quality, rather than a power or a right.  It does not depend on express stipulation, 
but follows from powers and functions accorded an organisation; because supra-
nationalism is a quality, no agreement exist on its attributes.  
Supra-nationalism is one of the main defining features of new-regionalism; 
it is that element which makes new-regionalism very different from the old-
fashioned regional organisations the world was accustom to (Hay, 1966). Supra-
nationalism simply transfers a considerable degree of sovereignty of member 
states to a supra-national organisation.  The EU is a very fine example of a supra-
national organisation. Supra-nationalism in new-regional RTAs could lead to 
monitoring and examination difficulties at the CRTA, due to the size, nature, 
powers and sphere of influence of such organisations. 
3.3.2.  Inter-regionalism:  
Inter-regionalism could be defined as a formal inter-governmental relationship on 
trade and economic issues between two or more regions or regional bodies or 
RTAs.  Inter-regional trade is simply trade between two or more regions or 
regional bodies or RTAs.  The growing influence of inter-regionalism is multi-
dimensional in nature.  It could be identified in the form of economic or political 
relationship between different regional groupings; it could also take the form of 
relationships between regional groupings and a single industrialised nation. 
These two forms of inter-regionalism are the most common in the world.  In 1996 
Europe and Asia formally concluded what could be termed as the very first 
recognisable inter-regional agreement known as the Asia-Europe meeting 
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(ASEM). Rüland, Hänggi and Roloff (2008) and many others have argued that 
ASEM has been one of the main multilateral channels of communication between 
Europe and Asia.  They also suggested that without any formal treaty or 
agreement, ASEM has helped strengthen interaction and mutual understanding 
between Europe and Asia via multi-channel dialogues. 
Rising intra-regional trade, intra-regional investments, production 
networks, banking, financial links, technology transfers, communication, cultural 
and personnel exchanges have all helped to increase regional cohesion, 
connectivity and interdependency among East Asia nations. (Lincoln, 2004)   In 
addition, the emergence, formation and establishment of intra-regional RTAs have 
also helped to reduce the total number of RTAs in existence.  As suggested by 
Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) the EU enlargement also consolidated the 
extensive network of intra-European RTAs built over the years by considerably 
reducing the number of existing agreements within the territory of Europe.  
3.3.3. Trans-regionalism: 
Trans-regionalism could be defined as bilateral trade agreements involving two 
or more countries located in two different geographic regions. The Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a clear example of a trans-regionalism project; 
APEC is made of 21 Pacific Rim countries from various continents. (Aggarwal, 
1998 and Bhagwati, 2008) and others have argued that trans-regionalism could 
truly be a game-changer for the future of traditional RTAs.  
In the present state of things, some authors would prefer to describe RTAs 
simply as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), because RTAs now seemed to 
have clearly moved away from its regional or geographic constraints.  Many RTAs 
nowadays are being concluded between nations in different regions or continents. 
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Lots of RTAs today are not based on the outdated model of early trade agreement 
that was normally concluded mostly by nations that were geographically 
proximate to one another. Some of these RTAs would include preferential or 
bilateral trade agreement between China and the United Kingdom; such 
agreement would be classified as a non-geographic RTA – Meaning such RTAs 
would normally be called trans-regional RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008). 
 It is believed by some that trans-regional RTAs could help ease global 
distribution of goods and services (Bhagwati, 2008). In addition, it is also widely 
believed that trans-regionalism could enable trans-national regulatory coherence 
across a broad spectrum of issues affecting trade and investments; thereby 
facilitating globalisation (Aggarwal, 1998).  It is essential to understand the terms 
of reference of trans-regionalism that it is just an innovation beyond the already 
extensive approach adopted by “normal RTAs” – in terms of geographic proximity 
and location. Trans-regionalism RTAs are our normal RTAs moving away from 
their physical geographic limitation (Bhagwati, 2008).  These new forms of RTAs 
no longer place any importance on the ‘regional’ aspects of our normal RTAs – 
That is the LOCATION aspect. Instead trans-regional RTAs tend to place more 
emphases on a range of trade and trade-related issues than the geographic 
location importance of old fashioned RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Finally, trans-regionalism is a multi-lateralising form of regionalism 
because it tends to untangle the difficulties and limitations placed by “regionalist 
or old fashioned RTAs” that tend to limit the extent and nature of all agreements 
that could be classified Regional. One could say that Trans-regional RTAs are a 
global multi-lateralising innovation and initiatives from the concept of new-
regionalism (Bhagwati, 2008). 
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3.3.4. Regional Economic Integration:  
Regional economic integration could simply be defined as an agreement between 
and among countries in a specific geographic location, which aims at reducing or 
eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade thereby guaranteeing the free 
flow of goods, services and other factors of production within that region.  It could 
also be described as any form of agreement in which countries in a specific 
geographic area, agree to co-ordinate their trade, fiscal, and monetary policies 
together. Currently we have two types of regional economic integration model, 
namely the European and the Asian models. 
As suggested by Sakakibara, Eisuke and Yamakawa (2003), the forces 
behind the processes of regional integration in Europe and East Asia were initially 
very similar, i.e. they were political in nature, but ex-post the implementation and 
outcomes of the process have differed in several ways. Sakakibara, Eisuke and 
Yamakawa (2003) also suggested that the EU model of integration corresponds 
more to the policy-driven model of regional integration arguing that institutions 
and governments have ended up guiding the process, as the number of regional 
institutions and regional agreements shows.   
Furthermore, Sakakibara, Eisuke and Yamakawa (2003) also argued that 
the East Asian model of regional economic integration, better fits the market-
driven integration process scheme. They suggested that the market and 
corporations-driven process in East Asia has been encouraged by the 
development of both regional and global cross-border production networks and 
that intra-industry trade in parts and components and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) conducted by corporations; and encouraged by significant liberalisation, 
have been, and continue to be, the key driving forces of the established 
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production-sharing scheme, of the Asian subcontinent (Sakakibara, Eisuke and 
Yamakawa, 2003).  The difference in between these two models could impact on 
the MTS and multilateral trade negotiations in different ways from the two 
continents. 
3.4. The General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT): 
The general agreement on tariff and trade came into existence in the year 1947 
and was amended in 1994. It all started with the desire for some allied nations to 
improve trade, increase economic prosperity and open access to restricted 
markets immediately after the Second World War. This urge led to meetings and 
negotiations for the creation of international organisations to foster cooperation 
promote and regulate trade among them.  
One such international organisation of significances at the time the GATT 
was being negotiated was the international trade organisation (ITO).  Because of 
the United States of America refusal to sign the treaty intended for the creation of 
the ITO, the meeting for the creation of the ITO failed.  Because of the failure of the 
meeting’s main objective, which was the creation and establishment of the ITO, 
some participants of the negotiation were ready to look at other options.  
Accepting that an ITO could not be created and established as intended, 
negotiating nations decided to go into a contract to reduce tariff barriers, to 
liberalise trade as a result, GATT came into existence through the ashes of the ITO 
charter. 
Furthermore, once the GATT treaty was agreed upon and accepted, it 
became an international trade treaty.  The GATT is generally referred to as the 
GATT treaty. The opening section of the GATT 1947 treaty stipulated that the 
Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the 
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United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the Republic of Chile, the Republic 
of China, the Republic of Cuba, the Czechoslovak Republic, the French Republic, 
India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, the Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the 
Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and the United States of America: Recognising that their relations in the field of 
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the 
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods, 
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and 
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory 
treatment in international commerce (The GATT 1947 treaty). 
Although the GATT treaty was amended in 1994; however, it is often and 
correctly referred to as GATT 1947, since it was first contracted in the year 1947.  
GATT is a treaty, founded and entered into by CONTRACTING PARTIES. One of its 
most important Articles is GATT Article 1, it states that:  Any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted to any Contracting Party to products originating in 
or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
unconditionally to the like product originating or destined for the territory of all 
other CONTRACTING PARTIES (Pomfret, 1997). GATT Article 1 created an 
unconditional principle of non-discrimination.  This was coined as the most 
favoured nation (MFN) clause. The wording of GATT Article 1 is very relevant for 
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this work because it gave rise to the establishment of RTAs, and their notification 
to the WTO and examination at the CRTA. 
3.5.  The Text of Article XXIV of GATT 1994: 
1. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs 
territories of the CONTRACTING PARTIES and to any other customs territories in 
respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being 
applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional 
Application. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the 
territorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a 
Contracting Parting; Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be 
construed to create any rights or obligations as between two or more customs 
territories in respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article 
XXVI or is being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of 
Provisional Application by a single Contracting Party.  
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood to 
mean any territory with respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations of 
commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory with 
other territories.  
3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent: 
(a.) Advantages accorded by any Contracting Party to adjacent countries with the 
intention to facilitate frontier traffic; 
(b.) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste by 
countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such advantages are not in 
conflict with the Treaties of Peace arising out of the Second World War.  
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4. The contracting parties recognise the desirability of increasing freedom of trade 
by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between 
the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognise 
that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other CONTRACTING PARTIES with such territories. 
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the 
territories of CONTRACTING PARTIES, the formation of a customs union or of a 
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area; Provided that: 
(a.) With respect to a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to a 
formation of a customs union, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of any such union or interim agreement in respect of 
trade with CONTRACTING PARTIES not parties to such union or agreement shall 
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior 
to the formation of such union or the adoption of such interim agreement, as the 
case may be; 
(b.) With respect to a free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the 
formation of a free trade area, the duties and other regulations of commerce 
maintained in each of the constituent territories and applicable at the formation 
of such free-trade area or the adoption of such interim agreement to the trade of 
CONTRACTING PARTIES not included in such area or not parties to such 
agreement shall not be higher or more restrictive than the corresponding duties 
and other regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories 
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prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement as the case may 
be; and 
(c.) Any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall include 
a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs union or of such a free-
trade area within a reasonable length of time. 
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5a, CONTRACTING PARTIES 
proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article 
II, the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for 
compensatory adjustment, due account shall be taken of the compensation 
already afforded by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the 
other constituents of the union. 
7. (a.) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade 
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or area, 
shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to 
them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them 
to make such reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may 
deem appropriate. 
(b.) If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim 
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties to that 
agreement and taking due account of the information made available in 
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph (a.), the CONTRACTING PARTIES 
find that such agreement is not likely to result in the formation of a customs union 
or of a free-trade area within the period contemplated by the parties to the 
agreement or that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement. The 
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parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may seem, such agreement 
if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recommendations. 
(c.) Any substantial change in the plan or schedule referred to in paragraph 5c 
shall be communicated to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, which may request the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES concerned to consult with them if the change seems 
likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation of the customs union or of the 
free-trade area.  
8. (a.)     A customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single 
customs territory for two or more customs territories, so that  
(i.)     duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, where 
necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX are 
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in 
products originating in such territories, and, 
(ii.)     subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the union to 
the trade of territories not included in the union;  
(b.) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs 
territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce 
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and 
XX) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent 
territories in products originating in such territories.  
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article shall not be affected by the 
formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area but may be eliminated or 
adjusted by means of negotiations with CONTRACTING PARTIES affected. This 
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procedure of negotiations with affected CONTRACTING PARTIES shall, in specific 
situations apply for the elimination of preferences required to conform with the 
provisions of paragraph 8a, (i) and paragraph 8b. 
10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority approve proposals, 
which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 9 inclusive, 
provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free-
trade area in the sense of this Article. 
11. Taking into consideration the exceptional circumstances arising out of the 
establishment of India and Pakistan as independent States and recognising the 
fact that they have long constituted an economic unit, the contracting parties agree 
that the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from 
negotiating special arrangements with respect to the trade between them, 
pending the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis. 
12. Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the 
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories. 
3.6. The Text of GATS Article V: Economic Integration: 
1.This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to or 
entering into an agreement liberalising trade in services between or among the 
parties to such an agreement, provided that such an agreement: 
(a.) has substantial sectoral coverage (1), and 
(b.) provides for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in 
the sense subparagraph (a), through: 
 (i) elimination of existing discriminatory measures, and/or  
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 (ii)  prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures, either at the entry into 
force of that agreement or based on a reasonable time frame, except for measures 
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIV and XIV bis.2.   In evaluating whether the 
conditions under paragraph 1b are met, consideration may be given to the 
relationship of the agreement to a wider process of economic integration or trade 
liberalisation among the countries concerned. 
3.(a.) Where developing countries are parties to an agreement of the type 
referred to in paragraph 1, flexibility shall be provided for regarding the 
conditions set out in paragraph 1, with specific reference to subparagraph (b) 
thereof, in accordance with the level of development of the countries concerned, 
both overall and in individual sectors and subsectors. 
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph 6, in the case of an agreement of the type referred 
to in paragraph 1 involving only developing countries, more favourable treatment 
may be granted to juridical persons owned or controlled by natural persons of the 
parties to such an agreement. 
4. Any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be designed to facilitate trade 
between the parties to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member 
outside the agreement raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services within 
the respective sectors or subsectors compared to the level applicable prior to such 
an agreement. 
5. If, in the conclusion, enlargement or any significant modification of any 
agreement under paragraph 1, a Member intends to withdraw or modify a specific 
commitment inconsistently with the terms and conditions set out in its Schedule, 
it shall provide at least 90days advance-notice of such modification or withdrawal 
and the procedure set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Article XXI shall apply. 
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6.  A service supplier of any other Member that is a juridical person constituted 
under the laws of a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 1 shall be 
entitled to treatment granted under such agreement, provide it engages in 
substantive business operations in the territory of the parties to such agreement. 
7. (a.) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
shall promptly notify any such agreement and any enlargement or any significant 
modification of that agreement to the Council for Trade in Services. They shall also 
make available to the Council such relevant information as may be requested by 
it. The Council may establish a working party to examine such an agreement or 
enlargement or modification of that agreement and to report to the Council on its 
consistency with this Article. 
(b.) Members which are parties to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 
which is implemented based on a time-frame shall report periodically to the 
Council for Trade in Services on its implementation. The Council may establish a 
working party to examine such reports if it deems such a Working Party necessary. 
(c.) Based on the reports of the working parties referred to in subparagraphs (a) 
and (b), the Council may make recommendations to the parties as it deems 
appropriate. 
8. A Member which is a party to any agreement referred to in paragraph 1 may 
not seek compensation for trade benefits that may accrue to any other Member 
from such agreement.  
3.6.1. GATS Article V: Labour Markets Integration Agreements:  
This Agreement shall not prevent any of its Members from being a party to an 
agreement establishing full integration. 
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(2.) of the labour markets between or among the parties to such an agreement, 
provided that such an agreement: (a.) exempts citizens of parties to the agreement 
from requirements concerning residency and work permits; (b.) is notified to the 
Council for Trade in Services. 
3.7. The Understanding on the Interpretation of GATT 1994, Article XXIV: 
WTO members having regard to the provisions of Article XXIV of GATT 1994, 
recognising that customs unions and free trade areas have greatly increased in 
number and importance since the establishment of GATT 1947 and that today it 
covers a significant proportion of world trade; Recognised the contribution to the 
expansion of world trade that may be made by closer integration between the 
economies of the parties to such agreements; Recognising also that such 
contribution is increased if the elimination between the constituent territories of 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all trade, and 
diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded; Reaffirming that the purpose 
of such agreements should be to facilitate trade between the constituent 
territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other Members with such 
territories; and that in their formation or enlargement the parties to them should 
to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse effects on the trade of other 
Members; Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of 
the Council for Trade in Goods in reviewing agreements notified under Article 
XXIV, by clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or 
enlarged agreements, and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV 
agreements; Recognising the need for a common understanding of the obligations 
of Members under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV; Agreed as follows: Customs 
unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the formation of a 
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customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article XXIV, must 
satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6,7 and 8 of Article XXIV. 
3.7.1. Article XXIV: Paragraph 5: 
The evaluation under paragraphs 5 of Article XXIV of the general incidence of the 
duties and other regulations of commerce applicable before and after the 
formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges be based upon 
an overall assessment of weighted average tariff rates and of customs duties 
collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previous 
representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line basis 
and in values and quantities, broken down by WTO country of origin. The 
Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff rates and customs duties 
collected in accordance with the methodology used in the assessment of tariff 
offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.  For this purpose, 
the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the applied rates of 
duty.  It is recognised that for the purposes of the overall assessment of the 
incidence of other regulations of commerce for which quantification and 
aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations, 
product’s covered and trade flows affected may be required.  The “reasonable 
length of time” referred to in paragraphs 5 (C) of Article XXIV, should exceed 10 
years only in exceptional cases.  In cases where Members parties to an interim 
agreement believe that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide a full 
explanation to the CTG of the need for a longer period.  
3.7.2. GATT Article XXIV: Paragraph 6: 
Paragraphs 6 of GATT Article XXIV establishes the procedure to be followed when 
a Member forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of duty.   
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In this regard, Members reaffirm that the procedure set forth in GATT Article 
XXVIII as elaborated in the guidelines adopted on 10 November 1980 and in the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 must be 
commenced before tariff concessions are modified or withdrawn upon the 
formation of a customs union or an interim agreement leading to the formation of 
a customs union. These negotiations will be concluded in good faith with a view to 
achieving mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations, 
as required by paragraphs 6 of Article XXIV, due account shall be taken of 
reductions of duties on the same tariff line made by other constituents of the 
customs union upon its formation.  Should such reductions not be sufficient to 
provide the necessary compensatory adjustment, the customs union would offer 
compensation, which may take the form of reductions of duties on other tariff 
lines. Such an offer shall be taken into consideration by the Members having 
negotiating rights in the binding being modified or withdrawn.  Should the 
compensatory adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations should be 
continued; Where, despite such efforts, agreement in negotiations on 
compensatory adjustment under Article XXVII, as elaborated by the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of GATT 1994 cannot be 
reached within a reasonable period from the initiation of negotiations, the 
customs union shall, nevertheless, be free to modify or withdraw the concessions; 
affected Members shall then be free to withdraw substantially equivalent 
concessions in accordance with Article XXVIII.  GATT 1994 imposes no obligation 
on Members benefiting from a reduction of duties consequent upon the formation 
of a customs union, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of a customs 
union, to provide compensatory adjustment to its constituents.  
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3.7.3. GATT Article XXIV: Paragraph 7:  
(a.) “Any contracting party … shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES” 
At its 44th Session on 13 October 2006, the Committee on RTAs adopted a common 
and simplified notification format for regional trade agreements, and agreed to 
recommend it to the relevant bodies. The Council for Trade in Goods adopted such 
format at its meeting of 19 March 2007. As of 30 September 2011, 502 regional 
trade agreements (RTAs), counting goods and services notifications separately, 
had been notified to the GATT/WTO; 310 of which were in force by that same date.  
These figures correspond to 388 integrated RTAs (goods and services together), 
of which 209 remained in force by that same date.  Of the RTAs in force, 184 were 
notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or GATT 1994; 35 under the 
Enabling Clause and 91 under Article V of the GATS. (Appendix, 4) 
 3.8. The Ambiguities of Article XXIV of GATT 1994:  
Some of the major reasons that have been raised for the rapid proliferation of 
RTAs across the globe have been the systemic issues emanating from the 
interpretations of GATT Article XXIV.   The wording of GATT Article XXIV seems to 
have created lots of legal loopholes and ambiguity in its interpretation, leading to 
the formation and establishment of RTAs that are incompatible to the MTS, and in 
addition leading to the entering into-force of RTAs that do not conform to WTO 
rules (Bhagwati, 2008).  The confusion created by the ambiguity in the text of 
GATT Article XXIV makes it practically impossible for the CRTA to produce 
acceptable multilateral reports on the compatibility of RTAs under examination.  
And the CRTA cannot also prove with legal certainty that RTAs entered into-force 
conforms to WTO rules, under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV.  Even if the 
CRTA process is amended or reformed, the wording of GATT 1994, Article XXIV 
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would still present a formidable problem to the smooth functioning of the CRTA. 
And in addition, the respect and adherence to the CRTA’s recommendations to 
member states seeking to form RTAs as required by the WTO would still be in 
jeopardy. 
For any RTA to be compatible to the MST and in addition conforms to WTO 
rules under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, it must at least fulfil two 
requirements of GATT Article XXIV. The first being the nations must comply with 
the impact of the RTA they are seeking to establish to third party countries not 
members to the trade arrangement. Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XXIV suggested 
that this impact must be acceptable. The second requirement is that the internal 
liberalisation process within the territory of the RTA (Paragraph 8 of GATT Article 
XXIV).   
However, the purpose of these requirements by the GATT/WTO was to 
ensure that only RTAs which are not considered to be detrimental to third party 
nations and which would not practice protectionism within the territory of the 
RTAs are to be allowed to enter into-force.  Because the text of GATT Article XXIV 
itself seemed very ambiguous, it has created varying interpretations leading 
situations not previously intended by the founding fathers of the GATT treaty. The 
formation t of RTAs that are incompatible to the MTS or inconsistent with GATT 
Article XXIV seem very damaging to the global trading system (Bhagwati, 2008). 
The work of the CRTA has been seriously hindered by the interpretation 
accorded to GATT Article XXIV by WTO members in the formation of RTAs.  The 
extent of the exemptions granted to WTO members by the provisions of GATT 
Article XXIV, 5, has been a point of argument in the CRTA.  One of the problems 
regarding the interpretation of the text of GATT Article XXIV is that it does not 
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seem clear enough to some nations who are members of the WTO and represented 
at the CRTA.  It is not really clear how many of the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, 
5, are applicable only to Article I’s MFN clause or to other provisions of the GATT 
in as much as there is no violation of the rights of third parties in the formation of 
an RTA.  However, it seems GATT Article XXIV gives ample rights to WTO members 
to by-pass GATT/WTO rules in the formation of RTAs, provided the rights of third 
parties are taken care of.  
 In 1997, the representatives of Korea at the CRTA suggested that the 
drafters of GATT 1947 treaty envisaged the express legal contravention of all 
obligations under the GATT treaty, in matters relating to the formation of RTAs, 
not just that of the MFN Clause. Similarly, to the expression of the Korean 
representatives, the EC representative also alleged that the wording contained 
under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV,5, which states that the provisions of 
this agreement shall not prevent the formation of RTAs grants absolute exemption 
to all GATT provisions regarding the formation of RTAs.  
Furthermore, the EC representative also suggested that from their 
interpretation of the wording of GATT Article XXIV, it uniquely meant that RTAs 
that are properly formed are, therefore, exempt from all provisions under the 
GATT.  For example, in the Turkey-Textile case the issue of what is really exempt 
in the RTA arrangement came up in full-force and was addressed by both the Panel 
and the Appellate Body. However, the Panel was of the view that the invocation of 
the provisions of GATT Article XXIV to legitimise a GATT incompatible measure 
taken by a WTO member other than a departure from the MFN clause is 
unacceptable and not consistent with WTO rules.  But this ruling was later 
challenged and thrown out by the Appellate Body, in its declaration that GATT 
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Article XXIV clearly justifies inconsistencies with other provisions under the GATT 
treaty. 
Nonetheless, in the US–Wheat Gluten case of 2001, the Appellate Body 
reaffirmed the extended interpretation of GATT Article XXIV. In its ruling, it stated 
that: they understand that Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 may provide a defence 
to a claim of violation of the GATT 1994, and may also provide a defence to a claim 
of inconsistency with a provision of another covered agreement, if it is somehow 
incorporated into that provision or agreement (US–Wheat Gluten case, 2001).  
The problems arising from the decision of the Appellate Body on these 
cases, creates enormous difficulties in terms of a consensus on a unique 
interpretation of GATT 1994, Article XXIV. This does not help the work of the CRTA 
in any way, regarding the surveillance and monitoring of RTAs by the WTO; since 
the CRTA is mainly mandated to examine RTAs and in addition to assess their 
conformity to GATT Article XXIV, 5 and 8, and their compatibility with the MTS. 
The broadness of this interpretation is significant, because the CRTA is not 
mandated to test other areas, such as RTAs’ conformity to all GATT Articles.  
However, certain protectionist measures against third parties, such as 
quantitative restrictions (QRs) could be slipped in by WTO members under the 
pretext of RTAs or the formation of RTAs. In addition, RTAs could only be formed 
when WTO members decide to invoke the exemption to the MFN clause in their 
dealings with one another. There is no other principle or clause that permits the 
violation of WTO rules by member states of the WTO other than GATT Article I 
(Bhagwati, 2008). The wording under the provisions of GATTT Article XXIV, 5, 
which contains the ambiguous phrase reads: ‘shall not prevent’ has been 
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interpreted variously as giving express permission to member states of the WTO 
to breach all GATT provisions in their quest to form RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008). 
However, others have suggested that this phrase simply means that no 
GATT provision can prevent the formation of RTAs.  This makes the position of the 
CRTA irrelevant, in terms of multilateral surveillance, monitoring and 
examination of RTAs to ascertain their conformity to GATT Article XXIV.  This also 
renders the compatibility assessment of RTAs to the MTS almost impossible to 
carry out because these two requirements put together certainly goes beyond the 
mandate of the CRTA.  This is one of the main reasons why we have the 
proliferation of some incompatible and inconsistent RTAs in existence within the 
MTS today (Bhagwati, 2008). 
In practice, the CRTA should have been the committee to scrutinize all 
RTAs and make the appropriate recommendations that should be introduced into 
RTAs formed through the invocation of GATT/WTO provisions, which goes 
beyond the exemption of GATT Article I. For the role of the CRTA to be effective 
and relevant, WTO members seeking to establish RTAs or intending to introduce 
new measures into existing RTAs should present a submission of the proposed 
measures to the CRTA for approval and recommendation. 
The WTO could also expand the mandate of the CRTA to include every 
aspect of multilateral monitoring and surveillance of RTAs.  Because even if RTAs 
have been approved by the CRTA and recommendations are issued to member 
states, they could still implement measures that do not conform to GATT Article 
XXIV, if the RTAs are not properly monitored by the CRTA and if no reports are 
made by third parties affected by these measures (Bhagwati, 2008). It should be 
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mandatory for WTO members to implement recommendations from the CRTA on 
notified RTAs, before they are entered into-force.    
In principles, the CRTA could stick to a tight procedure that could make it 
mandatory for all measures necessary for the formation of RTAs to be introduced 
at the beginning of the formation process, before notification to the WTO to enable 
the CRTA to scrutinize these measures during its examination process.  Therefore, 
the CRTA should be given the mandate to test the overall compatibility and 
suitability of RTAs to the MTS before the RTAs are entered into-force. The CRTA 
should also be able to check the overall conformity of RTAs to GATT/WTO rules 
before they are issued with any recommendations. If this vast mandate were to be 
put in place, it would be plausible for WTO members to adhere to the authority of 
the CRTA when forming RTAs.  
3.9. Conclusion:  
With the use of qualitative research methodology, this chapter has studied the World 
Trading System, the concept of regionalisation, regionalism and new-regionalism. It 
has also looked at Regional Economic integration, GATT/WTO rules, provisions, 
procedures applicable for the formation and establishment of RTAs, the text of GATT 
Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  
This chapter has highlighted some of the differences between law and 
practice and in addition explored the implications of these divergences as per 
GATT/WTO rules and provisions for the formation of RTAs. It studied the impact of 
the GATT Treaty on the world trading system and on the role of the CRTA and 
explored events leading to the creation of the GATT treaty. In addition, it looked at 
the ambiguities of GATT Article XXIV, its impact and consequences on the role of the 
CRTA.   
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What has been learnt from this chapter is that the GATT treaty created the platform 
for WTO members to legally and comfortably establish RTAs – Thus leading to the 
proliferation of RTAs in our trading system. And this seems to have helped in 
undermining the importance of multilateral trade negotiations. And because of some 
of the ambiguities of the GATT and its legal loopholes the role of the CTRA in the 
examination of RTAs was also undermined, giving rise to the proliferation RTAs in 
our trading system.  
Finally, one could say today that RTAs are now a global phenomenon and this 
situation was facilitated via the GATT treaty. Although the GATT treaty might have 
impacted positively on the MTS by liberalising trade through multiple RTAs, 
however, it might have also had a negative impact via the proliferation of some 
incompatible and unsuitable RTAs. Nonetheless, further research is still needed in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER 4.  
4.1. Introduction: 
This chapter explores the origin, nature, functions and importance of the Most 
Favoured Nation (MFN) principle. It seeks to answer the research question: How 
does the MFN clause affects the formation of RTAs and their examination at the 
CRTA? Furthermore, it studies the exceptions of the MFN principle, Article XXIV of 
GATT 1994, Article V of GATS 1994 and MFN Exemptions. It also looks at the 
formation of RTAs and abuse of WTO exemptions from which RTAs are formed. In 
addition, it studies the Transparency Mechanism for RTAs, legal obligations under 
the Transparency Mechanism and discusses the distinctions between interim 
agreements and full-RTAs, and the requirement for the notification of interim 
agreements.  
 
4.2. The Most Favoured Nations (MFN) Clause:  
The negotiations that led to the establishment of the GATT 1947 treaty were 
strongly influenced by First and Second World War experiences. Originally, these 
negotiations were concluded towards the creation of an International Trade 
organisation (ITO). But since negotiating countries were unable to ratify the ITO 
charter, the negotiations led to the establishment of the GATT 1947 treaty 
(Bhagwati, 2008).  
One of the main purpose of the GATT 1947 treaty was to provide a legal 
framework for multilateral trade negotiations and a means to foster non-
discriminatory trade among allied nations. The cornerstone of the GATT 1947 
treaty was the extension of the MFN clause to all signatories to international trade 
agreement under the auspices of the GATT/WTO. As a result, the GATT 1947 
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treaty and WTO membership guaranteed MFN treatment for its entire members. 
In a nutshell, the MFN treatment together with the principle of national treatment, 
are the true cornerstones of the GATT/WTO and world trade law.  
MFN clause in international trade simply means that any tariff concession 
or reduction agreed by member states of the WTO would automatically apply to 
all other member states, even though those members were not involved in the 
negotiations. The MFN treatment is simply the principle of non-discrimination in 
matters of trade between nations. The bottom-line here is very clear, the fact is 
that all WTO member states must be treated equally in matters of international 
trade among each other. For instance, if Country A, a member of the WTO succeeds 
in negotiating a 45% customs duty reduction with country B, it would 
automatically apply to all other member states of the WTO. That is what the MFN 
really means in simple terms (Bhagwati, 2008). 
During the GATT days, despite the commitment to unconditional MFN 
treatment, the GATT did not totally exclude all discriminatory trade policies. 
These exceptions illustrate the practical difficulties in legislating against such 
measures (Bhagwati, 2008). The exceptions to the MFN treatment allows for 
preferential treatment towards trade agreements with or between developing 
nations, such as CUs and FTAs. It is due to these exceptions that the MFN became 
the main underlying principle by which nations began negotiating various types 
of RTAs. According to Pomfret, the exception to the unconditional nature of MFN 
treatment was created on British insistence. This was done through the insertion 
of a ‘grand-father’ clause into the GATT treaty, permitting the continuation of 
existing preferential arrangements (Bhagwati, 2008). 
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Some of the major difficulties faced by allied nations after the Second World War 
led many policy-makers to put faith in economic and political integration, as the 
most reliable pathway towards economic prosperity. Crawford and Fiorentino 
(2005) suggested that RTAs were being embraced by many WTO member nations 
as trade policy instruments and at best as complementary to the MFN clause. They 
also argued that economic considerations were only one facet of the complex RTAs 
strategies being pursued by individual countries or groups of countries. These 
strategies often include broader foreign policy objectives, with specific interest on 
security and political matters. They also argued that the proliferation of RTAs 
presents WTO Members and the MTS with so many challenges.  
In addition, Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) also identified that RTAs 
presents WTO members with certain opportunities that could be carefully 
explored for the benefits of RTA members. Interestingly, no matter how trade 
diverting RTAs are presumed to be for third parties, the functions and importance 
of the MFN clause to the world trade arena cannot be underestimated. In fact, the 
MFN clause and its exceptions have played very important roles in the negotiation, 
formation and establishment of the various RTAs in existence – Thus contributing 
enormously to the development of the MTS and the desire towards the 
establishment of global free trade. 
4.3. Functions and Importance of the MFN Clause: 
The nature and implication of the most MFN clause in the negotiation and 
establishment of RTAs in our present multilateral trade system comprising more 
than 100 countries is very complex.  In considering policies relating to RTAs and 
the multilateral trade system the MFN clause becomes a most important factor. 
Due to the sheer number of nations who are going to benefit from a specific 
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negotiating process even if they are not party to it as prescribed by the MFN, 
specifically in Article 1 of GATT, this creates the problem of free riders (Jackson, 
1983 and 1989). The main function of the MFN was to reduce discrimination 
among trading nations to facilitate trade by reducing trading cost for all through 
the elimination of tariffs and other trading barriers (Jackson, 1983). 
The MFN clause has multiple functions and one of the principles behind the 
crafting of this clause is that it would help to foster trade in the most multilateral 
way possible. Nonetheless, in a very specific fashion the multilateral trade 
arrangement and agreement of GATT/WTO also allows for exceptions to the MFN 
clause in specific circumstances. One of the main provisions granting exception to 
the MFN clause is found in Article XXIV of the GATT treaty. The provisions of this 
article give rise to the formation and establishment of RTAs, if the trading bloc 
meets all the requirements of the article (Jackson, 1989).  
As a matter of fact, the basic notion behind the exception to the MFN clause 
was the promotion and expansion of free trade within the territories of an FTA or 
CUs, which in turn could help the development of the MTS. The principle covering 
this concept of RTA in the multilateral trading arrangements of the GATT/WTO is 
that if tariffs and other trading barriers are reduced or eliminated on ‘substantially 
all the trade’, this would be a clear means of testing the notion of multilateral free 
trade in a specific territory. And if this works very well, just like a pilot scheme in 
trading arrangements, it could be expanded to incorporate many other territories. 
Looking at the probability of arriving at multilateral free trade through the 
exception to the MFN clause, one could now say that the main purpose of this 
exception might have been trade creation rather than trade diversion as some 
authors have also argued (Bradsher, 1992 and Jackson, 1969 &1989). 
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4.4. The Exceptions to the MFN Principle: 
As per the GATT treaty member nations of the WTO can freely setup RTAs, while 
respecting WTO rules and provisions. Nonetheless, in certain conditions WTO 
members could invoke a waiver. There are conditional exceptions, which 
Members could invoke when departing from their MFN commitments. These 
conditions are contained in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, the understanding on 
the interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994, Enabling Clause and GATS 
Article V (Bhagwati, 2008). 
The Enabling Clause was introduced by a decision of the Contracting 
Parties to the GATT in 1979 to allow for preferential conditions for RTAs involving 
only developing countries. It exempts such RTAs from the stipulations contained 
in Article XXIV of the GATT for regular RTAs, such as procedural prerequisites and 
reciprocity of preferences. (Bhagwati, 2008) Thus, while approximately three 
quarters of the RTAs in force are FTAs and less than ten per cent are customs 
unions, the remainder are made up of these partial scope arrangements.  
(Bhagwati, 2008) 
However, when concluding an RTA, a WTO member should invoke one of 
the above provisions and comply with the necessary conditions or seek a waiver. 
As a matter of fact, the Doha Ministerial Declaration of the 14th of November 2001, 
made two references in relation to RTAs. First, the declaration recognised the 
WTO as the unique forum for global trade rule making and trade liberalisation. 
Secondly it acknowledged RTAs’ role in trade liberalisation and development.  
During this ministerial meeting, there was a call for further negotiations that 
would clarify and improve WTO rules and procedures on RTAs. However, it was 
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agreed that the WTO rules and procedures should take into consideration 
developmental aspects of RTAs within member nations (Bhagwati, 2008). 
As earlier mentioned, one of the key features in the formation of RTAs is the 
exception to the principle of the MFN clause. For the creation of RTAs this 
exception is very important. It seems the principles of transparency and 
predictability of RTAs apparently make RTAs an integral part of the MTS. The legal 
framework for the creation of an RTA, under the WTO rules is provided in these 
provisions: 
• Article XXIV of GATT 1994. (Paragraphs 4 to 11 - RTAs entered into by 
WTO-members).  
• GATS Article V (RTAs involving agreements on trade in services). 
• The enabling clause of 1979:  
However, in relation to the Enabling Clause, it is only developing countries that 
are authorised by the WTO to make use of its provisions, because the Enabling 
Clause is an exception to the MFN clause. This exception to the MFN clause was 
granted to developing countries by the WTO, towards trade liberalisation. 
(Enabling Clause RTAs are not subject to the CRTA process, as a result, they will 
not be considered by this work) 
4.4.1. Article XXIV of GATT 1994 and the MFN Clause: 
Studying the GATT treaty carefully, one will discover that Article XXIV is an 
exception to the MFN principle contained in article I of the GATT treaty.  As earlier 
mention in this work, according to the MFN principle "any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity" granted by any CONTRACTING PARTIES to any product 
originating from other CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be extended to like products 
originating from other CONTRACTING PARTIES. From this interpretation, the 
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MFN principle of the GATT/WTO system is the mechanism for multilateralisation 
of bilateral preferences among CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT/WTO 
(Bhagwati, 2008). 
However, it is GATT Article XXIV that prevents this multilateralisation from 
operating in such a circumscribed setting. There are specific conditions posed by 
GATT Article XXIV for the formation of RTAs. One of the major aims of Paragraph 
4 of the GATT Article XXIV is to facilitate trade between the constituent territories 
and not to raise barriers to the trade of other CONTRACTING PARTIES with such 
territories. Jacob Viner also highlighted and supported the general functions of 
Paragraph 4 of GATT Article XXIV, with the request that the trade creating effects 
of RTAs should prevail over the trade diverting effects of RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008).  
As earlier mentioned in chapter 3 of this work, Article XXIV of GATT 1994 
regulates two types of trade agreements: CUs and FTAs. The provisions of 
Paragraph 4 of GATT Article XXIV is to ensure that the agreement will enable and 
facilitate trade, instead of generating increased trade barriers. That the purpose 
for the formation of CUs or FTAs; must not be to restrict trade against third party 
countries, who are not part of the agreement. It states further that the 
establishment of FTAs should enable free trade in large number of products. 
However, it also requires that in the establishment of a CU, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES should develop a common trading policy among themselves (Bhagwati, 
2008).  
Furthermore, in paragraph 5 and 3 of Article XXIV, there is a plan and 
schedule for interim agreements for the duration of up to 10 years (this is treated 
in detail in this chapter under the heading - Interim Agreements). As stipulated in 
Article 1 of GATT, the MFN clause states that all member states of the GATT/WTO 
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should and must be treated equally. In this case, there should be a level playing 
field for all; and in circumstances where WTO-members are willing to establish 
CUs, they maybe in breach of the MFN restriction. An obligation they might have 
agreed upon at the time they joined the WTO. In such cases, negotiations with 
those countries with initial negotiating right (INR) would be re-conducted to 
achieve compensatory adjustments (Bhagwati, 2008).  
Looking at the preferential nature of RTAs through the MFN clause, Frankel 
(1997), suggested that the principal objectives in the drafting of the customs union 
and free trade areas provisions became to tie down, in the most precise legal 
language possible, the conditions that such regional groupings would have to fulfil 
to escape prohibition under the MFN clause. It seems that in drafting GATT Article 
XXIV, the position of DCs were some–how taken into consideration in matters 
relating to RTAs formation. This consideration might have been directly or 
indirectly put in place for the protection of the economies of DCs from more 
developed economies.  
It seems the exception to the MFN clause is one of the main factors that are 
encouraging the formation and proliferation of RTAs, since the MFN clause is re-
enforced by the principles of national treatment of GATT Article III. However, the 
principle of national treatment provides protection from discrimination in 
relation to the MFN clause, by preventing countries from taking advantage of the 
MFN principle, to discriminate against products from a third-party country. As 
suggested by Frankel (1997), the phrase MFN causes considerable confusion. He 
suggested that some WTO members think that the phrase means, they could 
choose whom to favour, in trade deals. 
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Basically, one of the main reasons for the proliferation of RTAs among DCs is that 
they are negotiated under the principles of reciprocity. Practically, both sides to a 
RTA are supposed to be under similar degree of obligations. Nonetheless, in most 
RTAs concluded on a North–South basis, developing country partners often tend 
to lose their preferential privileges of non-reciprocity that are normally accorded 
to them, even under the WTO system. Paragraph 8 of GATT Article III stipulates 
that any newly concluded agreement requires that all customs duties and other 
restrictive trade regulations, be eliminated on ‘substantially all the trade’ (this will 
be treated in detail in chapter 6).  
The terminology of ‘substantially all the trade’ seemed to have been put to 
test, in the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
the EU and African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. During negotiations, the 
EU negotiators thought the term ‘substantially all the trade’, meant 90% of trade. 
But ACP negotiators thought it meant 60% of trade. This discrepancy in 
interpretation shows how the principle of reciprocity is of paramount importance 
to DCs (Crawford, and Fiorentino, 2005). Such variation in interpretation tends to 
highlight certain confusion arising from the wording of most WTO Articles 
(Crawford, and Fiorentino, 2005). 
 In relation to Rule of Origin (ROO), there is no direct mention of it in GATT 
Article XXIV. But according to Pushe (2000), ROO could be inferred from 
paragraph 5 of the Articles that deals with other regulation of commerce. The crux 
of the matter is that DCs place a lot of importance on ROO, since it gives exclusive 
rights to products originating within a specific region in terms of the 
establishment of RTAs. The application of ROO could be clearly seen in regional 
integration schemes such as ECOWAS. The absence of ROO in some RTAs could 
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make them unnecessary and lacking in adequate economic benefits (Mathis, 
2002).    
The use of ROO rules in RTAs has not yet proven to be in contradiction to 
WTO rules. It should be noted that the phenomenon of the proliferation of RTAs 
has resulted in a bewildering ‘spaghetti bowl’ of crisscrossing bilateral tariff rates 
and complicated the ROO rules, concerning the trans-shipment of non-members’ 
products through some member countries territory (Baldwin, 2006).  As 
suggested by Crawford and Fiorentino (2005), RTAs are traditionally established 
between so-called “natural” trading partners. This means geographically 
proximate countries. Generally, these countries already have well-established 
trading patterns with one another. These RTAs include RTAs between countries 
such as Australia and New Zealand, NAFTA, the EU and CEFTA (Bhagwati, 2008). 
With such RTAs, their examination at the CRTA will not pose a serious problem in 
terms of coverage (Crawford and Fiorentino, 2005). 
4.4.2. GATS Article V and MFN Exemptions: 
The basic MFN obligation as contained under Article II of the GATS is applicable in 
principle to all services sectors. In fact, Article II:1 of GATS states: "With respect 
to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord 
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and 
service suppliers of any other country". However, the probability avoiding the 
MFN rule via a wholesale sectorial exclusion of certain service sector from GATS 
emerged during the Uruguay Round, to rectify this situation limited exemptions 
to the MFN clause were permitted under the GATS. MFN exemptions could be 
defined as deviations from the MFN principle (Bhagwati, 2008). 
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Nonetheless, such exemptions would have to be in accordance with the provisions 
of GATS Article II:2, which states: "A Member may maintain a measure 
inconsistent with paragraph 1 provided that such a measure is listed in, and meets 
the conditions of the Annex of Article II Exemptions". The Annex of Article II 
Exemptions, provides for new exemptions to be listed only at the end of 
negotiations, when agreements have been finalised by WTO members (Adlung, 
2003). 
GATS Article II Exemptions lists approximately 400 MFN exemptions in its 
Annex. The Annex on GATS Article II Exemptions specifies the condition that are 
exempt from obligations under paragraph 1 of GATS Article II, such as, "in 
principle, such exemptions should not exceed a period of 10 years", or "in any 
event, they shall be subject to negotiation in subsequent trade-liberalizing 
rounds". The MFN principle is one of the core fundamental principles of the 
GATT/WTO and it is also considered as one of the most important elements in 
trade liberalization in the multilateral framework (Mathis, 2002). 
However, apart from services specified in individual MFN exemption lists 
contained in GATS Article II Exemptions lists, the only GATT/WTO permitted 
deviation from the principle of the MFN is covered under the formation of RTAs 
contained in GATS Article V, provisions for Economic Integration (found in 
chapter 3 of this work). It seems the provisions of GATS Article V are fashioned 
based on the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, because GATS Article V,1, permits 
any GATT/WTO member to conclude further agreements for liberalization of 
trade in services with other member nations, provided such agreements has 
‘substantial sectoral coverage’ that helps in the elimination of discrimination in 
trade in services. GATS Article V,2 also recognizes the need to open and expand 
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the market for trade in services for the aim of economic integration (Baldwin, 
2006).    
It seems the drafting of the provisions of GATS Article V, helped in the 
improvement of the interpretation of the equivalent provisions contained in GATT 
Article XXIV, in that the terms such as ‘substantial sectorial coverage’ was more 
carefully defined under GATS Article V. This is because GATS Article V tends to 
disqualify agreements that exclude any of the four modes of supply. While some 
other provisions are just carried from GATT Article XXIV to GATS V with little 
changes; For example, GATS Article V,4, states that: any RTA entered into-force 
must be designed to help trade among its members, and must not result in the 
increase in additional or total barriers in trade in services for third parties 
(Adlung, 2003).  
The provisions under GATS Article V:5 stipulates that `there must be 
negotiations to provide for appropriate compensations for third parties, in a 
situation where the formation and entry into-force of an RTA or it subsequent 
enlargement leads to withdrawal of commitments to third parties. While the 
provisions of GATS Article V,8, explains that third parties will be awarded benefits 
accruing from an RTA. In addition, the provisions of GATS Article V,7, creates a 
transparency obligation, in which GATT/WTO members to an RTA are required to 
promptly notify the WTO of its formation and any significant modification of the 
RTA or subsequent enlargement. As per these provisions NAFTA, the European 
Communities and their member states are some of the agreements which have be 
notified to the WTO (Baldwin, 2006). 
Furthermore, in studying the usage of the MFN exemptions based on the 
World Bank classification and statistics on developed and developing countries, 
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one discovers that developed countries that account for 36% of the WTO members 
have registered 47% of MFN exemptions, while developing countries with 53% of 
the total number of WTO membership have registered approximately 45% of the 
MFN exemptions. This shows that the usage of the MFN exemption is much higher 
amongst developed nations than developing countries who make-up the bulk of 
WTO membership.  As per the role of the CRTA in the examination of RTA with 
substantial sector coverage, these exemptions create additional difficulties, in 
terms of conformity to GATS rules (Adlung, 2003). 
4.5. Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs):  
As earlier mentioned, most RTAs are established between so-called “natural” 
trading partners, which are geographically contiguous nations, with already well 
established trading patterns. But nowadays, different forms of RTAs are found in 
every continent. Among the best known are the EU, the EFTA, NAFTA, the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) (Bhagwati, 2008). 
It is important to distinguish between different types of trade agreements 
that are contained under the broad heading of RTAs. One must consider the fact 
that bilateral trade agreements, trade agreements involving more than two 
countries and preferential trade agreements are all various forms of trade 
agreements that are classified under RTAs. Many scholars such as Crawford and 
Fiorentino (2005) argued that RTAs are now a major part of our everyday life and 
perhaps an irreversible feature of our today’s MTS. This is partly because there 
are so many different trade agreements negotiated under GATT Article XXIV that 
could be classified as RTAs. However, only two types of such trade agreements 
 105 
negotiated through GATT Article XXIV, falls under the prescribed norms of RTAs 
accepted by the WTO. These two trade agreements are free trade areas (FTAs) and 
customs unions (CUs). These also include interim trade agreements leading to the 
formation of both (Bhagwati, 2008).  
Both FTAs and CUs require the elimination of ‘substantially all trade’ 
barriers between member nations.   Nonetheless, in an FTA, each member nation 
is free to determine its own trade relationship with third parties. A good example 
of an FTA is NAFTA, where members such as the United States of America (US), 
Canada, and Mexico were permitted to retain their own tariff rates for the rest of 
the world, while eliminating duties and other trading barriers amongst 
themselves (Bhagwati, 2008). Basically, all CUs are FTAs, but not all FTAs are CUs. 
The singular clear difference between CUs and FTAs is that with CUs a common 
external tariff is agreed between its members in relation to third parties to the 
trade agreement (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001).  
Crawford and Fiorentino (2005) suggested that under the existing WTO 
provisions on RTAs, the proliferation of preferential agreements between 
developed and developing countries, poses the latter with the formidable 
challenge of transition from non-reciprocal trade preferences to trade 
liberalisation on a mutual basis, under reciprocal RTAs with developed country 
partners. A clear case one could point at is the current negotiations for Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific group of countries (ACP) that are supposed to replace the existing non-
reciprocal preferences of the Cotonou Agreement (Bhagwati, 2008).  
GATT/WTO records shows that since the early 1990s, the number of RTAs 
concluded or being negotiated has greatly increased. There have been some 421 
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RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO up to December 2008. This includes 324 RTAs 
notified under Article XXIV of the GATT 1947 or 1994 and 29 notified under the 
Enabling Clause, while 68 RTAs were notified under Article V, of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services. The mandate of the CRTA under the auspices of 
the GATT/WTO committee system is to examine these RTAs and ascertain their 
conformity to GATT/WTO rules and compatibility to the MTS. 
4.5.1. Requirements for RTAs and their Complications: 
WTO rules and requirements through which RTAs are formed and established are 
expressly found in the provisions of GATT Article XXIV and are very complex in 
their interpretations (Jackson, 1969).  In fact, one can easily identify four 
significant rules from this article which could be classified as follows: the very first 
being ‘substantially all the trade’ requirement; the ‘not-on-the-whole-higher’ rule, 
a requirement for customs unions; the interim agreement plan and schedule rule; 
and last but not the least the rule governing notification and decision of the 
GATT/WTO (Jackson, 1993) 
The rule of ‘substantially all the trade’ requirement is clearly identifiable in 
the description of the various entities that are permitted by the GATT treaty to 
have recourse to the exceptions to Article XXIV of the GATT. Indeed, this exception 
to the MFN clause is reserved for customs unions and free trade areas. This 
exception to the MFN clause forms the basis by which RTAs are created and 
established.  The issue of importance here is that in the forming and establishment 
of an RTA, the nations involved in this process agree through this arrangement to 
eliminate tariffs and other trading barriers in relation ‘substantially all the trade’ 
in the whole territory of the customs unions and free trade areas.  
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However, the rationale behind this rule is that if tariffs and other trading barriers 
are eliminated on substantially all the trade in the territory of the RTA, the 
advantage that would accrue from this rule is a free trade element. And it would 
be more beneficial to the MTS or far outweigh the disadvantages from the use of 
the exception to the MFN clause. However, Jackson (1993) suggested that the 
phrase ‘substantially all’ is profoundly troublesome and ambiguous. And 
suggested that the wording ‘eliminate’ (in terms of tariffs and other trading 
barriers) is apparently vague and problematic in the context of GATT Article XXIV. 
The ‘not on the whole higher’ rule, a requirement for CUs, this is so because 
of certain CUs that do not only eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade 
between member states. But instead creates a common external trade regulatory 
system in relation to imports from third party countries. In this situation, there is 
the requirement from GATT Article XXIV, which prevents the regulations, duties 
and even tariffs of the common external regulatory system not to be ‘on-the-
whole’, higher than the previous ones before the customs union was formed 
Jackson (1993).  
Furthermore, Jackson (1993) also suggested that there is the additional 
requirement that the regulations and duties of the common external system shall 
‘not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the 
duties and regulations’ applicable prior to the formation of the union. The 
ambiguity in the wordings of this provision or rule is troublesome as Jackson also 
suggested. He nonetheless suggested that some have argued that the new union 
essentially needs to only ‘net in’ the different advantages and disadvantages 
available to third parties from the formation of the union to fulfil this rule. 
Meaning the parties involved in the RTA, just need to square things up to meet this 
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requirement; in as much as the whole changes to the common external regulatory 
system, involving regulations and duties are not indeed ‘on-the-whole’ higher than 
the previous ones. It would mean the parties have in fact complied with the rule 
(Jackson, 1993). 
From GATT Article XXIV it is clear that the benefit from the invocation of 
the exceptions to the MFN clause does not only applies just to FTAs or CUs but also 
to ‘interim agreements’ leading the formation of both. The reasoning behind this 
provision of the GATT hinges on the fact that before a RTA is formed there must 
be a considerable lapse of time. This interim or transitional period gives room for 
adjustment to the agreement to be made by the parties involved. As per GATT 
1994, the wording on interim agreement states that interim agreement shall: 
include a plan and schedule for the formation of agreements such as CUs or FTAs 
within a reasonable length of time. The definition of what exactly constitutes a 
reasonable length of time could differ from person to person for different reasons.  
So therefore, a uniform interpretation of the wordings of this requirement would 
be troublesome (Jackson, 1993). 
The rule governing notification of RTAs and decision of the GATT/WTO is 
based on the procedural requirements derived from GATT 1994, Article XXIV. 
These rules require the notification of new RTAs to the GATT/WTO. In fact, 
Paragraph 7a of GATT Article XXIV states that any Contracting Party deciding to 
enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agreement leading to 
the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and shall make available to them such information regarding the 
proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and 
recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate. 
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And furthermore, Paragraph 7b of GATT Article XXIV, which is really our point of 
interest here states if, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an 
interim agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not 
likely to result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area within 
the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or that such period is not 
a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall make recommendations to 
the parties to the agreement. The parties shall not maintain or put into-force, such 
agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these 
recommendations. 
The general interpretation of this specific paragraph of this article is that 
once an RTA has been notified to the GATT/WTO, unless recommendations are 
made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES or the CRTA, the RTA can be put into-force. 
Often this has been the case with the GATT/WTO in relation to the many RTAs in 
existence. Jackson (1993) suggested that before the creation of the CRTA in 1996 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the GATT treaty have never been able to agree on 
any set of recommendations on notified RTAs. Therefore, it means that there are 
some RTAs in operation that do not fully comply with the provisions of GATT 
Article XXIV. And such RTAs would certainly be detrimental to the development 
of the MTS, because of non-compliance to GATT/WTO rules and requirements 
Jackson (1993). 
In addition, to these rules and requirements for the formation of RTAs, 
there still exist some other contentious areas in terms of the wordings, 
interpretation and application of GATT Article XXIV.  In relation to the formation 
of RTAs, the interpretation behind the ‘Rule of Origin’ (ROO) is still one major 
point of confusion. ROO concerns the determination of the origin of goods, which 
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are to be traded in the territory of the regional bloc. This rule all depends very 
much on the territory of origin of the goods or where they are produced. ROO as 
it is, has be crafted to favour goods and components produced within the territory 
of the regional bloc. In any case the application of the ROO in the formation and 
establishment of RTAs, poses serious disadvantage to goods originating from third 
party territories. Jackson (1993) also suggested that ROO could be very damaging 
to the trade of third parties, if the rules are designed to strongly favour products 
and parts manufactured within the preferential area.  He also suggested that 
neither the wordings of the GATT treaty nor even the wordings of GATT Article 
XXIV dealt seriously with this important question patterning to the nature of ROO 
(Jackson, 1993). 
With all the efforts made towards free trade and the establishment of an 
MTS that would benefit all and sundry, there still exist lots of motivations for the 
formation of RTAs. This is partly because of the ambiguity of the GATT treaty, and 
the complex nature of GATT Article XXIV, through which RTAs are formed. It has 
been noted by several authors, such as Jackson that certain trade policy laws and 
the GATT/WTO rules are not clearly worded (Jackson, 1993).   
Jackson (1993) also suggested that there often arise varying 
interpretations from many rules and laws found within the GATT treaty, because 
of the apparent ambiguity in the language that has been used in their wordings. 
For instance, Jackson (1993) pointed at some areas of potential difficulties such as 
in the application of safeguard or escape clause. He acknowledged that a 
preferential agreement could give preference to its members in matters 
concerning the escape clause. Noting that this is correct because members of a 
regional bloc are supposed to be treated as a single trading unit. Considering the 
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situation of the rules governing the unfair trade practices, such as anti-dumping 
and countervailing duties, Jackson admitted that there is now the practice of 
tolerating RTAs, which do not eliminate such unfair trade practices between 
member states (Jackson, 1993).  
4.5.2. The Formation of RTAs and Abuse of WTO Exemptions: 
RTAs are normally negotiated and formed under certain exemptions to WTO rules 
and provisions (these are the exemptions under GATT Article XXIV that covers 
RTAs in trade in goods). But the abuse of these exemptions to WTO rule and their 
provisions for the formation of RTAs has led to the proliferation of RTAs globally. 
So, addressing this abuse of the exemptions to WTO rules and their provisions has 
been a constant problem to the Director-General of the WTO. The suggestion is 
that the mechanism put in place to ensure that RTAs are compatible to the MTS 
were proving ineffective and raising lots of concerns to WTO governance. This also 
alludes to the suggestion that mechanisms such as the CTRA, established for the 
examination of RTAs were not working well as expected or were inadequate.  
Bhagwati (2008) argues that mechanisms such as the CRTA employed by the 
WTO, were not effective enough to assure a reasonable degree of compatibility 
and consistency between RTAs and the MTS. 
Investigations into how the exemption to the fundamental MFN clause 
came to be under the GATT 1947 treaty reveals a power struggle between two 
hegemonic groups. Policymakers and trade negotiators of the United States of 
America (USA) and the economic powerhouses of Europe, who were in a 
desperate struggle with each other to obtain the best trade deals possible at the 
time. During these negotiations, the focus of Europe and Japan, during the time of 
the drafting of the 1947 GATT treaty was reconstruction and development. This 
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was because of the destructions they sustained in their territories from the Second 
World War. So, European countries and Japan were very much interested in the 
principle of reciprocity – where similar concession would be granted to each 
nation as required (Keohane, 1989). But the USA was very much in favour of the 
MFN. By so doing, it accepted its exemptions in the negotiations and establishment 
of bilateral trade agreements – RTAs (Mansfield and Milner, 1999). 
The formation and proliferation of RTAs have generally been based on the 
provisions stipulated in the GATT treaty. That is the exception to the MFN clause. 
This exception allows member nations of GATT/WTO to be parties to RTAs. Schiff 
& Winters, (2003) suggested that the exemption to the MFN clause regarding 
RTAs, such as FTAs and CUs was accepted in the GATT treaty to make GATT more 
attractive to some countries. However, the loose manner by which the GATT treaty 
is interrelated prompted Feketekuty (2000) to suggest that it would be beneficial 
to WTO member nations, if GATS Article V were redrafted.   
Keohane, (1989) suggested that the reciprocity element within the GATT is 
not very attractive to all member states. Suggesting that to balance things up the 
exemption to the MFN was permitted by GATT Contracting Parties, to give 
member states an opportunity to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreement 
amongst themselves (Keohane, 1989). By so doing, GATT Article XXIV was made 
a balancing mechanism between the MFN and the principle of reciprocity 
(Keohane, 1989).  This apparent appeasement created the loopholes from which 
some many RTAs have now been formed. In effect, threatening the very existence 
of the multilateral system that created these legal loopholes (Keohane, 1989).  
May be the drafters of the GATT 1947 treaty would not have envisaged the 
damage that the exemption to the MFN clause could have caused the MTS through 
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the proliferation of RTAs. Since it seems some GATT/WTO members apparently 
considered the provisions of GATT Article XXIV as a license for the formation of 
RTAs (Keohane, 1989). This article appears to represent a facilitator in the 
formation of all sorts of RTAs. It is embossing to see that over 300 RTAs are 
existence in our world today (Crawford & Laird, 2001). This figure more than 
double the number of WTO members, considering that the WTO has only 146 
member nations (Crawford & Laird, 2001).  The founding fathers of the GATT 
treaty would not have tolerated such an exception, if they had any knowledge of 
the threat that it could pose in future to the MTS. However, the intended exception 
is now become the norm in our trading system. It is no secret that RTAs have 
eventually become a vital threat to the successful establishment of a viable MTS 
(Baldwin, 2006). 
The preference of some nations nowadays is new-regionalism RTAs rather 
than multilateral trade agreements of the WTO. Even the apparent non-conclusion 
of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has given currency to the assertion that 
RTAs are more beneficial for the short-term needs of many nations than 
multilateral trade negotiation. This is because some multilateral trade 
negotiations could take more than a decade to conclude. In this light, it seems 
correct because many RTAs are negotiated and concluded more quickly than 
multilateral trade deals (Baldwin, 2006). 
 Moreover, the move from the old system of RTAs to the new-regionalism-
RTAs has created extra benefits for members, thereby leading to more nations 
participating in the formation of RTAs. Some nations who previously seem hostile 
towards the formation of RTA are now cashing in on RTAs, especially on new-
regional RTAs, which are not confined to specific geographic locations (Ethier, 
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1998). However, RTAs have always been among natural trading partners or 
nations that are geographically proximate to one another, such as the countries of 
Europe, or the countries of Africa, or RTAs among Asian countries or a RTA 
between Australia and New Zealand; these are normal traditional RTAs than a 
bilateral agreement concluded between ten African countries, four Latin American 
countries and China (Ethier, 1998). 
Furthermore, the emergence of mega-bloc RTAs, comprising nations of 
different continents has made RTAs even more attractive than ever before. 
Nowadays even ardent supporters of the MTS have turned into advocates of RTAs. 
Almost all nations of the world now want to tap the benefits accruing from these 
new-regionalism mega-bloc RTAs. Since, these RTAs seem rather more 
multilateral than bilateral in nature. This is partly because these RTAs involve so 
many different countries across the globe (Baldwin, 1995). The Euro-
Mediterranean FTA is a very good example of such mega-bloc RTAs, with lots of 
attractive benefits. Such RTAs may pose a real and recognisable threat to the 
success of an MTS under the auspices of the WTO (Bhagwati, 2008).  
In addition, several other RTAs are being negotiated and established on an 
inter-RTAs arrangement. Some of these complex negotiated RTAs turn to create 
new RTAs from already existing ones. Thereby creating a spaghetti bowl of RTAs 
across the globe (Baldwin, 2006). Generally, it would not be wrong to say that we 
are not only entering an era of new-regionalism RTAs, but an era of new-
regionalism with the conglomeration and merger of RTAs, across multiple regions. 
This phenomenon of conglomeration or merger of RTAs seems rather to be 
approaching very steadily. Because of the confusing nature of the evolution of 
these RTA mergers, many policymakers have not yet been able to sound their 
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opinions on this very situation as it engulfs the globe. One reason being that many 
contenders think this very phenomenon could help foster multilateral trade 
negotiations. Believing that inter-regional RTAs arrangements could help bring a 
faster establishment of the MTS. Through a steady reduction of the total number 
of regional and bilateral trade agreements, which have been proliferated all over 
the globe. Some of the best examples of these inter-regional RTAs include among 
others the CARICOM-CACM, ACP-EU and SACU-SADC inter-regional RTAs (Bilal & 
Van Hove, 2002).  
It is very necessary nowadays to take a closer look at the provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV that has led to the formation of many of the RTAs in the world 
today. In principle, GATT Article XXIV allows for the formation of two distinct 
RTAs. Namely Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs) (Bhagwati, 
2008).  
However, it is worth noting that it is in section 8 of GATT Article XXIV that 
the WTO specify the provision for the formation of FTAs and CUs, and interim 
agreements leading to the formation and establishment of either of them. The 
most important factor or element in the formation of FTAs or CUs is that there 
would be the elimination of substantially all trading barriers between member 
states. Since FTAs and CUs are easily and very quickly negotiated, they represent 
very attractive alternatives to multilateral trade negotiations. And they also 
present recognisable threats to the success and survival of the MTS (Bhagwati, 
1993). 
RTAs that are compatibility to MTS could be very important to the smooth 
functioning of international trade and global business (Bhagwati, 2008). One of 
the main reasons the CTRA is so vital for the establishment and smooth running 
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of the MTS is that some RTAs in existence do not actually meet the requisite 
requirements of the WTO provisions through which RTAs are formed, although 
member nations must have evoked the provision contained in section 8 of GATT 
Article XXIV for the formation of these RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008). Most of the tariff 
reduction they apply does not always meet the prescribed provision of 
‘substantially all trade’ requirement of GATT Article XXIV (Crawford and Laird, 
2001). It seems that just the slightest compliance to this requirement is often 
considered as sufficient by some WTO members forming such RTAs (Crawford 
and Laird, 2001). 
This research believes that if the work of the CRTA was robustly carried 
out and the examination of RTAs at the CRTA was truly effective, unsuitable RTAs 
might have been censured to effectively meet higher degree of the requirements 
of the provisions of GATT Article XXIV (Crawford and Laird, 2001). However, as it 
is right now, many developing countries are willing to bypass compliance of WTO 
rules in relation to the principle of reciprocity by simply invoking the Enabling 
Clause rule. 
Furthermore, the need for faster negotiations towards the formation of 
RTAs, have encouraged many developing countries to use the Enabling Clause rule 
in a manner that was never envisaged by the founding fathers of the GATT treaty 
(Majluf, 2004). The number of RTAs formed while invoking the provisions of the 
Enabling Clause could constitute abuse of the WTO system. It would be interesting 
to recall that the true purpose GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES put the Enabling 
Clause into the GATT treaty in 1979 was to allow for the existence of preferential 
practices on RTAs involving only developing countries. The reason for the 
allowance of this preferential condition was to help speed up development in 
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developing countries that were in serious need of development after their 
independence struggles.  
The Enabling Clause rule is an exemption from the requirement contained 
in the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, which applies to regular RTAs. 
Furthermore, almost three quarters of all the RTAs in existence or in-force today 
are FTAs; only about ten percent of them are CUs, whilst the rest fall under the 
Enabling Clause rule. However, almost all the RTAs falling under the Enable Clause 
provision are classified technically as ‘partial scope arrangements’, since they do 
not cover so much trade as other regular RTAs (Bhagwati, 1991). 
It seems the wordings of the GATT 1947 treaty encouraged WTO members 
who naturally trade amongst themselves to congregate and form closer trading 
ties with one another. This in effect seems to portray the fact that the GATT treaty 
showed considerable support for regionalism. When one studies the wordings of 
GATT Article XXIV, one would discover that the text itself recommends 
regionalism as a progressive means for trade liberalisation. The GATT 1994 states 
that the CONTRACTING PARTIES recognise the desirability of increasing freedom 
of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration 
between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements (The Text of 
GATT, 1994).  
However, the abuse of the exemptions to WTO provisions for the formation 
of RTAs is bad. But this does not actually make regionalism a bad concept amongst 
other things, because there are certainly lots of economic benefits accruing from 
regionalism that could be beneficial to CONTRACTING PARTIES involved in RTAs. 
The problem here is that the unchecked proliferation of RTAs is a threat to the 
MTS, which the WTO aims to establish for the benefit of all members (Bhagwati, 
 118 
1991). Nonetheless, the founding fathers of the GATT 1947 treaty might not have 
envisaged that RTAs could become a bad concept. There seems to have been a 
general belief that regionalism could help to foster or enhance the MTS (Robson, 
1993). This undoubtedly could have been the case, if RTAs entered into-force did 
not tend to increase trading barriers to third parties (Bhagwati, 1991). 
Practically, the WTO favours the MTS, instead of RTAs, because the MTS is 
a more comprehensive way of eliminating substantially all trade barriers for all 
WTO members than RTAs. Thereby adhering to the principle of non-
discrimination in matters of trade between member nations of the WTO 
(Bhagwati, 1991). Economically speaking the MTS might be able to guarantee the 
passing to individual consumers the advantages derived from international trade 
principle of comparative cost advantage, through lower prices for goods and 
services, if distorting trading barriers and tariffs are finally eliminated (Bhagwati, 
2008). 
Nonetheless, with the MTS and without any sort of protectionist 
mechanism, such as quotas, tariffs and even other trading barriers, it seems some 
firms would be able to reduce their cost of production considerably (Bhagwati, 
2008). This reduction of cost could lead to efficiency in all sectors of the economy, 
thereby leading to lower prices for goods and services and a marked improvement 
in welfare for all citizens of trading nations (Panagariya and Krishna, 2002). This 
is one of the main reasons advocated by staunch supporters of free trade and the 
MTS. Many argue that free trade and the MTS would benefit all trade nations and 
improve the wellbeing, and welfare of citizens of all trading nations (Panagariya 
and Krishna, 2002). 
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Bhagwati (2008) suggested that free trade and the MTS could offer more to 
nations than RTAs, in terms of trade liberalisation. Clearly, the wording of the 
preamble of the GATT 1947 treaty reads thus, “...relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world 
and expanding the production and exchange of goods etc.” (GATT, 1947, p1). 
The stipulation of the preamble of GATT 1947 treaty constitutes a clear 
proof that the GATT Contracting Parties were ready to allow any form of RTAs that 
could enhance the MTS. This enhancement was envisaged to occur through 
maximizing the effective use of available resources, increase in trade and job 
creation. Because of the facilitation of exchange of goods and services, the 
wellbeing of most citizens in all trading nations will improve. And without raising 
tariffs and other barriers to trade for third parties to a regional bloc, there would 
be a general reduction in the cost of trade. This could lead to a marked 
improvement in the global economy through increases in the volume of trade 
(Panagariya and Krishna, 2002). 
Viner (1950) categorisation of RTAs as either trade creation or diversion 
looks very much simplistic. Because in terms of the sophisticated, complicated and 
challenging effects of the proliferation of RTAs to the MTS Viner (1950) 
categorisation seems too basic in nature. In fact, seeking to only determine if RTAs 
are trade creating or trade diverting in nature could only turn to simplify the long 
run damaging effects to the MTS that could result from the formation, 
establishment and proliferation of RTAs. The advantages accruing from RTAs are 
very clear. Especially, the advantages RTAs avail to its members in the short term. 
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However, in the long run, the general and global impact resulting from the 
proliferation of RTAs is tremendous. In practice, a new RTA could lead only to 
more RTAs being created by other nations who are also party to other existing 
RTAs. In effect creating the Spaghetti Bowl effect propounded by Bhagwati in 
1995, with no real or comprehensive economic benefits (Bhagwati, 1995).  
Some of the negative effect of a trade diverting RTAs could be effectively 
construed from Jacob Viner’s prediction, in which he stated emphatically that 
situations could occur: “...where the trade-diverting effect is predominant, one at 
least of the member countries is bound to be injured, the two combined will suffer 
a net injury, and there will be injury to the outside world at large” (Viner, 1950, 
p2). This shows that it is clearly impossible to determine the degree of damage to 
the MTS that could be caused by such trade diverting RTAs. Since these RTAs are 
many in number and since they are very easy to form, their impact on the MTS 
could be unimaginable (Viner, 1950). 
Some contenders have also argued that Viner’s interpretation of the effects 
and consequences of the proliferation of RTAs, whether they are trade creating or 
diverting, provides a better critical and analytical outcome than many recent 
interpretations of the impact resulting from the abuse of the exemptions of GATT 
Article XXIV. Viner’s analysis confirms the fact that RTAs do not necessarily 
liberalise trade (Bhagwati, 2008).  But they could help minimise certain difficulties 
to trade within a short term, by eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade 
within a specific region. Affirming the notion that in a situation where RTAs are 
rapidly formed without compliance to WTO rules, this would constitute an abuse 
of the exemptions to WTO rules permitting the formation of PTAs (Bhagwati, 
2008). 
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Like Summers (1991), Baldwin (1997) also suggested that the reduction of tariffs 
and other trade barriers through the formation of RTAs could trigger a positive 
domino effect on trade. They argued that this could in return force an effective 
reduction of tariffs and other trading barriers by third parties to the RTA. 
Therefore, the resulting impact would be the cancellation of any probable negative 
effect of trade diversion through the formation of that specific RTA Baldwin 
(1997). In effect, Baldwin was suggesting that RTAs could indirectly act as building 
blocks to the MTS.  He also acknowledges that there is always a natural reaction 
to the formation of RTAs by third party nations, which are not party to the RTA in 
question (Ethier, 1998). However, if this is clearly the case, this might in fact 
eliminate the negative consequences resulting from the formation of trade 
diverting RTAs and Baldwin (1997) suggested that this is plausible in real life.  
However, the perception is that the formation of some RTAs could results 
in a general reduction or even elimination of tariffs and other trade barriers in 
third party countries, in line with the reduction of tariffs and other trading 
barriers in the territories of the RTA nations (Lawrence, 1999). As a result, one 
can confidently say Baldwin (1997), Summers (1991), Lawrence (1999), Ethier 
(1998) and others like them with the similar views consider RTAs not only as 
building blocks but also as part of the process of multilateral trade liberalisation 
and one of the main mechanisms towards the establishment of an effective MTS 
(Krueger, 1999). 
Although, Viner’s (1950) Thesis seems very clear, elaborate and plausible 
in its presentation, however, not many authors agree with his assertions. Authors 
such as Summers (1991) and Lawrence (1999) belittle Viner’s assertion 
concerning RTAs that are trade diverting. They suggested that if trade diversion 
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through the formation of RTAs, it would constitute a side of effect of RTAs. And 
that this could be very well compensated through the general effect of a 
comprehensive elimination of tariffs and other trading barriers within the 
territory of the RTA (Summers, 1991).  
Furthermore, Summers (1991) suggested that all RTAs help to enhance the 
MTS, no matter their make-up. Summers also argued that in as much as RTAs help 
in eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade, they should be considered 
generally as MTS enhancing, no matter whether they are bilateral or multilateral 
in nature. Summers and many others like him holding such views, constitute the 
group who consider RTAs as building blocks to the MTS (Summers, 1991).  
However, others have also argued that the existence of so many RTAs 
within the MTS does not make RTAs a progressive instrument or building blocks 
of the MTS (Krueger, 1999). Rather, RTAs seem more like stumbling blocks to the 
MTS because no matter how RTAs are, they do not create the urgency needed for 
the conclusion of multilateral trade negotiations. Instead RTAs seems to have 
helped in slowing down multilateral trade negotiations. This could have been 
partly because some parties to RTAs apparently feel that they are benefiting from 
what it offers (Krueger, 1999). The continuous abuse of WTO provisions through 
which RTAs are formed constitutes a significant threat to the establishment of the 
MTS (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Nonetheless, there is lack of consensus on the overall economic impact of 
RTAs on the MTS (Bhagwati, 2008). The debate on whether RTAs are building 
blocks or stumbling blocks of the MTS, falls short of a clear assessment as to the 
true nature of the positive or negative impact exerted on the MTS by the existence 
of RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008).  Although some contenders have argued that RTAs 
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seem to exert considerable negative impact on the efforts made towards the 
establishment of the MTS, however, others do not consider this argument a big 
issue. 
 If RTAs were only exerting positive impacts on the MTS, no concern would 
have ever been raised about them (Bhagwati, 2008). Since there are some tangible 
concerns regarding the compatibility of some RTAs with the MTS, one could 
conclude that RTAs might be a problematic global instrument towards the 
establishment of the MTS. As a result, the move towards the establishment of an 
effective MTS, might need the refining of some RTAs via the CRTA process 
(Bhagwati, 2008). 
4.6. Interim Agreements: 
Although GATT Article XXIV made mention of interim agreements, however, the 
legal principles under GATT rules does not give rise to other forms of regional 
integrations. In a nutshell, interim agreements are not a separate form of legal 
RTAs from fully-fledged-RTAs (an FTA or CUs), but they are simply a pathway to 
full-RTAs. These are agreements leading to the formation of full-RTAs or which 
should lead to the formation of full-RTAs in the end of the transitional period, 
usually 10 years.  
In practice, it is hard for any integration initiative to become fully 
operational from the very beginning, in most cases, transitional agreements 
leading to the formation of RTAs are initially put in place to cover harmonisation 
and adaption phases – Thus interim agreements as they are conventionally known 
by GATT/WTO (Bhagwati, 2008).  
The problem with interim agreements is that they could sometimes last for 
a very long period of time, thus becoming a discriminatory preferential trade 
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agreements in their own rights. To avoid this dilemma, GATT article XXIV requires 
any interim agreement to be formed with a plan and schedule leading to the 
formation of a fully-fledged RTA within a reasonable time. This period should not 
exceed 10 years from the date of the commencement of the interim agreement, 
only in exceptional circumstances should an interim agreement exceed 10 years 
(Majluf, 2004).  
However, some have argued that because the GATT treaty was drafted just 
immediately after the Second World it did not take into consideration further 
forms of regional integration at the time. That GATT rules did not address other 
forms of integration because higher forms of integration at the time were 
unforeseeable (Majluf, 2004).  
4.6.1. The Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 1994:  
The Interpretation of GATT Article XXIV provides that CUs, FTAs, and interim 
agreements leading to the formation of both shall be consistent with GATT 1994, 
Article XXIV and must satisfy, inter alia, the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8 
(Majluf, 2004). 
Following the review of CUs and FTAs by WTO members, all notifications 
made under paragraph 7(a) of GATT Article XXIV shall be examined by a working 
party in the light of the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 and of paragraph 1 of 
the Understanding on RTAs. The working parties shall submit a report to the 
Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) on its findings in this regard. The CTG may make 
such recommendations to members as it deems appropriate (Bhagwati, 2008). 
In relation to interim agreements, the working party may in its report make 
appropriate recommendations on the proposed time frame and on measures 
required to complete the formation of the customs union or free-trade area. It 
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may, if necessary, provide for further review of the agreement. Furthermore, 
member nations who are parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial 
changes in the plan and schedule included in that agreement to the CTG and, if so 
requested, the Council shall examine the changes (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Furthermore, should an interim agreement, which have been notified under 
Paragraph 7a of GATT Article XXIV not include a plan and schedule, contrary to 
Paragraph 5c of GATT Article XXIV the working party shall in its report 
recommend such a plan and schedule. The parties shall not maintain or put into 
force, such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with 
these recommendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review of the 
implementation of the recommendations (Majluf, 2004). CUs and FTAs shall 
report periodically to the CTG, as envisaged by the Contracting Parties of GATT 
1947 and any significant changes and/or developments in the agreements should 
be reported to the CTG as they occur (Majluf, 2004). 
Under GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V or the Enabling Clause, WTO 
members participating in new negotiations aimed at the formation of RTAs shall 
endeavour to inform the WTO. In addition, WTO members who are parties to 
newly formed RTAs shall convey to the WTO information on the RTAs, including 
its official name, scope and date of signature, any foreseen timetable for its entry 
into-force or provisional application, relevant contact points and/or website 
addresses, and any other relevant unrestricted information. This information 
should be forwarded to the WTO Secretariat, which will post it on the WTO 
website and periodically provide WTO members with a synopsis of the 
communications received (Bhagwati, 2008). 
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4.6.2. Transparency Mechanism for RTAs:  
As mentioned earlier, there were significant changes at the WTO on the 
notification and examination of RTAs and interim agreements when the CRTA was 
established in 1996. The CRTA took over all the functions previously performed 
by an ad hoc working party model. However, because of the ineffectiveness of the 
CRTA, a decision on the ‘Transparency Mechanism for RTAs was taken on the 14th 
of December 2006, by the GATT/WTO General Council. And this resulted in the 
substantial revision of the work of the CRTA. However, the Transparency 
mechanism did not distinguish between interim agreements leading to the 
formation of full-RTAs and a fully-fledge RTA (Bhagwati, 2008). 
This new transparency mechanism was negotiated in the Negotiating 
Group on Rules, it provided for early announcements of RTAs and notification to 
the WTO. Therefore, members to RTAs were henceforth expected to consider the 
notified of the RTAs based on a factual presentation by the WTO Secretariat. The 
aim of the transparency mechanism was to retrieve information on the formation 
of RTAs and on the historical background information on the CRTA. In fact, only 
RTAs falling under GATT Article XXIV) and GATS Article V were to be considered 
by the CRTA (Bhagwati, 2008). 
RTAs falling under the Enabling Clause of 1979, which are preferential 
trade arrangements on goods between DCs were to be considered and regulated 
by the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD). However, non-reciprocal 
preferential agreements involving selected developing and developed countries, 
require WTO members to seek a waiver from WTO rules. Among the best-known 
examples of such agreements are the US-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act 
and the Cotonou Agreement recently signed by the EC and the ACP countries to 
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replace the Lomé Convention (Bhagwati, 2008). At the time this research was 
being conducted, the waiver initiative was still under consideration at the WTO. 
Notwithstanding, it was also decided that the transparency mechanism 
would be implemented on a provisional basis, however, members were to review 
it and if necessary modify the decision; and replace it with a permanent 
mechanism that maybe adopted as part of the overall results of the Doha Rounds. 
However, members agreed to begin the review of the Transparency Mechanism 
for RTAs as required by the General Council Decision, with a view to making it 
permanent.  This was based on two proposals put forward by the United States 
and Ecuador (Bhagwati, 2008). 
4.6.3. Legal Obligations Under the Transparency Mechanism: 
Under the transparency mechanism the contracting parties were now specifically 
obliged to provide GATT/WTO Secretariat with detailed and specified data on all 
notified RTAs and interim agreements within 10 weeks of notification. However, 
20 weeks, for RTAs involving DCs only. And this must be prior to implementation 
and not later than the ratification date. This data must include the following: All 
Tariff concessions under the agreement, in case of RTAs involving trade in goods 
and secondly, a full list of each member nation’s preferential duties to be applied 
in the year of entry into-force of the RTA. Thirdly, a full list of each member 
nation’s preferential duties, which are to be applied over the transition period and 
when the RTA is to be implemented in stages (Bhagwati, 2008).  
One of the major points about the transparency mechanism for RTAs, is 
that it enhances the role of the WTO Secretariat in relation to the notification of 
RTAs, and at the same time it reduced the role of the CRTA. The Secretariat was 
now empowered to prepare factual reports on RTAs based primarily, but not 
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exclusively, on information provided by parties to a RTA. The CRTA was no longer 
empowered to produce a report and recommendations on notified RTAs as 
mandated in its original terms of reference, but it was required to hold just a single 
meeting, based on written questions submitted earlier, on which the RTA would 
be considered (Bhagwati, 2008).  
Following this transparency mechanism which changed terms of reference 
of the CRTA, a formal review on RTAs base on their compatibility with GATT 
Article XXIV was no longer undertaken by the CRTA. Practically, this situation 
shifted the burden of the challenge of the compatibility of RTAs to GATT Article 
XXIV to dispute settlement. Legally, this situation also applies to interim 
agreements, since they are treated in terms of notification in the same light as full-
RTAs (Majluf, 2004). 
As mentioned earlier, WTO rules for interim and full-RTAs were also 
strengthened by the Understanding of the interpretation of GATT Article XXIV. 
However, it seems the adoption of this Understanding has paradoxically created a 
precisely opposite effect than that which was intended, because since 1995, of the 
300 or so RTAs that were notified to the WTO/CRTA none were notified as interim 
agreements. Although most of this RTAs legally did not meet the requirement of 
full-RTAs during their notification. This situation might have been created directly 
or indirectly by the Transparency mechanism because interim agreements were 
rather ignored in its wordings (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
4.7. Distinctions between Interim Agreements and Full-RTAs:  
The distinction between interim agreements leading to the formation of RTA and 
full-RTAs is contained in GATT Article XXIV and the Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XXIV GATT. An RTA (FTAs) is defined by GATT Article 
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XXIV,8, as a territory in which duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade. In contrast GATT Article 
XXIV:5 defines an interim agreement, as an agreement necessary for the formation 
of an RTA (Bhagwati, 2008). The implication of the interpretation of the 
definitions of these two provisions as per GATT Article XXIV,8, is that only 
agreement which have already been implemented or entered into force are 
classified as full-RTAs. However, any agreement that has not yet entered into force 
or not yet implemented, but includes a plan and schedule for implementation 
would be classified as an interim agreement (Bhagwati, 2008).  
a.) Internal condition for Interim Agreements and Full-RTAs:   
There is a clear difference between interim agreements and full-RTAs in relation 
to the internal requirements for trade liberalisation within the constituent 
territories of an RTA. Under GATT Article XXIV,5c, an interim agreement must 
include a plan and schedule for the formation a full-RTA within a reasonable 
length of time. According to Paragraph 3 of the Understanding of GATT Article 
XXIV a ‘reasonable length of time’ referred to in paragraph 5c, GATT of Article XXIV 
should not exceed 10 years but only in exceptional circumstances (Armstrong and 
Taylor, 1993) 
In exceptional circumstances the GATT/WTO requires parties to an interim 
agreement to provide a full explanation to the CTG if there is a need for an 
adaption period of more than 10 years. However, with full-RTAs there is no such 
requirement. Because it is presumed that a full-RTA is already providing 
liberalisation on substantially all the trade between the contracting parties.  
Nonetheless, in relation to WTO notifications and reviews, interim agreements 
and full-RTAs are treated on equal terms by GATT/WTO (Bhagwati, 2008).  
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b.) External Requirement for Interim Agreements and Full-RTAs:  
By contrast, there is no difference between interim agreements and full-RTAs on 
external requirements because under GATT Article XXIV,5a, and 5b duties and 
other restrictive regulations of commerce may not be higher during the adoption 
of an RTA or interim agreement leading an RTA, than before the adoption period. 
This external requirement applies from the very date the agreement is concluded, 
no matter whether it is an interim agreement or a full-RTA (Bhagwati, 2008).  
c.) Review of Interim Agreement and Full-RTAs by WTO Members:  
One other difference between Interim agreements and full-RTAs is based on the 
control over notified agreements exercised by WTO members. GATT Article 
XXIV,7a, states that: Any contracting party deciding to enter into a CU or FTA, or 
an interim agreement leading to the formation of both, shall promptly notify the 
contracting parties and shall make available to them such information regarding 
the proposed union as will enable them to make such reports and 
recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.  
Furthermore, according to the understanding of GATT 1994, Article XXIV,7, 
notification of an RTA made under paragraph 7a of GATT Article XXIV shall be 
examined by a working party in accordance to the provisions of paragraph 1 of 
the understanding of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. In addition, after the 
examination, the working party shall submit a report to the CTG on its findings.  
And if need be, the CTG may make appropriate recommendations on the examined 
RTA to member nations (Majluf, 2004).  
Legally, the degree of control over notified RTAs exercised by WTO 
member nations is vague, because there is no legal obligation on the part of 
member nations of an RTA to accept or implement any appropriate 
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recommendations on an RTA proposed by the CTG. However, as clarified in the in 
the Appellate Body Report in the Turkey-Textile case of 1999, legally the non-
acceptance or non-implementation of appropriate recommendations from the 
CTG does not prevent recourse on the question of the legality of the RTA, through 
dispute settlement process. Nonetheless, in the case of an interim agreement the 
situation is different.   
GATT Article XXIV,7b, states that in situations where WTO Member nations 
discover that a notified interim agreement is not likely to result in the formation 
of a CU or an FTA within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement 
or that such period is not a reasonable one, they may make appropriate 
recommendations. In such a situation, the contracting parties to the interim 
agreement are under an obligation not to maintain or enter into-force the 
agreement, if they are not willing to modify the agreement in accordance with the 
appropriate recommendations (Bhagwati, 2008).  
Under Paragraph 8 of the Understanding of GATT Article XXIV, these 
obligations are further elaborated and reinforced. It states that: the working party 
may in its report make appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-
frame and on measures required to complete the formation of the CU or FTA. It 
may if necessary provide for further review of the agreement. 
Furthermore, under Paragraph 10, a new set of obligations are also added 
for an interim agreement, which obliges the working parties to recommend a plan 
and schedule if the parties have not included one as per GATT Article XXIV,5c. In 
addition, Paragraph 10 also obliges the contracting parties not to maintain or 
enter into-force the agreement, if they are not prepared to modify the interim 
agreement in accordance with the recommendations (Majluf, 2004).  
 132 
4.8. Requirement for Notification of Interim Agreements and Full-RTAs:  
As mentioned earlier, GATT Article XXIV,7, and the Understanding of the 
interpretation of GATT Article XXIV requires notified interim agreements to 
include a plan and schedule, which should include how the interim agreement will 
lead to the formation of  a full-RTAs within a ‘reasonable length of time’, as per the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV,8. Furthermore, the Transparency Mechanism 
decision also specifically obliged the contracting parties to provide a full-listing of 
each contracting party’s preferential duties, which is applicable over the 
transition period of the agreement. This transition period of the interim 
agreement must not exceed a reasonable length of time, which is 10 years as per 
the provisions of the Understanding of GATT Article XXIV (Bhagwati, 2008).  
In fact, at the end of the transitional period of the agreement, no matter 
whether the agreement was notified as an interim agreement of a full-RTA, it is 
expected that the agreement must liberalised trade in all sectors substantially. 
However, neither GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES or WTO members have ever 
reached an agreement as to the interpretation of the phrase ‘substantially all the 
trade’ under the provision of GATT Article XXIV. The ambiguity of the phrase 
‘substantially all the trade’ a requirement of GATT Article XXIV, was famously 
contested during the Turkey-Textiles case, and noted in the WTO Appellate Body 
Report of 1999 (Majluf, 2004). 
 However, the phrase ‘substantially all the trade’ does not explicitly mean 
all the trade, but could be considered as substantial liberation of trade not just 
some trade, as construed from the WTO Appellate Body Report of the Turkey–
Textile of 1999.  Nonetheless, no matter the interpretation of the requirement of 
substantially all the trade, the bottom-line of this provision requires that a 
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considerable amount of trading barriers must be eliminated between the 
contracting parties’ territories by the end of the transitional period of the 
agreement (Majluf, 2004).  
4.8.1. The Reasonable Length of Time Requirement:  
As per the Paragraph 3 of the Understanding of the provisions of GATT Article 
XXIV, the phrase ‘reasonable length of time’ in relation to paragraph 5c, of GATT 
Article XXIV, states that interim agreements should not exceed a period of 10 years 
and that this timeframe could be exceeded only in exceptional circumstances In 
circumstances in which GATT/WTO members decide that a transitional period of 
10 years would be insufficient for an interim agreement to transit to a full-RTA, 
they should provide a full explanation to the CTG explaining the need for a longer 
transitional period for the agreement (Bhagwati, 2008). 
 However, although this transitional period could be extended when 
invoked in exceptional cases, it does not have any legal backing under WTO rules 
or provisions.  For example, in United States-Chile RTA of 2003, a 12-year 
transition period time frame was agreed for the achievement of a complete 
liberalisation on all agricultural produce – that is a 2-year extension to the 
requirement of the GATT/WTO provision.  
In addition, in the case of EC-Jordan RTA of 2004, the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES agreed that Jordan would need more than 10 years to achieve 
competitiveness in its economic sectors and adjust to the requirements of the RTA 
by its exporters. As a result, a 12-year period was agreed as the timeframe for the 
transitional period (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).  
Nonetheless, in Australia-US RTA of 2007 involving beef export from 
Australia to the USA, it took 18-years for USA trade barriers to Australia beef 
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exports to be fully eliminated, making the extension to transition period unfixed.  
Although in the two previous examples, the extensions were for two years only, 
this did not constitute a legal precedent under the GATT/WTO system.  Since 
neither Article XXIV of GATT or the Understanding of GATT 1994, Article XXIV 
explicitly limits the transition periods to a timeframe of ten years, the meaning of 
the phrase ‘reasonable length of time’ is opened to numerous interpretation and 
application by members of the WTO (Bhagwati, 2008).  
It is also impossible to give a definite legal interpretation to the phrase 
‘exceptional circumstances or cases’ member nations of the GATT/WTO are free 
to use any argument to justify the need for a longer transitional period of more 
than 10 years and inconsistencies are bound to exist. As a result, some member 
nations have invoked the sensitivity of the agricultural sector, goods, imports, 
exports and even the overall economic situation to justify an extension of the 
transitional period.  This is partly because GATT Article XXIV explicitly requires 
the elimination of tariffs on substantially all the trade for the formation of RTAs. 
Furthermore, it is also possible for member nations to invoke Part IV of the GATT 
treaty or even the GATT/WTO Preambles to support and justify the need for an 
extended transitional period for the formation of RTAs (Majluf, 2004). 
4.8.2 The ‘Plan and Schedule’ Requirement:  
As mentioned earlier, an interim RTA must include a plan and schedule on how a 
full-RTA would be achieved by the end of the transition period. And following the 
Transparency Mechanism decision, there was no difference between interim RTAs 
and full-RTAs during notification to GATT/WTO. In a nutshell, after the 
Transparency Mechanism decision all RTAs were henceforth being notified to the 
GATT/WTO as full-RTAs. This is because the conditions that were normally 
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applicable only to interim RTAs were now being applied to all RTAs, whether 
interim or full. Since all RTAs notified to the GATT/WTO were to include a plan 
and schedule with a transitional period (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).  
This decision created some difficulties to WTO members in terms of the 
specific content of the plan and schedule, such as the degree of liberalisation. And 
WTO Secretariat requires such information to be able to prepare and issue a 
factual report on the RTAs notified. For example, in the case of the factual report 
of SADC, the WTO did not consider sugar in its assessment of the liberalisation of 
trade on the provision of ‘Substantially all the trade’. Because in SADC’s plan and 
schedule, the liberalisation of sugar was to be concluded after 2012, and this will 
also depend on the global market for sugar.  As a result, sugar was excluded by the 
WTO in its assessment of the degree of trade liberalization during the transitional 
period, in its preparation of SADC’s factual report (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Furthermore, the legal difficulties emanating from the implications and 
interpretation of the ‘plan and schedule’ for RTAs could be tested by the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV,7b, which stipulates that: if the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to an interim RTA discover that the agreement will not lead to the 
formation of a full-RTA within the agreed period, usually ten years, CONTRACTING 
PARTIES shall make recommendations to the RTA members. The provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV,7b, gives GATT/WTO member nations the authority to make 
recommendations to parties to RTAs, but does not specifically oblige members of 
an RTA to provide a ‘plan and schedule’. As such the provision of a ‘plan and 
schedule’ during the notification RTAs by WTO member is simply instrumental 
(Bhagwati, 2008). 
In regards, to the understanding of the interpretation of GATT 1994, Article 
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XXIV, the provisions of Paragraph 10, authorizes the CRTA to impose a ‘plan and 
schedule” if the parties’ to the notified RTA did not include one. The legal 
implication of GATT Article XXIV,7b, is that with a ‘plan and schedule’ from 
members of an RTA, WTO member would be unable to approve the interim 
agreement (Bhagwati, 1995). 
As per GATT/WTO rules on RTAs between developed and developing 
countries under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, there could develop the legal 
issue of asymmetric trade liberalisation in relation to the requirements of 
‘substantially all the trade’ during the transitional period when RTA is considered 
an interim agreement. However, the provisions under GATT Article XXIV,7, and 
the understanding of the interpretation of GATT Article XXIV placed no conditions 
on the formation of RTAs. However, under GATT Article XXIV,8, the condition is 
that the interim agreement would lead to the formation of a full-RTA, with the 
approval of the CRTA (Bhagwati, 1995).  
However, the issue of asymmetry does not actually give rise to any legal 
difficulties under GATT/WTO rules, to end the RTA, even if trade has already been 
fully liberalized by some of the parties to the agreement. The legal implications of 
GATT/WTO rules on this matter, effectively eliminates the controls and oversights 
required under the provisions of GATT Article XXIV for interim agreements 
between developed economies and developing countries, including reviews and 
dispute settlement (Bhagwati, 1995). 
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4.9. Conclusion: 
Employing qualitative research methodology, this chapter has studied and traced 
the origin of the MFN principle, its functions and importance. It has also studied the 
exceptions and exemptions to the MFN principle to gain an understanding of its 
effects on the formation of RTAs and their examination at the CRTA. From the studies 
in this chapter, shows that unconditional MFN treatment might have lost its appeal 
because of widespread noncompliance to GATT/WTO obligations.  
In addition, since the requirements for the formation of RTAs such as FTAs 
seem weak, it is apparently much easier to achieve the rights to MFN deviation to 
form RTAs. The undermining or abuse of the exceptions to the MFN principle, which 
is the core principle of the GATT led to the proliferation of RTAs, making the number 
of RTAs in existence more in number than WTO membership. Since most WTO 
members were engaged in the formation of RTAs, the mandate of the CRTA in the 
examination of RTAs might have been indirectly undermined.  
Furthermore, this chapter has also explored probable deviation from the law, 
rules and procedures of GATT/WTO that might have had some practical implications 
on the role of the CRTA, some of which were contained in the Transparency Decision. 
After the Transparency Mechanism, all subsequent trade agreements were notified 
to the WTO as ‘full’ agreements with an implementation period, making it very hard 
to distinguish between full RTAs and interim agreements.  
Finally, what has been learnt from this chapter is that GATT/WTO treaty 
or/and decisions helped to encourage the proliferation of RTAs, by diminishing the 
control mechanism for RTAs via the Transparency Decision. The formation of RTAs 
by WTO members became much easier after 2006 because the mandate of the CRTA 
was revised through the Transparency Decision for RTAs. 
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CHAPTER 5.  
5.1. Introduction: 
This chapter explores the motivation for the formation of RTA and looks at the 
nature and make-up of some of the major RTAs in existence in the world today. It 
seeks to answer the research question: How does the regulation and examination of 
RTAs at the CRTA affect the formation and proliferation of RTAs? It studies the 
multilateral surveillance, monitoring of RTAs at the CRTA and explores the 
regulation of RTAs involving: the examination of RTAs at the CRTA, the procedure 
for RTA examination, RTA examination process, difficulties in the examination of 
RTAs and difficulties in the CRTA process for RTAs. Furthermore, it also looks at the 
inability of the CRTA to perform its duties and the need to reorganise the CRTA’s 
examination process. 
 
5.2. Motivation for the Formation of RTAs: 
Some WTO members are sceptical about the benefits of RTAs compared to the 
benefits that could accrue from multilateral trade negotiations and from the 
establishment of a successful MTS. However, the urgency in which some 
established economies used in the formation of RTAs, leave much to be desired. 
Although some trade policymakers are very much in favour of multilateral trade 
agreements, notwithstanding, WTO members continue incessantly to be involved 
in the formation of RTAs, even with on-going multilateral trade negotiations 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003) 
Although, it is impossible to dismiss the short-term benefits that could 
accrue from the establishment of RTAs, however, it might not take a long for such 
benefits to be quickly eroded by the creation of another RTA by third parties 
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(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). The rapid proliferation of RTAs seems to 
present the evidence that there is acute competition between different types of 
RTAs in different regions, offering different benefits to its members.   
Nonetheless, it seems some RTAs are created to counter the negative 
impact caused by the creation of a specific RTA or might even be an indirect 
response to the creation of a specific RTA (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). Some 
authors have argued that many political considerations are taken into 
consideration in the formation of RTAs (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). For 
example, a 2001 World Bank Report by Guy de Jonguieres, suggested that the 
purpose of regional integration is often political, and that the economic 
consequences, good or bad, are side effects of the political pay-off (Mansfield & 
Milner, 1999). While others believe that RTAs are not only established solely for 
trade liberalisation purposes, that their merits go far beyond free trade (Mansfield 
& Milner, 1999).  
In the 19th century, some emerging and even industrialised economies 
looked up to the United States of America (US) for leadership, in many aspects of 
life including trade. Although the US was an ardent supporter of multilateral trade 
negotiations under the auspices of the GATT/WTO before the 1990s, but during 
the early 1990s the US position in relation to RTAs changed considerably, and this 
seems to have created a domino effect in relation to the proliferation of RTAs 
throughout the world (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). As a result, some of the 
countries that looked up to the US for leadership could have felt that the US itself 
was now in favour of RTAs, when the US became a member of NAFTA. The 
conclusion might have been that RTAs are surely the best way forward and this 
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might have led to a massive proliferation of RTAs worldwide (Mansfield & Milner, 
1999).  
Although, some RTAs could serve a useful economic purpose beyond the 
direct gains from multilateral trade liberalisation, however, regional security and 
defence is also one of the most important factors that encourages some WTO 
members to form RTAs, because an unstable region cannot attract sufficient 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic development (Kufuor, 2006).  
Schiff and Winters (1997) suggested that RTAs could help reduce regional 
conflicts.  The free movement of goods and people via RTAs has also helped in 
reducing regional tensions, territorial conflicts and even wars. Schiff and Winters 
(1997) also suggested that RTAs could help in the provision of political and 
military protection for member nations.   Furthermore, some RTAs could also give 
rise to regional security operations, such as the Economic Community of West 
African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in the case of ECOWAS (Kufuor, 
2006). The inclusion of Rwanda and Burundi in the East Africa Co-operation (EAC) 
may help to minimize the probability of future conflicts between Rwanda and 
Burundi (Kufuor, 2006).  
In much the same manner, Kufuor (2006) also suggested that according to 
Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet, the founding fathers of the EU, European 
integration aimed at, inter alia, preventing any future Franco-German conflicts. He 
also argued that this same principle has been re-applied in the creation of 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to help reduce tensions between 
Indonesia and Malaysia (Kufuor, 2006). 
Nonetheless, some RTAs could help in the enhancement of regional 
cohesion, by promoting the notion of belonging and citizenship. For example, 
 141 
some individuals in the EU see themselves most often as European citizens, rather 
than citizens of their own countries (Kufuor, 2006).  
Furthermore, the ability for firms in the territory, to spread their 
operations throughout the entire territory because of trade liberalisation 
resulting from RTA is one of the major reasons for the proliferation of RTAs. It is 
also believed that the degree of cooperation that may be achieved through RTA 
could help propel economic development in the entire region via joint-project 
initiatives (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). As suggested by Kufuor (2006), 
interactions between members of ECOWAS helped to breed trust leading to 
positive spin-offs such as cooperation in hydroelectric projects and transport 
networks (Kufuor, 2006). 
Nonetheless, the importance of regional cohesion and co-operation 
through RTA was also highlighted by the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy, 
on the 26 of March 2009, during a state visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
where he suggested that Kinshasa and its Great Lakes neighbours should work 
together for their own mutual benefits (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993).  
The desire to achieve better and quick trade agreements through the 
reduction of negotiation time, because similarity of needs is one of the greatest 
motivation for the formation of RTAs (Kufuor, 2006). It seems most of the nations 
involved in an RTA, know exactly what is at stake, as a result negotiations are 
smooth and fast (Kufuor, 2006). Moreover, the duration and resources involved in 
the GATT/WTO negotiations seems to make RTAs a better option to WTO 
negotiations (Kufuor, 2006), because multilateral trade negotiations often take a 
longer period to conclude, since they involve many nations with varying problems 
from different regions of the world (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).   
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In addition, since some DCs share similar histories and cultures resulting from 
similar background, these nations are either poor or former colonies of developed 
nations, as a result, some of them feel comfortable congregating together via RTAs 
to find the best way forward. Countries sharing the same language and who have 
similar ethnic groups can easily form RTAs. This factor is one of the major driving 
force or motivation for the formation and proliferation of multiple RTAs across 
the globe. However, RTAs could also create employment opportunities 
throughout the territory, thereby reducing political tension within member-states 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). 
In an increasingly globalising world the need to pool resources together as 
a unit became the focus of some DCs, the preference for mutually reciprocal 
market access with countries at the same stage of development was favoured to 
multilateral trade arrangements. Kufuor, (2006) suggested that an expanding 
market for goods and services through the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
is an important factor for economic growth and development. In addition, the 
seminal work on Jacob Viner’s study on regional integration underscores the links 
between trade creation and national welfare (Viner, 1950).  
It is believed that one of the most attractive features of RTAs, is that it could 
serve as a guarantor against loses that could be suffered from unforeseen 
economic calamities (Kufuor, 2006). Nonetheless, commitment to a common 
purpose is certainly what brings most nations together for the formation of RTAs. 
A common interest could arise from RTAs, leading to a solution to a common 
problem, such as the part played by the Southern African Development Co-
operation (SADC) in resisting apartheid (Kufuor, 2006).  
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According to a remark attributed to E. Anthony Wayne, Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs of the USA at the time of the Leadership Forum 
Dinner, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, on the 15th of September 
2003, he said that the U.S. will continue to aggressively pursue bilateral and 
regional trade agreements with countries committed to opening markets and 
undertaking economic reform. As per this statement, it shows that the motivation 
for RTAs for most advanced economies is truly market access more than anything 
else.  As such even customs unions such as the EU (an RTA) and other RTAs also 
continue to pursue bilateral trade agreements in the face of on-going multilateral 
trade negotiations (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).  
5.3. Some of the Major RTAs in Existence in the World Today: 
Some contenders have suggested that powerful nations such as the USA, the 
United Kingdom, Japan, China, Canada, Australia and amongst others continue to 
be engaged in the formation and establishment of RTAs, while acknowledging its 
disadvantages and the detriment of RTAs to the MTS.  
Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Trade in 2003, Mr. Pascal Lamy, 
also surprisingly expressed ambivalence towards the MTS after the Cancún 
conference in 2003. Whilst speaking to Journalists in Brussels on the 16th of 
September 2003; he said: “We will have to have a good hard think amongst 
ourselves... should we maintain our priority as multilateralism which was the 
basic tenet of EU commercial policy?” This statement supporting maintaining the 
push towards multilateralism by a representative of an RTA is further proof that 
although some advanced economies are now engaged in RTA, the benefits that 
could accrue to WTO members from an established MTS could by far surpass the 
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benefits accruing to nations currently involved in RTAs (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 
2003). 
However, trade liberalisation through RTAs is not truly multilateral in 
nature and the advantages it brings is just a taste of what a global free trade 
incorporating all WTO members and non-members could bring as benefits to all 
nations involved. Although multilateralism is the priority for many nations, yet 
they continue with their unquenchable taste for RTAs, with their short-term 
benefits, such as quick market access. 
5.3.1. The European Union (EU) 
The EU is an economic union of 28 European member nations. It could simply be 
classified as a supranational RTA based on economic and political integration. It 
was established through the Maastricht treaty signed by six Western European 
member nations in the Netherlands, on the 7th of February 1992, and entered-into 
force on the 1st of November 1993.  
The six Western European nations who originally founded the EU were 
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. The EU has 
expanded from its humble beginning of six nations to its present 28 nation status 
and it would continue to expand as new nations join the union. Currently the EU 
is the most vibrant RTA as compared to its counterparts globally. Its integration 
process has apparently been very smooth and fast as compared to similar 
integration models across the globe such as the African Union (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 2003).  
5.3.2. The North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 
The North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was established on the 1st of January 
1994, by the United States of America (USA), Canada and Mexico. These three 
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countries are all North American nations. The formation and establishment of this 
RTA permit member nations to eliminate all duties, tariffs and other barriers to 
trade between them but are supposed to retain their own individual rates of tariffs 
with other nations of the world, who are not members of NAFTA, such as the 
United Kingdom.  
One of the most important aspects of NAFTA is that NAFTA is a free trade 
area. The most important element of a Free Trade Area over a Customs Union or 
Common markets, is that in a Free Trade Area each member state can freely 
determine its own trade relationship with other third parties as it pleases. NFTA 
is a regional bloc that fits the regional closed proximity element of our traditional 
RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008). 
5.3.3. Caribbean Community (CARICOM): 
CARICOM came into existence in 2001, to replace the former Caribbean 
Community and Commons Market that was formed and established in 1973, 
through the treaty of Chagares’s, with headquarters in Georgetown, Guyana. The 
Caribbean Community and Commons Market was also the replacement of the 
former Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) that became redundant in 
1968. The process of regionalisation in the Caribbean has always been evolving 
since the creation of CARIFTA, just as RTA itself has been an ever evolving and 
self-innovating process of political and economic integration.  
The Treaty of Chagares’s gave rise to associate institutions that helped to 
promote cooperation and economic development among Caribbean member 
states such as the Organization of East Caribbean states and the Caribbean 
Development Bank. CARICOM is made up of Antigua, Bahamas, Barbuda, Belize, 
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and 
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Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and 
Tobago. While associate member status includes Anguilla, Bermuda, the British 
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. However, 
Venezuela, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Aruba all 
exercise observer status within CARICOM.   
From the late1980s to 2006 CARICOM went through certain changes and 
other major changes were also envisaged for further integration such as the 
CARICOM Single Market (CSM) and the proposal to create a single currency within 
the territory of member states. In fact, the evolution of CARICOM has been 
constant, although certain changes have taken a longer time than necessary to be 
implemented by all member nations. The treaty of Chagares’s, which established 
the organisation, was revised in July 2001, by a meeting of the head of 
governments of member states (Bhagwati, 2008). 
5.3.4. MERCUSOR: 
MERCUSOR is a customs union made up of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, 
Paraguay and Bolivia. Bolivia was the last member country to join the regional 
bloc in 2012, after ratifying the MERCUSOR treaty by members of its legislature 
on the 7th of December 2012. The purpose and objectives of MERCUSOR is to 
encourage free movement of labour, good and services within the territories of 
the customs union. Generally, the promotion of free trade amongst member 
nations of an RTA has always been the direct motive for the formation and 
establishment of RTAs; MERCUSOR is not an exception. The three official 
languages of MERCUSOR are Spanish, Portuguese and Guarani. In the Americas, 
Guarani is one of the most-widely spoken indigenous languages. A vast proportion 
of non-indigenous people in the Americas also speak Guarani. Along with Spanish, 
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Guarani is also an official language of Paraguay. In fact, Guarani is spoken in 
Paraguay, parts of North-Eastern Argentina, South Eastern, Bolivia and South 
Western, Brazil.  Since 2004, it is the second official language of the Province of 
Corrientes, Argentina), Currently, MERCUSOR is undergoing transitory stages of 
transformation into a common market status from its original formation as a 
customs union. This transformation process has been encouraged or triggered by 
the successes achieved so far by the EU model of regional economic and political 
integration. 
5.3.5. The African Union (AU): 
The AU was formed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 26th of May 2001 and launched 
in South Africa, on the 9th of July 2002. It is a regional integration scheme, which 
is made up of 54 African Nations, the very latest member that made the 
organisation’s membership number to increase from 53 members to 54 member 
states is South Sudan who became a member of the AU in the summer of 2011. The 
AU was created to replace the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which became 
more of a mere talking shop, a gathering for African head of states to meet and 
greet one another.  
The main objective of the AU is to foster political and economic integration 
among its 54 African member states, from its inception the AU seemed more 
robust in ideology than the defunct OAU. Although the aims of both organisations 
have been quite similar, such as the eradication of poverty, the promotion of Pan-
African democracy and unity amongst African states, their progress and 
accomplishments in this regard are insignificant, since, dictators are still ruling 
most of the continent now and when the OAU was functional. The AU is considered 
the brainchild of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who was very 
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interested in creating a ‘United States of Africa’, governed by only one president, 
like the USA. Although the AU is modelled from the EU ideology, however, its 
structures and manner of operation are quite different from those of the EU 
(Kufuor, 2006).  
Currently, Morocco is the only African country that is not a member of the 
AU (Kufuor, 2006). In 1984 Morocco left the OAU because the organisation 
granted membership status to the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, which is 
seeking independence from Morocco for the disputed territory of Western Sahara, 
which Morocco considers to be part of its territory. Since, then Morocco has not 
applied for re-admission into the organisation.  
The progress of the AU as an economic and political integration scheme has 
been extremely slow. Even now there are still tangible restrictions and barriers 
within its territory, in terms of movement of capital and labour, which are one of 
the main aspects of a successful political and economic integration scheme 
(Kufuor, 2006). Although most AU institutions seem weaker than those of the EU, 
however, it is still too early to describe the AU as a complete failure just like the 
OAU. One of the main institutions of the AU is the Pan-African parliament, which 
was inaugurated in March 2004. The Pan-African parliament is a deliberative body 
that debates issues affecting the continent and acts as an advisory to head of states 
of member states (Kufuor, 2006).  
The AU has very many ambitious projects that very much mirrors the EU 
in its set-up, such as the establishment of a human rights court, an African central 
bank, an African monetary fund, and an African Economic Community with a 
single currency, all these projects are envisaged to be in place by the year 2023. 
However, one of the most interesting elements of the AU is the intervention in the 
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affairs of member states in case of conflicts, such as wars or serious political 
instability. This is very much a departure from its predecessor the OUA, which was 
modelled very much on non-interference in the affairs of member states. The 
creation of the OAU after post-independence struggle made sovereignty a very 
important element for most African nations and their leadership. However, the 
current departure from the protection of sovereignty to intervention in cases of 
conflicts within the African continent is a new development in integration 
schemes in Africa (Kufuor, 2006).  
The AU’s believe that conflicts in Africa must be settled before prosperity 
could be achieved within the continent. The end of these conflicts could encourage 
sustainable development (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). As a result, this ambition 
led to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council, in 2004 (Kufuor, 2006). 
The mandate of this council is the deployment of a military force in any member 
state at short notice in situations where genocide or crimes against humanity are 
being committed. Nonetheless, plans for the council to set-up a rapid-reaction 
military force by 2010, did not actually materialise, however, this is not 
uncommon with the AU or its predecessor - the OAU (Kufuor, 2006).  In fact, the 
AU has provided peacekeepers and cease-fire monitors along with the United 
Nations (UN) in places such as Darfur and Burundi, and has maintained a military 
presence in Somalia since 2007.  
To attract foreign direct investments for member states through the union, 
the AU established a body known as the New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(NEPAD).  NEPAD `is an anti-poverty blueprint which aims to placate Western 
democracies to provide both foreign aid and investments to member states who 
try to practice good governance (Kufuor, 2006). The AU has often suspended 
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member states over unconstitutional change of government, suspended members 
are only re-admitted after rule law and respect for the constitution is re-
established, for instance, in 2009, Madagascar was suspended from the AU after 
Andry Rajoelina ascended to power through an unconstitutional means. 
5.3.6. The Association of South East Asia (ASEAN):  
ASEAN was created on the 8th of August 1967, during a meeting of South East Asian 
countries in Bangkok, the capital of Thailand. The founding member nations of 
ASEAN are: the host nation Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore. ASEAN founding member nations made a declaration in Bangkok 
stating that the association represents the collective will of the nations to bind 
themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and 
sacrifices, to secure for their people and for posterity the blessings of peace, 
freedom and prosperity (Kufuor, 2006).  
The aim of ASEAN was to create a fully functional economic community 
among its ten member nations. From its inception, economic growth in the 
region’s territory was at the forefront of its main objectives. Presently, ASEAN is 
made up of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of 
Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Republic of the 
Union of Myanmar, and the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, 
the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  
During the very first ASEAN summit in 1976, in Bali, Indonesia, member 
nations accepted and signed a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). The aim of 
the TAC treaty was to enshrine amongst its member nations the principle of non-
interference by other member states in the domestic affairs of member nations. 
However, the TAC treaty has also been signed by five non-member nations of the 
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organisation. China, India, Japan, Russia and South Korea, are all signatories to the 
TAC treaty, making the treaty effectively opened to other non-members of the 
organisation.  
However, in 1994, ASEAN member nations created an important regional 
security forum known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that attracted the 
interest of other non-ASEAN member nations, such the USA and North Korean, up 
to 23 nations are members of this forum. The aim of this forum was to foster long-
term security, prevention conflicts among member nations and the resolution of 
conflicts via diplomacy and any available peaceful instruments. Furthermore, in 
1995 ASEAN member nations also signed the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-
Free Zone Treaty, a very important treaty for the enhancement of regional security 
and stability (Kufuor, 2006). 
ASEAN is moving towards EU integration style or ideology by harmonising 
its economic policies, scrapping tariffs within its territory, liberalising trade and 
the free movement of factors of production – Labour and Capital. ASEAN is also 
pursuing and negotiating a possible FTA with Japan, China and India. Many have 
suggested that a successful FTA between China and ASEAN would create the 
largest free trade zone the world has ever seen. Nonetheless, in 2005, ASEAN 
organised its very first ever East Asian Summit (EAS), as from 2005, it was agreed 
by members that the summit would be held on a biennial basis.  
The EAS is made up of all member nations of ASEAN, including also 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea China and India. Some commentators 
believe that one of the main aims of this forum is to create a consolidated trade 
bloc, which could be a rival to the USA and the EU. A landmark charter that was 
created by ASEAN member nations in November 2007 was finally ratified and 
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signed by all ten members of ASEAN in 2008, constituting a major progress in 
regional economic integration amongst ASEAN member nations. This charter 
turned ASEAN into a rules-based legal entity, with commitment for the promotion 
of democratic ideals and the protection of human rights amongst member nations, 
and the prevention of human rights abuses within its territory. 
5.4. Multilateral Surveillance and Monitoring of RTAs: 
By the 1st of January 1995, 60 new RTAs were already notified to the WTO and 
most were also enforced. But no examination had been completed on any of them 
and no examination reports were adopted or published for any of them. However, 
by the end of the year 1998, there were 62 RTAs at the CRTA awaiting examination 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
Multilateral monitoring and surveillance of RTAs under the CRTA process 
requires that members should agree to a report on the examination of notified 
RTAs as mandated by WTO rules.  Principally, the examination process should be 
on the consistency and compatibility of the RTA to the MTS, taking into 
consideration any exceptions to WTO provisions invoked by its members during 
negotiations (Crawford and Laird, 2001). This is to say; there is also the 
requirement of conformity examination of RTAs to the WTO provision by which 
they are formed. Finally, the examination report is then supposed to be 
transmitted to the relevant WTO body. Apparently, it seems it does not really work 
this way (Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
• Article XXIV of the GATT 1994: Subsection, 7a.: This provision 
elaborates the implicit requirement for consistency assessment of RTAs 
and thereby leads to mandatory examination of RTAs at the CRTA. 
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• Enabling Clause: Subsection, 4a and 4b gives rise to RTAs by involving 
only developing countries. Here there are possibilities for consultations 
with the WTO’s CRTA, but in principles there is no requirement for 
examination of such RTAs at the CRTA. 
• GATS Article V: Subsection 7a, gives rise to RTAs on trade in services: 
This article stipulates there is explicit requirement for consistency 
assessment and possible examination of such RTAs at the CRTA 
 5.5. The Regulation of RTAs: 
One of the major problems facing the GATT/WTO and the MTS is the lack of an 
effective multilateral regulatory mechanism for RTAs. The CRTA is proving to be 
an inadequate regulator of RTAs and this seems evident from the rapid 
proliferation of RTAs around the globe. Before the creation and establishment of 
the CRTA, the examination of RTAs to determine their compatibility to the MTS 
was carried out by ‘individual working parties’ under the auspices of the GATT 
treaty (Kufuor, 2006).   
During the GATT days, newly formed RTAs were notified to the Council for 
Trade in Goods, known variously as the Goods Council. During this period, the 
Goods Council was the sole regulator of RTAs. The Council delegated the 
examination to determine the compatibility and suitability of RTAs to the MTS to 
individual working parties. In principles, after the examination of RTAs, these 
individual working parties were expected to report back their findings and 
recommendations to the CTG (Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
The examination process was often incomplete because of some 
difficulties, and it was very almost impossible for representatives of member 
nations to agree on the interpretation of the provisions of GATT Article XXIV. And 
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one other major difficulty was that the amount of information disclosed by 
member nations purporting to conclude an RTA, was usually inadequate. This 
inadequate information made it almost impossible for the “Individual Working 
Party” to properly examine for notified RTAs, in accordance with WTO standards. 
As a result, there were no definite conclusion on the examination of any RTA 
during this period. The European Economic Community (EEC), which was one of 
the very first best known RTAs established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, has no 
adopted or published examination report as to its compatibility or incompatibility 
to the MTS. Furthermore, no conformity report exists, as to the conformity of the 
EEC to GATT Article XXIV.  
The regulatory situation of RTAs has wholly been inadequate because of 
the lack of consensus on the rules governing RTAs and the lack of adequate 
information on the RTAs to be examined. The examination of RTAs by the 
‘Working Parties’ continued for over 46 years. By 1995, 98 RTAs had been notified 
to the WTO and examined by the ‘Individual Working Parties’. On the matter of 
conformity to GATT Article XXIV, only one RTA was regarded to have conformed 
to the provisions of this article, that is the Czech-Slovak customs union (Crawford 
and Laird, 2001).  
5.6. The Examination of RTAs: 
One of the main functions of the CTRA under the auspices of the WTO is the 
examination of RTAs. As mentioned earlier, before the creation and establishment 
of the CRTA, there was some form of examination of RTAs carried out by 
Contracting-parties of the GATT treaty. The CRTA was established in 1996 as 
earlier mentioned for the examination of RTAs to test their conformity, suitability 
and compatibility to multilateral trade agreement of the WTO or the MTS. But 
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generally, the CRTA only examines RTAs falling under GATT Article XXIV, and in 
addiction, RTAs falling under GATS Article V. In fact, before 2010 the CRTA had 
under examination more than 100 agreements (Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
The examination of RTAs at the CRTA serves two purposes: it ensures the 
transparency of RTAs and allows Members to evaluate an agreement's 
consistency with WTO rules. The examination is conducted based on information 
provided by the parties to the RTA, through written replies to written questions 
posed by WTO Members or through oral replies to questions posed at CRTA 
meetings. Once the factual examination is concluded, the Secretariat drafts the 
examination report. Thereafter, consultations are conducted and once the report 
is agreed by the CRTA, it is submitted to the relevant superior body for adoption 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
It is worth noting that the Committee had 62 RTAs before it for 
examination at the end of 1998, but it was not able to complete any of them. As a 
result, no report has been adopted. The main reason the CRTA was not able to fulfil 
its mandate for the examinations of these RTAs was due to the lack of consensus 
on interpretation of the so-called systemic issues originating in GATT 1994, Article 
XXIV (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
The intention of the GATT/WTO General Council’s decision to establish the 
CRTA in 1996 had two main objectives – the gathering of information on and their 
examination at the CRTA. However, one of the primary requirements of CRTA 
from the General Council of GATT/WTO   after its establishment in 1996 was that 
the Committee would report annually to the General Council of the WTO on all its 
activities (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
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Furthermore, the second main objective was to establish a Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA), which would be open to all Members of the WTO, with 
the following terms of reference: The First term of reference was to carry out the 
examination of agreements in accordance with the procedures and terms of 
reference adopted by the CTG, the CTS and thereafter present its report to the 
relevant body for appropriate action. The Committee would also carry out the 
outstanding work of the working parties already established by the CTG, the CTS 
or the Committee on Trade and Development (CTD), within the terms of reference 
defined for those working parties, and report to the appropriate bodies. 
The Second being to consider how the required reporting on the operation 
of such agreements should be carried out and make appropriate 
recommendations to the relevant body. The third was to develop, as appropriate, 
procedures to facilitate and improve the examination process. The Fourth was to 
consider the systemic implications of such agreements and regional initiatives for 
the multilateral trading system and the relationship between them, and make 
appropriate recommendations to the General Council. And the fifth and last was 
to carry out any additional functions assigned to it by the General Council.  
As a matter of fact, the CRTA’s terms of reference are found in WTO 
document, number: WT/L/127.  This document reads as follows: Having regard 
to agreements which are required to be notified, under Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, Article V of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services or the 1979 Decision on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries; Having 
regard to the biennial reporting envisaged in Paragraph 11 of the Uruguay Round. 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and Acting 
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pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article IV of the Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The term ‘agreements’ in this Decision refers to all bilateral, regional and 
multilateral trade agreements of a preferential nature. The CRTA was established 
and empowered by two relevant decisions namely: The General Council’s Decision 
and the Transparency Mechanism on RTAs. A study of the transparency 
mechanism on RTAs reveals the background details of the WTO’s intentions for 
the creation and establishment of the CRTA – Thus transparency in the CRTA 
process for RTAs is very essential. 
5.6.1. The Process of RTAs Examination: 
The CRTA’s examination process for RTAs is divided into two principal duties (The 
WTO’s decision of 6 February 1996, in relation to the CRTA is found on the WTO 
website and could be seen in the Document number: WT/L/127 of the 7th of 
February 1996 (Crawford and Laird, 2001). They are as follows: 
• To examine individual RTAs;  
• And to consider the systemic implications of RTAs for the MTS and the 
relationship between them. 
This simply means that in examining RTAs, the CRTA studies the information 
submitted by member nations involved in RTAs to determine the compatibility 
and suitability of RTAs to the MTS. The CRTA’s work should go further to check if 
the RTAs under examination complied with WTO rules or provisions through 
which RTAs are formed (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). However, the work of the 
CRTA has been plagued and hindered by procedural issues. Some procedural 
issues at CRTA could be because of loopholes in GATT/WTO rules through which 
RTAs are formed and established (Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
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In addition, some WTO trade representatives at the CRTA, generally believe that 
the WTO and even the CRTA need to be reformed before the CRTA could properly 
perform the duties for which it was created. The WTO needs to be reformed, and 
reforms should also take place at the CRTA. The reason is that the procedure put 
in place when the CRTA was created seems inadequate and out-dated in relation 
to the ever-evolving nature of RTAs (Crawford and Laird, 2001).   
Although some adjustments to this procedure has since been made, like the 
Transparency mechanism for RTAs, they still fall short of what is expect for the 
CRTA to do an adequate work of the examination of the compatibility and 
suitability of RTAs to the MTS. The term “Transparency Mechanism” could be very 
confusing in terms of its usage in relation to the CRTA. It could have been made 
clearer and explicit, making things much more straight forward when a RTA has 
been formed, when must notification take place, exact information to be provided 
at notification. This simple and clear description of the process could provide the 
much-needed transparency regarding the work of the CRTA and save time, 
thereby minimising procedural defects.  
Notwithstanding, there also seems to be a lack of clear procedures as to 
exactly what is to be done when RTAs have been formed, the clear step by step 
approach or procedure that could have given WTO members of RTAs the ability to 
act in an authoritative manner once a RTA have been formed. This lack of clear 
transparency, tends to delay or confuse things, making the work of the CRTA even 
harder to effectively examine RTAs as it should (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).  
Furthermore, present day RTAs seems to have vast coverage and scope, 
because RTAs are now very open ended in terms of sectorial coverage. Since some 
RTAs nowadays do not cover only goods; the coverage extends to almost every 
 159 
aspect of trade in any form, from goods to services, antidumping, dispute 
settlement, safeguard mechanisms and even development. Because of this, the 
CRTA in its present state does not have sufficient scope to cover all these aspects 
in the present life of today’s RTAs (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).  
In the GATT days, RTAs were simple bilateral trade agreements, but now 
they have changed drastically, involving so many nations and admitting new 
members as time goes by. With such expansion, some RTAs today are not confined 
to a specific region instead they cover two or more continents. As a result, the 
work of the CRTA seem irrelevant in its examination of the compatibility and 
suitability of such RTAs. Since, the procedures and mechanisms in place are just 
not adequate for its role. 
According to WTO rules RTAs referred to the CRTA for compatibility and 
suitability examination to the MTS are only RTAs notified to the WTO under 
Article XXIV of GATT 1947. The WTO is not obliged to refer RTAs notified under 
GATS Article V to the CRTA, since such RTAs are regulated by the Council for trade 
in Services. This is very confusing, in terms of clarity as the specific RTAs the CRTA 
is supposed to examine, because some newly RTAs created RTAs do not actually 
limit themselves to either goods, or services. As a result, there is a degree of 
uncertainty as to where certain RTAs should be examined, since it is not within 
the mandate of the CRTA to examine all or such RTAs. The burden to clear this 
apparent state of confusion is on the WTO to make certain vital decisions on RTA 
examination, once the formation of any RTA is notified by member nations 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). 
Furthermore, in the present situation, when any RTA is established the 
WTO decides or determine whether such a RTA needs examination at the CRTA, 
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or to be handled by the Council for Trade in Services or analysed at the Committee 
on Trade and Development. However, regarding the analysis of RTAs at the 
Committee on Trade and Development, in practice, RTAs formed under the 
Enabling Clause rules of the GATT/WTO by developing countries are not referred 
to the CRTA for examination. And such RTAs are even exempt from critical and in-
depth analysis at the CTD under the present WTO rules. As a result, the application 
of the CRTA procedure on any RTA is very uncertain. And the probability of a 
comprehensive examination of all RTAs at the CRTA for compatibility and 
suitability to the MTS is almost impossible, due to very unclear rules and 
procedures. The problem is that the powers of the CRTA are very limited, since 
the CRTA is not mandated for the surveillance and monitoring of all types of RTAs.  
And the decision on what RTAs to examine is not within the powers of the CRTA 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
One of the other major confusions on the WTO-CRTA process is the 
notification of RTA by member countries. The fact is that the wordings of the 
timing of the notification period or procedure are very ambiguous, thereby leaving 
many countries with different interpretations. However, the choice of 
interpretation of the timing of notification depends very much on the need of 
member countries on when they feel comfortable to notify the RTA. 
Notwithstanding, GATT Article XXXIV,7a, establishes the requirement of 
notification for RTAs by member states. The rule seems very vague because it 
states that: any WTO members deciding to negotiate and enter into-force an RTA, 
shall promptly notify the WTO of their intention. The word promptly here is not 
clearly defined as to the exact time scale that the notification would seem correct, 
legal and in line with WTO requirement (Crawford and Laird, 2001).  
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The wording “PROMPTLY” is open to varying interpretations. Many have argued 
that promptly here simply means as soon as possible before the RTA is entered 
into force by the member states. Normally, if one is to consider the position of the 
CRTA, as to the entry into force of an RTA, the CRTA is supposed to examine RTAs 
before they could be operational. But this is not the case because most RTAs are 
already in operation or in force before they are even notified to the WTO 
(Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).  
Nonetheless, some policymakers have argued that due to certain political 
ramifications and legal complexities many RTAs cannot be notified to the WTO 
before entering into-force or before enactment. This makes the examination of 
such RTAs at the CRTA futile, because the RTA is already in operation before being 
examined by the CRTA, to ascertain whether it is compatible to the MTS or if, it 
even conforms to WTO rules by which RTAs are supposed to be formed. The fact 
is that the ideal situation would have been for a specific notification period to be 
decided by the WTO and made very clear to all members and a decision on a strict 
and exact notification time frame, stating that no RTA could be considered 
concluded or entered into force before the completion of examination report by 
the CRTA, so that member states could make adjustments from the 
recommendations of the CRTA before the RTA could be legally entered into force 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
Although, it is a necessity for WTO members to notify the WTO as to their 
intentions before an RTA is formed and certain information concerning the 
formation the RTA is supposed to be submitted to the WTO, for the RTA to be 
examined by the CRTA.  This is not often the case, the information usually 
submitted by member nations to an RTA, at the early stages of the RTA, when 
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notification is required by the WTO, does not usually meet the protocol for the 
examination of these RTAs at the CRTA. Generally, the information submitted is 
often rather insufficient or too little for the CRTA to appropriately examine the 
RTAs involved. This insufficient information or the lack of it, very much hampers 
or tends to limit the work of the CRTA, with regards to the RTAs to be examined 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
In respect to the Understanding of GATT 1994, Article XXIV on the 
conformity of CUs to the MTS, it was clarified that the examination of CUs at the 
CTRA should be centred upon an overall assessment of weighted average tariff 
rates and of customs duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import 
statistics from a previous representative period to be supplied by the CU, on a 
tariff-line basis, broken down on country of origin. The implication of this 
provision is that WTO members are supposed to furnish the WTO/CRTA with 
substantial information regarding the RTA they are intending to form (Crawford 
and Laird, 2001). However, the exact information required by this provision is not 
very clear, because the term substantial information could nonetheless include a 
comprehensive statistical trade data of the territory and this type of data is 
probably very difficult to assemble at the early stage of the RTA (Crawford and 
Laird, 2001).  
However, even if such data could be readily assembled, it would not be a 
true reflection of the actual situation prevailing within the territory, since the RTA 
is still very new. The impact of the RTA would be felt after a passage of reasonable 
time, maybe after a year of the RTA being enforced. So, the requirement of the 
provision stating the supply of import statistics for a previous representative 
period is vague and could be misleading. The work of the CRTA seems almost 
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impossible to fulfil because of the difficulties in the submission of appropriate 
statistical data within a reasonable timeframe. However, the submission of this 
data is not only for the CRTA to complete its work on factual examination of an 
RTA, but it is also to enable the CRTA submit a comprehensive factual report about 
such RTAs to the WTO members, to prove that such RTAs conform to WTO rules 
and compatible to the MTS (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
5.6.2. The Procedure for RTAs Examination: 
The process of the examination of RTAs at the CRTA follows specific orderly steps. 
The first requirement from member states to an RTAS is – The notification by the 
parties to an RTA, plus submission of relevant related documentation to the WTO. 
Furthermore, the second expectation from the parties to an RTA is – The 
submission of background information on the RTA, either by the parties in a 
Standard Format or by the Secretariat in the form of ‘Factual Presentation’. The 
third and last step is - The Factual Examination of the RTA by WTO members, at 
the CRTA. The procedure for this final step is that it is done in three stages, 
following specific detailed process procedure: 
• Firstly, there is the presentation of oral policy statements 
• Followed by oral comments, questions and replies 
• Then there are written exchanges of comments and questions and replies 
by delegates or representatives of WTO member nations. 
The examination of an agreement in the CRTA serves two purposes: it ensures the 
transparency of RTAs and allows members nations of the WTO to evaluate an 
agreement's consistency with WTO rules. The examination is conducted based on 
information provided by the parties to the RTA, through written replies to written 
questions posed by WTO Members or through oral replies to questions posed at 
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CRTA meetings. Once the factual examination is concluded, the Secretariat drafts 
the examination report (Crawford and Laird, 2001). Thereafter, consultations are 
conducted and once the report is agreed by the CRTA, it is submitted to the 
relevant superior body for adoption. 
5.7. Difficulties in the Examination of RTAs: 
Between 1996 and 2010, the examination reports of many of the RTAs in 
operation have not been adopted or published, because of this very reason the 
compatibility of some of these RTAs to the MTS and their conformity to WTO rules 
is very uncertain, doubtful and debatable. Until a conclusive report on the 
examination of all RTAs examined under the CRTA process are adopted and 
published, one cannot truly estimate the exact impact on the MTS by any of the 
RTAs in operation today (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
One of the major problems affecting dispute settlement in cases related to 
RTAs has been the non-adaptation and publication of examination reports of 
RTAs. This has led to acute confusion in the interpretation of basic dispute 
settlement rules and on the implementation of solutions. The most fundamental 
problem here lies on the responsibility of the burden of proof on the issue of 
compatibility of RTAs to the MTS and the conformity of RTAS to WTO rules in the 
event of disputes between WTO members and member of an RTA. The popular 
argument has always been that the burden of proof lies with the RTA members to 
prove that their agreement is in conformity with WTO rules by which RTAs are 
formed or that the RTA is compatible to the MTS (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). 
However, others have also argued that the legal position in international 
law puts the burden of proof on the third party to an RTA to clarify that an RTA is 
in breach of WTO provisions by which RTAs are supposed to be formed or that the 
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RTA in operation does not conform to GATT Article XXIV. The legal argument here 
is that since no WTO member would intentionally want to establish a RTA that is 
in direct breach of WTO rules, the burden of proof should lie with any third party 
affected by the formation of an RTA to prove the contrary (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 2003). 
5.7.1. Difficulties in the CRTA Process for RTAs: 
Since, the CRTA seems to have been unsuccessful in its primary responsibility, 
which is the examination of the various RTAs in operation, it probably needs to be 
reformed. In fact, the CRTA seems to have failed in its duty to assess their 
suitability and compatibility of RTAs to the MTS. Although the CRTA seems to also 
have been unable to ascertain the conformity of RTAs to WTO rules, it has enjoyed 
some reasonable success in terms of informing the WTO on the systemic issues 
relating to RTAs (Crawford and Laird, 2001). Information gathered by the CRTA 
on the many RTAs in existence has helped the WTO in its quest to find ways and 
means to check the rapid proliferation of RTAs. And the CRTA has also helped the 
WTO in its desire to seek means to make RTAs more beneficial to the 
establishment of an effective MTS.  
After the examination of any RTA, one of the main duties of the CRTA is to 
recommend ways and means that the RTA it has just examined could become 
more compatible to the MTS. The other alternative is to recommend ways and 
means on how the said RTA could best fulfil the necessary requirements of Article 
XXIV of the GATT treaty. In my opinion, the CRTA has reasonably failed in the 
exercise of this very important duty (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
However, the point of contention is that, when the CRTA was created it was 
thought that it would help solve the compatibility problem of RTAs in relation to 
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the MTS. And in addition, indirectly help to solve the issue of RTAs’ conformity to 
WTO rules. It might have been assumed that these regulatory measures could have 
helped reduced the global proliferation of RTAs. If the regulatory measures were 
effective, it could have helped to contain the negative impact exerted on the MTS 
through the existence of multiple incompatible and unsuitable RTAs (Bhagwati 
and Panagariya, 2003). However, this has not been the case, because different 
issues have affected the CRTA’s work in relation to the examination of RTAs and 
some of these issues are fundamental in nature and others include problems 
arising from RTAs formed by DCs under the Enabling Clause rules, which are 
normally exempted from the CRTA process (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). 
The lack of adequate and sufficient information on RTAs involving 
developing countries has helped to create additional headaches for the WTO in 
relation to the establishment of an effective MTS. It would have been much better 
for all existing RTAs to be subjected to equal treatment at the CRTA. In fact, the 
examination process at the CRTA should have focused more on the transparency 
of RTAs. With this procedure in place DCs could also benefit from the CRTA’s 
recommendations on the RTAs they form. By examining all RTAs at the CRTA, 
there could have been enormous progress in the formation of new RTAs, from 
recommendations from the CRTA the CRTA process. In this light, the WTO could 
have been able to collect appropriate feedbacks on all RTAs, from the information 
gathered by the CRTA (Mathis, 2002). 
Furthermore, one of the other most profound difficulties experienced at 
the CRTA is on the issue of late notification and insufficient submission of 
information regarding the RTA being negotiated. This research strongly suggests 
that the situation at the CRTA could dramatically improve, if there is sufficient 
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motivation for WTO members to strictly comply with the requirements of GATT 
Article XXIV, 7a, because of some deep difficulties experienced by the CRTA 
(Mathis, 2002) 
In addition, Mathis (2002) suggested that the CRTA’s examination 
procedure should be divided into different linking sets of stages to minimise 
difficulties faced by the CRTA’s. In addition, Mathis (2002) also suggested that the 
CRTA process for the examination of RTAs should be divided into different 
separate stages and that this division would greatly improve the work of the CRTA. 
In fact, Mathis (2002) suggestions depend very much on the setting that each stage 
of the CRTA’s examination process should be very independent of one another.  
Furthermore, Mathis (2002) recommended that through the passing of one 
stage, the next stage would then be ushered in.  For example, in any circumstances, 
RTAs seeking the approval of the CRTA should first comply with stage one of the 
CTRA’s process before moving into the next stage of the process, which is stage 
two.  Furthermore Mathis (2002) suggested that, in a situation where an RTA is 
not able to comply with stage one of the CRTA’s examination process, there would 
be no reason whatsoever for the process to continue. Clearly speaking, he meant 
that failure to comply with stage one of the CRTA process by any RTA; this should 
simply be the end of the CRTA process for that RTA. 
The process of disclosure of information to the WTO by RTA members 
should be the very first stage in the CRTA’s examination procedure. This simply 
means that disclosure of information to the WTO should constitute stage one 
(Mathis, 2002). And this stage should first be completed satisfactorily before any 
factual examination by the CRTA is carried out. In this regard, once members to an 
RTA are unable to fulfil this specific obligation at stage one, the CRTA process 
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should end immediately. Mathis (2002) further suggested that this could be 
considered as tangible proof that the RTA has failed to comply with WTO rules. As 
a result, the RTA in question must cease to exist, as a legal agreement. The 
reasoning behind his proposal is that this RTA has not been able to comply with 
GATT/WTO requirements. If this procedure were to be implemented, it would 
convey a clear message to all WTO members that GATT/WTO rules must be 
strictly adhered to.  
Mathis (2002) also suggested that if the already mentioned reforms 
become the order of the day for all RTAs in existence, it would be very effective 
towards the adherence to the provisions Article XXIV, 7a, of the GATT. Arguing 
that this could help to strengthen the probability of members of an RTA receiving 
positive recommendations from the CRTA before the RTA is put into force. 
Nonetheless, it is still very possible that even if the proposal put forward 
by Mathis (2002) previously analysed is implemented by the CRTA, very little will 
change. Because there is a very high probability that some WTO members would 
continue to use the apparent ambiguity contained in the interpretation of WTO 
rules, in their desire to establish RTAs. This is very plausible, because the general 
desire of these nations is to use loopholes found in WTO rules in their quest to 
achieve their individual goals. Indeed, the CRTA in its present state seems rather 
more like a political forum for member states of the WTO than a mechanism for 
the surveillance and monitoring of RTAs (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003). 
Apparently, it seems a monumental task to effectively reform the CRTA to meet its 
obligations and mandate under the auspices of the WTO. This is partly because 
before any reform could be possible, there must be consensus by all member 
states of the WTO. This has always been the case within the WTO system. 
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Consensus must be reached, for the application of any decision to reform or make 
changes to anything is applicable (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
In principle, a strict application of the interpretation of WTO rules and 
adherence to the provisions of Article XXIV,7a, of the GATT 1994 treaty is needed, 
for the work of the CRTA on RTAs to be relevant and respected to the letter, by 
WTO member states. If this cannot be attained the CRTA would continue to be 
inapt in its duties, obligations and mandate to the WTO and its member states. 
Because of this inability for the CRTA to properly perform its duties, any reform 
of the CRTA process would be beneficial, no matter how small.  
However, if the suggested proposal of Mathis (2002) and a clarification on 
the strict and unique interpretation of GATT Article XXIV,7a is accepted by 
member states of the WTO, this could be the solution to the difficulties faced by 
the CRTA process.  If Mathis (2002) suggested proposal is achieved, it could help 
to check the proliferation of RTAs, which are not in compliance to WTO rules and 
also prevent the coming into force of so many RTAs that are not also compatible 
to the MTS. Due to lots of minor problems and some major problems, such as the 
ambiguity in the interpretation of Article XXIV,7a, of the GATT treaty, WTO 
members apparently have not been unable to reach a clear consensus on the 
unique interpretation of this Article (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
Legally, the wordings of GATT Article XXIV seems ambiguous, since it 
creates varying interpretations by WTO members, as need arises. These legal 
loopholes or ambiguity has been one of the main problems at the CRTA in relation 
to the formation of nonconforming RTAs (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2003).  
Nonetheless, if needed reforms are implemented it could lead to a change or 
rewording or even a specific interpretation of the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, 
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that could state that no RTA should be entered into-force if it does not comply fully 
with all WTO rules (Mathis, 2002). In fact, this could be a great step forward. And 
if this situation becomes the norm, the trouble of dealing with RTAs that come into 
force without the authorisation of the WTO through the examination process at 
the CRTA could become a thing of the past (Mathis, 2002). Through such reform, 
the CRTA could be well able to execute its mandate with renewed vigour, authority 
and legitimacy. As a matter of fact, this has not been the case with the role of the 
CRTA between 1996 and 2010.  
Furthermore, the unreasonable delays and bureaucracy that sometimes 
seem to plague the WTO and even the CRTA are both political and institutional 
(Mathis, 2002). If the CRTA process could be reformed, the WTO should insert a 
limited time frame between notification and the delivery of CRTA’s 
recommendations to member states intending to establish an RTA; to minimise 
any unnecessary negative impact on the work of the CRTA, which could in turn 
impact negatively on trade and trading matters of member states (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 2003).  
WTO members could then use this time frame to assess and implement the 
CRTA’s recommendations (if any) before RTAs are entered into-force. If the role 
of the CRTA in its delivery of recommendations on RTAs were prompt, without 
delays and without unnecessary bureaucracy, WTO members would view the 
CRTA process as effective and relevant.  By so doing, adherence to the CRTA 
process might be supported and respected by all and sundry (Mathis, 2002). 
At mentioned earlier, the CRTA seemed even more powerless in relation to 
insufficient information submitted on RTAs to be formed by WTO members. The 
situation of insufficient submission of information by members to an RTA has 
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been one of the practical hindrances to the CRTA’s work. The CRTA could not be 
expected to finish its work on any RTA without the needed or necessary 
information to do its investigative work: Firstly, on the examination of the 
compatibility of RTAs to the MTS. And secondly, on the conformity of RTAs to WTO 
rules. All these areas need to be reformed to give the CRTA the needed help 
necessary for it to be able to do its work properly in relation to the examination of 
RTAs.  
However, with RTAs formed under the provisions of GATS Article V, the 
problem of insufficient information was carefully eliminated, because the 
wordings of the provisions of GATS Article V made it very clear that the Council 
for Trade in Services (CTS) can request additional information from members of 
an RTA, if need arises. But this is not the case with the wordings of GATT Article 
XXIV.  The wordings of GATT Article XXIV could be amended, since, the 
withholding of vital information concerning the formation of RTAs has led to 
difficulties in the examination process at the CRTA, in relation to RTAs formed 
under GATT Article XXIV. 
In addition, as per the wording of GATS Article V,7a, there is the 
requirement by member nations to submit to the CTS all requested relevant 
information concerning the RTA being formed - and this is a must. GATS Article V: 
7a states that members which are parties to an RTA shall also make available to 
the Council of Trade in Services (CTS) such relevant information as may be 
requested by it. Furthermore, the Enabling Clause provision contained in 
Paragraph 4a also states that WTO members intending to introduce an 
arrangement shall furnish the WTO with all the information it may deem 
appropriate relating to such action. There seems to be a clear authorisation of 
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legitimate authority given to the CTS to decide on the level of information it deems 
necessary. Therefore, the CTS could request the submission of such information 
from WTO members seeking to form RTAs. Nonetheless, this has not been the case 
at the CRTA (Mathis, 2002). 
The CRTA’s position in relation to the GATT treaty as per the submission of 
information concerning RTAs being formed can be interpreted as follows: 
Although it enables the WTO through the CRTA to make certain reports, there are 
practically no legal powers given to the CRTA to request further information 
relating to RTAs from Contracting Parties. However, if the information submitted 
by WTO members to the CRTA is deemed insufficient – the provisions of GATT 
Article XXIV in its present state renders the CRTA powerless as compared to the 
CTS in relation to GATS Article V (Mathis, 2002).   
In this light, the mandate of CRTA should be changed to give powers and 
authority required to perform its duties. Reforms in this direction could help the 
CRTA in performing its role appropriately. However, this would certainly do very 
little in real terms in relation to RTAs examination backlog already existing at the 
CRTA.  Since reforms are made to take care of the future not the past. Furthermore, 
in terms of the formation of RTAs between WTO members and non-members the 
CRTA is even more powerless. This is an area the WTO needs to take full charge of 
by reforming mandate of the CRTA.  
Finally, if the WTO is to monitor all existing RTAs, in its effort to establish 
free trade through a carefully crafted MTS, the CRTA would need to be reformed 
to ensure it is fit for purpose - effective and relevant (Mathis, 2002). 
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5.7.2. Inability of the CRTA to Perform Its Duties: 
It seems the CRTA has proven to be inept to fulfil its mandate, because the 
examination process of RTAs at the CRTA has been wholly ineffective. Clearly, the 
examination process of RTAs at the CRTA has been incomplete and inadequate, 
because of so many reasons mentioned earlier in various sections of this work. 
This inadequacy of the CRTA to complete the examination of the various RTAs in 
operation was one of the main difficulties that plagued the ‘Individual Working 
Parties’ during the GATT days.  
Although it was the desire for WTO members to oversee the examination 
of RTAs and the publication of examination reports, which led to the 
establishment of the CRTA and the disbanding of the Working Party model, 
however, the CRTA also has failed in the execution of these two functions. Because 
the CRTA has also been plagued by similar difficulties, which also troubled the 
Contracting Parties of the GATT.  
Crawford and Laird (2001) suggested that the CRTA has been unable to 
come to a decisive conclusion in its examination of many of the RTAs in existence 
today. This has led to incomplete examination of RTAs and the non-finalisation of 
many examination reports of most of the RTAs in existence in our world today. 
Because of incomplete examination reports of many RTAs, there has been no 
publication of final examination reports (Crawford and Laird, 2001). Since, there 
are no final examination reports on these RTAs, there can be no adoption of these 
reports (examination reports) by the WTO or the CRTA. This has been the position 
of the CRTA, since its establishment in 1996 up to 2010 (Crawford and Laird, 
2001). 
 174 
Furthermore, the CRTA has also been unable to suggest recommendations to the 
various RTAs it has attempted to examine. This has been partly due to the lack of 
decisive, conclusive and final examination reports of these RTAs at the CRTA 
(Crawford and Laird, 2001). In 2003, one of the published reports of the CRTA on 
its activities, the CRTA suggested that it had pursued its examination work on 
RTAs, but had been unable to finalise reports on any of the examinations before it. 
 In addition, the former Director General of the WTO, Mr Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, also made a damning indictment of the CRTA, by saying that the 
CRTA has been a ‘moribund’ committee. This was a clear acknowledge by a leading 
figure at the WTO that one of its committees is inept or irrelevant or that the 
committee is not progressing with its work, as it should; or whichever other way 
one chooses to see it. 
Mr. Panitchpakdi, however, attempted to explain away his “moribund” 
comment about the CRTA, by alluding to the fact that the failures at CRTA has been 
partly because the CRTA had been unable to carry out a proper examination of 
RTAs, notified to the WTO. He suggested that this had occurred simply because 
WTO members forming an RTA have been unable to furnish the CRTA with full 
and factual-information on the RTAs, they are seeking to establish. He 
acknowledged that for the CRTA to effectively carry out its duties, WTO member 
nations seeking to form and establish RTAs must assist the CRTA in its 
examination process. He also suggested that the lack of proper and adequate 
information about the RTAs under examination had helped to hinder the work of 
the CRTA.  This has effectively made the CRTA look moribund. Thereby placing the 
examination of RTAs by at the CRTA under the auspices of the WTO almost in the 
same position they were before the creation of the CRTA in 1996.  
 175 
However, in a WTO annual report of 2001, the WTO made a very strange 
admission in relation to the examination of RTAs at the CRTA. In highlighting 
failures encountered by the CRTA in the examination process of RTAs, the WTO 
suggested in its report that the it does not have rules and procedures for 
examination of RTAs that function adequately (Crawford and Laird, 2001). 
5.7.3. The Need to Reorganise the CRTA Examination Process: 
If the CRTA process is reorganised, it might enable the CRTA to effectively fulfil 
the purpose for which it was created. To make the CRTA process more effective 
the WTO as an institution might also need to be reformed. In addition to the 
reorganisation of the examination process, there would be added benefits to WTO 
members if the process of multilateral surveillance and monitoring of RTAs at the 
CRTA were reorganised. The reason being that the current CRTA process for the 
examination of RTAs, aimed at assessing compatibility of RTAs to the MTS, and 
their conformity to WTO rules is completely inadequate (Crawford and Laird, 
2001).  
The apparent gross inadequacy of the examination process at the CRTA 
makes it almost impossible for WTO members to reach consensus to be able to 
make informed legal decisions on RTAs under examination (Mathis, 2002). 
Because of the inadequacies in the examination process at the CRTA, the WTO 
seem unable to carry out appropriate multilateral surveillance and monitoring of 
many of the RTAs in operation. It has now become a difficult task for the WTO to 
ensure that only RTAs that are suitable, which conform to WTO rules and are 
compatible to the MTS can continue to exist in our trading system (Mathis, 2002). 
To be able to correct these difficulties, defects or inability in the CRTA’s 
examination process: Firstly, there must be procedural and institutional changes 
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within the WTO, which would in effect affect the way the examination process at 
the CRTA works. Secondly, the WTO needs to re-examine the CRTA process and 
eliminate aspects in its work that tends to hinder the effectiveness of the 
examination process for RTAs. 
 In fact, improvements in the CRTA’s examination process could help to put 
in place adequate control mechanism for multilateral surveillance and monitoring 
of the various RTAs in operation and make the examination process worth-while. 
Thirdly, the wording of GATT Article XXIV needs to be clarified in terms of its legal 
ambiguity that has created so many loopholes in its interpretation. This could help 
reduce the abuse of WTO provisions, and help to limit the formation of RTAs that 
do not conform to WTO rule. 
A careful study of GATT Article XXIV reveals that it prohibits any RTA from 
entering into-force without the express permission of the CRTA through its 
consistency report on conformity to WTO rules. One of the duties of the CRTA in 
relation to the examination of RTAs is to produce recommendations that would 
have legal consequences on the RTAs being formed by WTO members. RTAs 
formed respecting WTO rules, as per GATT Article XXIV, 7a & 7b, are only those 
that should be permitted to enter into force by the CRTA. 
In addition, recommendations of compatibility and consistency reports 
from the CRTA states clearly that the RTA being formed would be incompatible to 
the MTS or does not conform to WTO rules, the question then would be, what 
happens next? Should member nations involved in the RTA continue to establish 
this RTA? The clear answer is of course, NO! Because if the CRTA is truly 
functional, with the right mandate and legal status, such RTAs should cease to exist 
immediately; or be amended to confirm to WTO rules.  
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In relation to GATT 1994, Article XXIV,7b, if the CRTA finds an RTA wanting of the 
WTO rules, the RTA must be modified, if not it cannot enter into-force – Thus the 
RTA must cease to exist. GATT Article XXIV, 7b, states that the parties shall not 
maintain or put into force, as the case maybe, such agreements if they are not 
prepared to modify it in accordance with the CRTA’s recommendations. 
The emphasis on the legality to enter into-force of an RTA is part of the 
mandate of the CRTA, and this should have been through the CRTA’s 
recommendations.  Through the GATT treaty, the CRTA was given the authority to 
decide which RTAs are to be entered into-force or not. If all RTAs are subjected to 
an effective examination process at the CRTA, then the probability that 
inconsistent or incompatible RTA would be allowed to exist under the auspices of 
the WTO could be minimised (Mathis, 2002). And this could present a substantial 
benefit to the development of the MTS. Furthermore, this could also help 
multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO, by preventing the establishment of 
unregulated RTAs.  
Even if an RTA has been formed invoking the exemption to form regional 
agreements found in GATT Article XXIV, 5, there is still no justification for such a 
RTA to enter into force just by notifying the WTO. The requirement of the GATT 
treaty states that the examination process at the CTRA and the CRTA’s 
recommendation is necessary to assess the consistency and compatibility of any 
RTAs before it can enter into-force. But this has not been the case since 1996 to 
2010. The matter is that RTAs should not have been allowed to enter into force 
immediately after notification to the WTO as the case seems to have been, without 
recommendations at the CRTA. Finally, the CRTA’s recommendations should have 
been the only legal entitlement granting RTAs the power and legal status to enter-into 
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force. This control and regulation mechanism could have helped checked the 
proliferation of RTAs and given the needed impetus to the conclusion of multilateral 
trade negotiations and to the development of the MTS (Mathis, 2002).  
With the passage of time the WTO regulatory process for RTAs has proven to 
be grossly inadequate. Even the clarification on the 1994 Understanding of GATT 
Article XXIV undertaken in the year 1997 has not been very productive because it 
did not prevent or check the proliferation of RTAs, and RTAs that could have 
caused lasting damage to the development and establishment of the MTS.  
Finally, with all the difficulty involved in preventing the entering into-force 
of RTAs that could be detrimental to the MTS, it is now evident that there seemed 
to have been a lack of real foresight in the drafting of GATT Article XXIV.  Because 
the wordings of GATT Article XXIV seemed to have created multiple legal 
loopholes and ambiguity in its interpretation that have led to incessant abuse of 
its provisions by WTO members in their quest to form RTAs. These and other 
situations created difficulties in the role of the CRTA. 
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5.8. Conclusion:  
This chapter has explored the impact of the work of the CRTA on the formation of 
RTAs, the examination of RTAs at the CTRA, and multilateral surveillance and 
monitoring of RTAs using qualitative research methodology. It attempted to shine 
light on the impact of the role of the CRTA on the formation of RTAs in the face of 
multilateral trade negotiations.  
In addition, the motivation and attractiveness for the formation and 
establishment of RTA both by developed and developing countries were explored and 
some of the major RTAs in existence in the world today were also looked at.  
The findings of this chapter points to the fact that RTAs have now become a 
global phenomenon, attractive to both developed and developing countries, with no 
exception.  
However, this research argues that with the present phenomenon of new 
regionalism RTAs, attractive to both developed and developing countries, the work 
of the CRTA did not seem to have had any significant impact on the formation and 
establishment of such RTAs between 1996 and 2010. Because the work of the CRTA 
did not seem to have affected the total number of RTAs formed or entered into force 
by member nations of the WTO, between 1996 and 2010.  
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CHAPTER 6  
6.1. Introduction: 
This chapter explores the research question: How does the coverage of RTAs affect the 
Role of the CRTA? It studies RTAs coverage, the difficulties posed by the meaning of 
the ‘Substantially all the Trade’ phrase and issues relating to WTO-plus provisions 
RTAs. Furthermore, it studies the complexities in the interpretation of the 
‘Substantially all the Trade’ provision and its implication in the Turkey-textile and the 
Canada-Auto cases. In addition, it also looks at the need to amend the GATT treaty, 
reform the WTO and other major international multilateral organisations whose 
influences could affect world trade. Finally, it discusses whether RTAs are a trade 
creation or a trade diverting mechanism, explores the impact of RTAs on the 
economic development of member states and looks at the Doha Development Round. 
 
6.2.  RTAs Coverage: 
It is very confusing when one uses the words RTAs without a comprehensive 
knowledge, since some RTAs cover a broad spectrum of trade in goods and 
services. The term RTAs seems simplistic if one is to describe it in very few words. 
However, the concept of what regional integration schemes really are and the 
broad verities they seem to represent is vast. It is very probable that no two RTAs 
are identical in nature, even if they are classified under the same heading, because 
all RTAs are formed and established through a treaty; and no two treaties are truly 
identical in nature and wordings. The very fact that all RTAs are formed and 
established through closed door negotiation calls to mind the incorporation of 
 181 
specific regional interest, and the fact is that each region of the world differs in 
many ways, shape and form from each other. 
In researching the role of the CRTA, it is important to look at the various 
types of RTAs classified under the broad heading of RTA that are negotiated, 
formed and established by WTO members all over the world and their different 
coverage. The various types of RTAs authorised by the GATT/WTO under GATT 
Article XXIV, 8, namely: Free Trade Areas (FTAs), Customs Unions (CUs) and any 
Interim Agreements leading to the formation of either FTAs or CUs. One of the 
most important requirements of FTAs and CUS is the elimination of substantially 
all tariffs and trade barriers between member states.  
One aspect that clearly stands out in an FTA is that all member states are 
free to decide on their own trading terms with non-member nations, such as in 
matters relating to tariffs and other trade barriers. An example of an RTA that 
operates directly in line with FTAs classification is NAFTA, where member nations 
can establish their own individual tariffs and trade barriers with other nations 
who are not members of the organisation. In fact, the USA, Canada or Mexico could 
individually freely decide what tariffs or trade barriers could be applicable to 
other trading nations of the world they chose to trade with. Meaning individual 
nations are at liberty to decide trade terms and trading policy with the rest of the 
world, without any interference from other member states of NAFTA. 
Basically, all CUs are FTAs, however, the main difference between CUs and 
FTAs is that with CUs there is a common external tariff applicable to all member 
states in relation to third parties. In practice CUs often requires significant 
harmonisation of trading policy amongst member states that could take a very 
long time to implement, sometimes this is part of the joining requirement. The fact 
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is that some present-day CUs first began as FTAs, before evolving into CUs through 
the harmonisation of trading policies, such as the implementation of common 
external tariff by all member states in relation to all third parties. One concrete 
example of an FTA that has transformed into a CU is the Andean Community. 
6.3. Difficulties posed by the Meaning of ‘Substantially All the Trade’- (SAT): 
There are systemic issues arising from the interpretation of the SAT phrase by 
WTO members to an RTA, as contained in Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT. The 
provisions of Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT states: “duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce are eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade 
between the constituent territories of the [RTA] or at least with respect to 
substantially all the trade…” (GATT Article XXIV: 8a (i) and 8b) 
There is a general understanding that the wording of this phrase under 
GATT Article XXIV,8, were to ensure and secure a level playing field within the 
territories of an RTA. SAT refers to the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of 
other trade barriers, in terms of all goods and services, rather than the 
liberalisation of certain selected areas of trade. But because of the ambiguity of 
the phrase ‘Substantially all the Trade’ in GATT Article XXIV, 8, some WTO 
member nations have interpreted this phrase to mean a less significant amount of 
trade could be liberalised. Thereby, permitting the existence of certain regulatory 
restrictions and duties within the territories of an RTA. 
Because of the non-clarification of the exact percentage of all the trade that 
is supposed to be liberalised in the territories the RTAs, as required by WTO 
provision through the SAT phrase contained in Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT, there 
has been varying interpretation as to the exact nature of compliance to be adhered 
to. This ambiguity in interpretation and the nature of compliance to the SAT has 
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been one of the major hindrances in the examination of RTAs at the CRTA. The 
CRTA has been unable to evaluate the exact application of the SAT phrase on RTAs.  
In fact, the CRTA has not been able to reach consensus on what could be 
considered as SAT in its examination process. The existing disagreement on the 
exact interpretation of SAT at the CRTA has been huge, leading to some 
suggestions on ways to find a consensus in its interpretation.  Since, the 
liberalization of trade is very fundamental when invoking the exemption to the 
MFN clause in the formation and establishment of RTAs. Some have suggested the 
utilization of a quantitative measure at the CRTA. While others have proposed that 
an exact percentage should be considered, accepted and implemented as the SAT 
phrase benchmark, which could be statistically verified by the CRTA. 
These proposals contain the clarification that certain percentage of all 
trade should be liberalised by member nations to an RTA, for the RTA to comply 
with the requirement of contained in Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT. These proposals 
or new interpretations always create additional problems for the CRTA’s 
examination process, since this could usher in a new set of regulations requiring 
WTO members to comply to certain amount of trade liberalisation in relation to 
new RTAs. And when the percentage of liberalisation are met, there would be no 
need for further liberalisation. This situation could put RTAs as clear obstacles to 
the development of the MTS. RTAS would then be clearly regarded by many as 
being unsuitable and incompatible to the MTS. RTAs conformity to WTO rules 
could also be clearly questioned, because the application of these interpretations 
in relation to Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT would be a clear breach of WTO rules in 
general, due to the fact that free trade cannot be achieved with indirect 
restrictions in place with the pretext of trade liberalisation. The agreed percentage 
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could henceforth be the acceptable level of trade liberalisation under the auspices 
of the WTO – one can truly see that SAT ambiguity is a real threat to the work of 
the CRTA. 
Furthermore, the other proposals put forward by certain WTO member 
nations at the CRTA have been described as a qualitative measure as opposed to 
the already proposed quantitative measure. This qualitative proposal is intended 
to consider and accepts SAT as the liberalisation of 95% of all the trade. This 
proposal seemed to be reasonable, in terms of coverage and trade liberalisation. 
This qualitative proposal as it seems went forward to state that RTAs do not 
exclude any sector of trade for liberalisation, and that 95% liberalisation of all the 
trade in this proposal means 95% liberalisation of all sectors of trade. Member 
nations of the WTO have been very wary of the phrase percentage, level or degree 
of liberalisation within the territories of an RTA, because some nations feel very 
strongly that a liberalisation process that goes just below what is required by the 
MFN clause and just above zero could be considered as sufficient liberalisation. In 
as much as there is substantial elimination of barriers to trade in all sectors of the 
economy. Considering there is no consensus on the bases by which this proposal 
is agreed upon, places a heavy burden on the CRTA.  
Since, many nations who favoured the quantitative approach before also 
accepted the qualitative proposal, this means that both interpretations could be 
applied variously at will by WTO member in relation to the formation and 
establishment of RTAs. The opinion of this research on this matter is that the 
CRTA’s examination mandate should be broadened to incorporate compliance to 
interpretations that have been debated and accepted at various instances. This 
could help in the promotion of the development of the MTS. Proposals such as 
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these quantitative and qualitative proposals to the interpretation of the SAT 
phrase, if implemented by the WTO could go a long way in improving the work of 
the CRTA. In fact, this could give the CRTA more power and authority in making 
legal and binding decision on RTAs entered into by member states of the WTO.  
To tighten the CRTA’s examination process for RTAs, the application of the 
provisions of Paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV of the GATT must be carefully 
reconsidered by the WTO. This could be done through the CRTA examination 
process by correlating the application of these two paragraphs. Since, it is through 
the assessment of the compatibility of RTAs with the provisions contained in 
Paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV of the GATT that RTAs could attain their legal 
status. The question at the CRTA has always been that which of these two 
Paragraphs should first be used to assess the compatibility of RTAs.  And if an RTA 
under examination fails to meet the first assessment should the second 
assessment be carried out? The fact is that to save time and reduce the 
unnecessary bureaucracy and workload at the CRTA, the examination process 
based on the compatibility assessment of Paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV of the 
GATT must be simplified.  
If this process is simplified, this could make the CRTA more effective in 
executing its mandate on the examination of RTAs and in its duty to assess RTAs’ 
suitability and compatibility to the MTS. Paragraphs 5 and 8 of Article XXIV of the 
GATT are very closely related. This is partly because the provisions of Paragraphs 
5 permit the formation of RTAs in the form of either FTAs, customs unions or 
Interim Agreements leading to the formation of any of the two. While the 
provisions of paragraph 8, grants exemptions to WTO rules. Simply by defining 
the nature of RTAs permitted by the WTO to be either FTAs, customs unions or 
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Interim Agreements leading to the formation of either of any of the two options. 
Indeed, to clearly enhance the work of the CRTA and simplify the examination 
process for RTAs, RTAs that are inconsistent with the provisions of Paragraph 8 
need not be assessed with the provisions of Paragraph 5 of GATT Article XXIV. 
Inconsistency with Paragraph 8 of GATT Article XXIV signifies that the RTA does 
not comply with the SAT phrase, so it can’t be put into force (Mathis, 2002).  
The provisions of Paragraph 4 of GATT Article XXIV and its influence on 
Paragraph 5 and 8 should also be taken into consideration at the CRTA, in its 
examination process of RTAs. The provisions under Paragraph 4, intended that 
RTAs should not raise barriers to trade with third parties who are not members 
to the agreement. The main interpretation of Paragraph 4 is that it helps to give 
ample cover and safeguard to Paragraphs 5 and 8. Practically, the provisions of 
Paragraph 4 do not constitute a separate assessment for RTAs. In relation to the 
Turkey-Textiles case, the Appellate Body made the following statement in its 
ruling, it stated that: Paragraph 4 contains purposive, and not operative, language. 
It does not set forth a separate obligation by itself but, rather, it sets forth the 
overriding and pervasive purpose for Article XXIV which is manifested in 
operative language in the specific obligations that are found elsewhere in Article 
XXIV. This in fact could be interpreted to signify that Paragraph 4’s provisions 
could help in re-enforcing the requirements under Paragraph 5 and 8, and that 
Paragraph 4 of GATT Article XXIV does not contain or purport a separate 
requirement. This means that the careful application of the requirements of 
Paragraph 5 and 8, in correlation with the safeguards contained in Paragraph 4, 
could help the CRTA in its examination process of RTAs. If the CRTA’s examination 
process were to be tightened, through the application of the requirements 
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contained in paragraph 5 and 8, it would help to prevent the entry into force of 
unsuitable and incompatible RTAs (Appellate Body’s Report on Turkey-Textile 
Case, 1999). 
Based mainly on GATT Article XXIV, 8a, SAT, the Appellate Body’s decision 
could be explored in these cases to gain insight into the interpretation of this 
phrase as applied by the Appellate Body’s. 
6.3.1. The Turkey-Textile Case: 
In Turkey-Textiles the definition of the provisions of Article XXIV,8a, of the GATT, 
for a GATT consistent Customs Union was addressed by the Appellate Body.  The 
Appellate Body suggested that Sub-paragraph 8a(i) of GATT Article XXIV 
establishes the standard for the internal trade between constituent members to 
satisfy the definition of a customs union. It requires the constituent members of a 
customs union to eliminate ‘duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce’ 
with respect to SAT between them. They also noted that neither GATT 
CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO members have ever reached an agreement 
on the interpretation of the term ‘substantially’ in this provision (Appellate Body’s 
Report on Turkey-Textile Case, 1999). 
It is clear, though, that SAT is not the same as all the trade, and that SAT is 
something considerably more than merely some of the trade. They also noted that 
the terms of sub-paragraph 8a (i) provide that members of a customs union may 
maintain, where necessary, in their internal trade, certain restrictive regulations 
of commerce that are otherwise permitted under Articles XI through XV and under 
Article XX of the GATT 1994. However, they agree with the Panel that the terms of 
sub-paragraph 8a (i) offer some flexibility to the constituent members of a 
customs union when liberalising their internal trade in accordance with this 
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subparagraph. Yet they cautioned that the degree of flexibility that sub-paragraph 
8a (i) allows should be limited by the requirement that duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce be eliminated with respect to substantially all internal 
trade (Appellate Body’s Report on Turkey-Textile Case, 1999). 
Applying the second step of the test set out in the explanation above, the 
Appellate Body in the Turkey-Textiles case examined whether the formation of an 
EC–Turkey customs union meeting the requirements of Article XXIV,8a (i) would 
have been prevented if Turkey were not permitted to impose the textile 
restrictions at issue. Turkey argued that without these restrictions, the European 
Communities would have excluded these products from free trade within the 
Turkey/EC customs union; since the goods at issue amounted to 40 per cent of 
Turkey’s exports to the EC, Turkey expressed concern that in that event, the 
customs union might not cover SAT. However, the Appellate Body found that the 
restrictions were not necessary because there were alternatives available for this 
purpose (Appellate Body’s Report on Turkey-Textile Case, 1999).  
But as the Panel suggested, there were other alternatives available to 
Turkey and the European Communities to prevent any possible diversion of trade, 
while at the same time meeting the requirements of sub-paragraph 8a(i). For 
example, Turkey could adopt rules of origin for textile and clothing products that 
would allow the European Communities to distinguish between those textile and 
clothing products originating in Turkey, which would enjoy free access to the 
European Communities under the terms of the customs union, and those textile 
and clothing products originating in third countries, including India. A system of 
certificates of origin would have been a reasonable alternative until the 
quantitative restrictions applied by the European Communities, which are 
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required to be terminated under the provisions of the ATC. Yet no use was made 
of this possibility to avoid trade diversion. Turkey preferred instead to introduce 
the quantitative restrictions at issue. For this reason, we conclude that Turkey was 
not, in fact, required to apply the quantitative restrictions at issue in this appeal 
to form a customs union with the European Communities (Appellate Body’s 
Report on Turkey-Textile Case, 1999). 
6.3.2. The Canada-Autos Case: 
In Canada-Autos case, Canada argued that under GATT Article XXIV, it was 
permitted to grant a selective import duty exemption in the automotive sector to 
products of its partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
But in a finding not reviewed by the Appellate Body, the Panel rejected this 
defence. It found that the measure was not properly characterized as a RTA 
measure, because the exemption applied to products of non-parties to the NAFTA, 
and was denied to some products of NAFTA parties: 
As a result, its ruling stated that their analysis of the impact of the 
conditions under which the import duty exemption is accorded, they found that 
those conditions entail a distinction between countries depending upon whether 
there are capital relationships of producers in those countries with eligible 
importers in Canada. Adding that the measure not only grants duty-free treatment 
in respect of products imported from the United States and Mexico by 
manufacturer-beneficiaries but it also grants duty-free treatment in respect of 
products imported from third countries not parties to a customs union or free-
trade area with Canada. Observing that the notion that the import duty exemption 
involves the granting of duty-free treatment of imports from the United States and 
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Mexico does not capture the aspect of the measure (Appellate Body’s Report on 
the Canada-Autos Case, 2000). 
Finally, they stated that in their view, GATT Article XXIV clearly cannot 
justify a measure, which grants WTO-inconsistent duty-free treatment to products 
originating in third countries not parties to a customs union or free trade 
agreement. They further note that the import duty exemption does not provide for 
duty-free importation of all like products originating in the United States or 
Mexico and that whether such products benefit from the exemption depends upon 
whether they are imported by certain motor vehicle manufacturers in Canada who 
are eligible for the exemption (Appellate Body’s Report on the Canada-Autos Case, 
2000) 
While in view of the specific foreign affiliation of these manufacturers, the 
exemption will mainly benefit products of the United States and Mexico; 
products of certain producers in these countries who have no relationship with 
such manufacturers are unlikely to benefit from the exemption. Thus, in practice 
the import duty exemption does not apply to some products that would be 
entitled to duty-free treatment if such treatment were dependent solely on the 
fact that the products originated in the United States or Mexico. However, the 
Appellate Body did not believe that the import duty exemption, which provides 
for duty-free treatment of imports of products of parties to a free-trade area is 
properly characterised as a measure (Appellate Body Report on the Canada-
Autos Case, 2000). 
6.4. Issues relating to ‘WTO-Plus- Provisions’ RTAs: 
In relationship to regional integration schemes, the needs of DCs are very much 
quite different from those of developed economies. While DCs are very much 
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interested in the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, with the agricultural 
sector occupying a prominent position, however, for developed economies such 
as the USA and some Western European countries their interest goes beyond these 
perspectives and includes areas such as intellectual property rights, investment, 
labour, environmental needs and competition. RTAs that are negotiated which 
includes such areas of coverage are classified as RTAs having WTO-plus provisions 
coverage. This simply means these RTAs involve areas of coverage not covered by 
the WTO provisions by which RTAs are supposed to be formed. Meaning that the 
coverage of such RTAs goes beyond what is expected by the WTO under GATT 
Article XXIV. 
Since, some of the RTAs being negotiated and entered into force today by 
developed economies who are members of the WTO includes the liberalisation of 
all sectors of the economy, they could be classified as WTO-plus provision RTAs. 
In addition, WTO-plus provisions could also be labelled on RTAs that are formed 
by WTO members with non-member nations. Politically, every nation can 
negotiate all sort of trade agreements with other nations whether WTO members 
or not. However, a tariff reduction trade agreement concluded between WTO 
members and non-members would be beyond the jurisdiction of the WTO, and 
such RTAs would be classified as ‘WTO-Plus-Provision’  
It is possible nowadays to identify two types of WTO-plus provisions RTAs 
following the rules under the provision of Article XXIV: 8 of the GATT 1947 treaty. 
The EU (Economic Union) and CARICOM (Common Market) are RTAs that could 
have probably gone beyond WTO provisions in their negotiations and areas of 
coverage. Apparently, most present day Common Markets and Economic Unions 
involve areas of coverage that goes beyond the requirement of the GATT Article 
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XXIV:8. However, an Economic Union goes far beyond a simple Common Market 
concept, since it incorporates the harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies 
within the territory of the union. The nations involved in these types of RTAs 
involving fiscal and monetary policies harmonisation would not have evoked the 
provisions prescribed under GATT Article XXIV:8, because fiscal and monetary 
policies harmonisation process is indeed superfluous to WTO rules. 
6.5. The Debate on RTAs – Trade Creation or Trade Diversion?   
Interestingly, most debates on RTAs have been centred on the perceptions of RTAs 
by Jagdish Bhagwati and his army of supporters, such as Arvind Panagariya, on 
the question of whether RTAs are trade diversion mechanisms or not?  The other 
part of this debate has been to identify if RTAs are stumbling blocks or building 
blocks of the MTS?  
The question and the answer now hinge very much on the relevance of the 
CRTA. However, if the answer is YES - it means RTAs are building blocks – that is 
all RTAs. If this were the case, the CRTA would be rather irrelevant, in the 
examination of RTAs; because it would mean RTAs could help in the process of 
achieving free trade; thereby being one of the means to accomplish one of the main 
objectives of the GATT/WTO – the achievement of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. But if RTAs are indeed ‘stumbling blocks’ to the MST, the position of 
the CRTA becomes very necessary, relevant and even compulsory to examine the 
various RTAs in operation or in existence and determine their compatibility to the 
MST. This was the initial feeling of the WTO when the CRTA was established I 
suppose – To examine the compatibility of RTAs to the MST and multilateral trade 
liberalisation (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996).     
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In 1950, Jacob Viner’s wrote one of the most pioneering literatures on preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs), ‘The Customs Unions Issue’. This pioneering treatise on 
PTAs opened the lid on the nature and difficulties of multilateral trade 
liberalisation through such agencies as RTAs. According to Arvind Panagariya, 
Viner’s 1950 treatise on Customs Unions focuses principally on what he claims 
Bhagwati coined a ‘static’ welfare questions (Viner, 1950).  
Bhagwati has been instrumental in coining most of the famous and fine 
phrases we are now conversant with. Most prominent among these phrases 
coined by Bhagwati includes ‘spaghetti bowl’ of PTAs and ‘stumbling blocks’ or 
‘building blocks’ in terms of the position of RTAs in relation to the MST. When one 
looks at PTAs or RTAs and some of the difficulties faced in the process of 
multilateral trade liberalization, one always turns to think of Bhagwati’s ideas, on 
the nature of these trade agreements (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996). 
 Viner attempted to answer the question about the desirability of RTAs 
posed by protectionists and some supporters of free trade. Viner developed an 
important distinction between trade creating and trade diverting PTAs. He argued 
that most RTAs would be trade creating if they allowed for the replacement of high 
cost domestic products with lower cost ones from a member nation or nations; 
the reverse would be trade diverting. Noting that RTAs that were trade creating 
could lead to enhancement in efficiency that would benefit member nations and 
the world at large and while those RTAs that seem to be trade diverting may lead 
to reduction in efficiency and welfare for all (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 1996).  
 In contrast, Baldwin (1995) laid emphases on incentive of outsiders to 
seek to become members of an RTA, asserting that monotonously this incentive 
could rise as the RTA expands to incorporate most, if not all the countries in the 
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region. In this case RTAs could turn out to be very attractive to non-members 
seeking to benefit from multiple trade incentives arising from them, instead of 
multilateral trade liberalisation.   
Nonetheless, in his conclusion, Viner stated that when supporters of free 
trade and some policy-makers are vying for RTAs, they probably would have in 
their minds trade creating RTAs, while protectionists would always be aiming for 
trade diverting RTAs (Viner, 1950). However, Viner’s analysis of trade creating 
and trade diverting RTAs seems very ambiguous because there are no clear 
criteria to assess or even determine if a specific RTA would be trade creating or 
trade diverting.   
The ambiguity in Viner’s analysis of trade creating or trade diverting RTAs 
led to further research and literature in this domain and direction by authors such 
as Krugman (1991), Wonnacott and Lutz (1989), Summers (1991) and many 
others searching for the modality to determine what are trade creating or trade 
diverting RTAs. This led to the assertion that RTAs concluded between already 
trading partners who are deemed natural trading partners and who are 
geographically proximate to one another; would lead inevitably to trade creation 
– thus trade creating RTAs (Baldwin, 1995). 
But Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) attempted to illustrate certain vital 
contradictions to this assertion or model. They pointed out that the term natural 
trading partners could vary if applied in a reverse manner. For instance, the fact 
that The USA could be a natural trading partner of India since India is seemed to 
be its biggest trading partner, this does not necessarily mean India is a natural 
trading partner of the USA. Taking the debate further they pointed out that even 
with some RTAs such as NFTA where member states are in closed proximity to 
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one another, member nations may not still be natural trading partners if the model 
is reversed. Stipulating that even if the USA maybe a natural trading partner of 
Canada, it could occur that both Canada and Mexico may not even be natural 
trading partner to one another.   
It is now widely accepted that the natural trading partner assertion can no 
longer be acceptable as a reasonable justification for the creation of RTAs. 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) properly elaborated and put some clarity to this 
assertion. It is very difficult however, to determine if a specific RTA would improve 
welfare or deteriorate it. However, Kemp and Wan (1976) and Panagariya and 
Krishna (2002) further clarified how trade diversion could be overturned in a CUs 
and FTAs by adjusting their internal tariff and setting appropriate general external 
tariff for member state by members of such RTAs. 
When one looks at Cooper and Massell (1965) and Bhagwati (1968) one 
can see an independent alternative as per welfare enhancing RTAs the nature of 
CUs in terms of emerging and developing economies seeking to advance their 
industrialisation through regional specialisation and trade. In this situation, a CU 
is the best option. This has been clearly supported by the analysis contained in 
Krishna and Bhagwati (1997) on how developing countries wanting to achieve an 
exogenous level of industrialisation at a lower cost, could achieve this through the 
formation of a CU.  
In addition, Bhagwati and Brecher (1979) and Brecher and Bhagwati 
(1981) attempted to show through various analyses how exogenous trading 
changes within small nations could very much make lots of unimaginable impacts 
on national welfare. Such impacts in national welfare through exogenous changes 
 196 
in trading matters are clearly noticeable within EU member nations especially in 
smaller nations within the EU, as a Common Market with single external tariff.  
Furthermore, a nagging question remains to be answered on the Issue of 
welfare improvement via exogenous changes in trading arrangements, since the 
welfare improvement or enhancement can only easily be noticeable in small or 
smaller nations within a Common Market with a single external tariff such as the 
EU. The question many would like to ask is: What are the welfare impacts on large 
or big countries such as Germany and France from these exogenous changes in 
trading arrangements. This has not been sufficiently demonstrated, since 
emphasis has always been on the welfare impacts on impoverished or small 
countries within the Common Market.  
Although Bhagwati and his army of supporters lost the policy debate or 
battle as some would say, he won lots of credits on the intellectual aspect of this 
debate. We could see today that what Bhagwati was staunchly critical about 
became more apparently clear to all; proving that he had some rear insight into 
the subject matter.  
Finally, as result of the proliferation of RTAs, the trade regime seems to be 
a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of PTAs crisscrossing each other. In fact, Bhagwati was right in 
this regard. Now, many trade scholars and policy-makers have come to agree that 
to address the problem of so many RTAs in the trading system, further multilateral 
liberalisation is needed. Most have ended up supporting Bhagwati’s assertion of 
deep multilateral trade liberalisation. Even the trade diversion argument against 
RTAs which seemed obvious in the late 1980s, does not seem to have any 
credibility in the 21st Century because most newly negotiated RTAs tend to 
reverse the trade diversion element of previous RTAs. Nevertheless, many 
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scholars such as Bhagwati are still clamouring for a universal tariff free trading 
system or a complete multilateral liberalisation of global trade (Krishna, Pravin 
and Bhagwati, 1997). 
6.5.1. The Impact of RTAs on Economic Development:  
“Assuring that regional and multilateral trade arrangements grow together and 
not apart is the greatest challenge for trade policy-makers today” (Ruggerio, 1996, 
p1). Mr Renato Ruggiero was the Director-General of the WTO between 1995 and 
1999. An Italian diplomat, Ruggiero believed that the WTO and the MTS were 
powerful tools for peace and prosperity. He was highly instrumental at finding 
common ground amidst a myriad of seemingly contradictory negotiating positions 
at the WTO. In the late 1990s, he played an extremely important role in brokering 
three important WTO agreements covering information technology products, 
trade in telecommunications services and trade in financial services. Ruggiero was 
also highly effective in guiding Ministers through the First WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in 1996. 
 In this Ruggerio’s statement, it could be interpreted that Ruggerio very 
much hoped that RTAs and multilateral trade arrangements could grow together 
and not apart, if certain measures of control were put in place. Generally, he was 
preferring to certain mechanisms that could ensure that RTAs complements 
multilateral trade arrangements. But in the present state of the WTO, these 
mechanisms could only be assured through the CRTA process. In a nut shell, 
through the work of the CRTA in the examination of RTAs. Others have also 
pointed out that there are many tangible and significant benefits accruing to 
nations engaged in the so many RTAs in operation. Apparently, that is why RTAs 
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seem to be very attractive to both developed and developing nations alike. 
(Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981) 
In terms of development, many have argued that RTAs are the most 
effective means of attracting significant foreign direct investments (FDI) within a 
very short period of time (Panagariya, 1999).  It is also generally believed that 
RTAs are the best means to guarantee market access, and they also act as 
safeguards for the protection of market access gained. In addition, there are lots 
of political interests involved or to be fulfilled directly or indirectly through the 
creation of certain RTAs, by individual member states (Lawrence, 1997).  That is 
why to some countries RTAs are more attractive than multilateral trade 
arrangements of the WTO, due to the politics involved in their creation – Thus 
responding to Ruggerio’s concern on the formidable challenges that RTAs could 
pose to the MTS if it turns out to be a competing model to multilateral trade 
arrangements  
Even in the 21st century, national development and bilateral trade 
arrangements continue to take precedence over multilateral trade negotiations, 
this might be partly because of the lack of adequate scientific evidence on the 
negative impacts of RTAs to the development of the MTS (Brecher and Bhagwati, 
1981). Furthermore, ambiguities in relation to many theories concerning trade 
distortion or trade diversion through the formation of some RTAs have also not 
helped matters in favour of multilateral trade arrangements (Bhagwati, 2008).  
The lack of clear scientific evidence to support some of the negative 
assumptions on the global impacts of RTAs on world trade and on the MTS, made 
the situation even more confusing to some WTO members looking for FDI 
(Bhagwati, 2008). As a matter of fact, many began to believe that closer regional 
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ties through the negotiation, formation and establishment of RTAs was a better 
option for attraction of substantial FDI for sustainable development, than 
multilateral trade arrangements preferred generally and advocated by the WTO 
(Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981).  
Nonetheless, most of the concepts propagated against the advantages 
gained through regionalism against that which could be gained from multilateral 
trade agreements seem very contradictory in everyday life situations. Because the 
benefits accruing through the congregation of countries in a specific region for 
free trade purposes seems more practical in real life than multilateral trade 
arrangements which could take multiple years to negotiate, with all its 
ramifications. These and many others are undoubtedly the main reasons why 
RTAs have continued to proliferate around the globe, in the face of on-going 
multilateral trade negotiations of the WTO (Brecher and Bhagwati, 1981).  
In fact, many of our present-day RTAs do not actually fall under the 
perception of what bilateral trade arrangements should look like. The scope, 
territory and coverage of many RTAs have surpassed the scope and nature of RTAs 
envisaged at time of the creation of GATT/WTO. Today FTAs and CUs are not how 
they intended them to be, they are now very vast with coverage outside a specific 
region. Globalisation has encouraged RTAs to abandon must of its original 
characteristics in favour of new ones. RTAs have now moved out of one of its very 
main characteristics, which is closed proximity. However, today’s reality is very 
different from the former. (Majluf, 2004) 
The coming together of two or more RTAs into an RTA is the new 
development in regionalism that would surpass some of the other complexities 
earlier posed by the proliferation of RTAs. But many see this new development as 
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a push towards multilateralism. Others have seen this new development in the 
formation and establishment of RTAs as ways and means to foster economic 
development and multilateralism among WTO members; a good example of such 
RTAs is the trade agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR. Some feel that if this 
trend continues it could help reduce the number of RTAs in existence, making it 
much easier to negotiate multilateral trade agreements. (Crawford and 
Fiorentino, 2005).  
Nonetheless, if the number of existing RTAs were to be reduced to a very 
small amount, the work of the CRTA in the examination of RTAs to determine their 
compatibility and suitability to the MTS would be much easier and could also be 
well managed. One of the advantages of this new development in RTA is the 
attraction of global FDI from different regions of the globe. This new development 
in RTAs could have been engineered by the continuous globalisation of the world 
economy (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Although the proliferation of RTAs is considered as a very serious 
challenge to the MTS promoted by GATT/WTO, it could sometimes also present 
strong economic advantage to member states through regional preferential trade 
liberalisation. It is also believed that RTAs could help DCs to compete for 
international market access through regional development. Development 
accruing from regionalism could help developing countries integrate from a 
stronger position into the global economy, better than through the MTS. Lots of 
developing countries consider RTAs as the most effective means to gain economic 
empowerment and development (Bhagwati, 2008). 
Through regional agreements there exists greater possibility for DCs to 
attain some level of economic of scales and specialisation in their industries. 
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Market expansion most often guarantees increase in production in all sectors of 
the economy. The gross domestic products (GDP) of many countries engage in 
RTAs often increases, because of some increase in market share.  Many countries 
also benefit economically, from the advantages accruing from the principle of rule 
of origin, usually applicable in most RTAs (Bhagwati, 2008).  
One of the main purposes of the Doha Development Round or Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA) was to find means and ways to accelerate 
development in developing countries by opening-up new markets access through 
the lifting of some trade restriction, tariffs and other trade barriers hindering 
development in these countries. The difficulties faced by many DCs and emerging 
economies in multilateral negotiation and the restrictive protectionist tactics 
employed by many developed industrialised countries to protect their markets 
from access to DCs, has made many DCs to rely very much on RTAs as one of their 
main development apparatus (Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 1997).  
Although some DCs have resorted to RTAs to push forward their 
development aspiration, however, some policymakers still feel strongly that RTAs 
are not the best way forward. There is the general belief amongst WTO members 
that RTAs are just a temporary measure but a fast solution in terms of 
development. As a matter of fact, it is assumed that the establishment of free trade 
and an MTS through multilateral trade negotiations is undoubtedly the best 
solution for development in the long run (Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 1997). 
Finally, the Director-General of the WTO Pascal Lamy, in presenting the 
Richard Snape Lecture on 26 November 2012, in Melbourne, Australia - Emerging 
economies have shifted the balance of power in world trade. He explained that: 
“The rising weight of influence of emerging economies has shifted the balance of 
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power. This clearly implies some number of transitions to which we have not yet 
adjusted as classic Westphalia concepts of sovereignty are being challenged by the 
realities of interdependence. Some may consider this a problem; it is perhaps 
better to think of it as an opportunity to look at the real shaping factors of trade.” 
This could be a confirmation by the Director-General of the WTO at the time, that 
the WTO needs to be reformed. 
6.5.2. The WTO Doha Development Round: 
The conclusion of the WTO Doha development round or Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) which started in November 2001, just after the destruction of the 
twin towers, of the World Trade Centre in New York, has been long over-due or 
awaited. This is partly because it would help to open-up new market access and in 
addition help in bringing about a new set-up in the multilateral arena, through 
completed negotiations.  
The main purpose of the DDA was to facilitate development in less 
developed countries and emerging economies through the integration of their 
domestic economies into the global economy by granting them unrestricted 
access to the markets of industrialised nations, which were formerly restricted to 
them. The main difficulties for the conclusion of the DDA has been partly due to 
the sheer number of nations involve in the negotiations. It is worth noting that all 
153 WTO member states are involved in this negotiation, and to arrive at a 
conclusion acceptable to all member nations involved would depend on what one 
could describe as ‘maximum luck’. The fact is that major agreements on 
multilateral negotiations most often are concluded by consensus and the DDA is 
not an exception (Adlung, 2006a). 
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Talks aimed at concluded the DDA has stalled for many years, longer than 
anticipated. One of the main areas of contention is the reduction of tariff for 
specific industrial goods. Some advanced countries want a reduction in tariff in 
this area to gain considerable market access through lower prices resulting from 
tariff cuts. However, emerging economies such as India, China and Brazil are not 
amused by this proposition of tariff reduction for specific industrial goods. They 
are not comfortable to allow such concession to industrially advanced economies, 
since nothing seems to be on the table for them in areas they desperately need 
market access in industrially advanced economies. As a result, the conclusion of 
DDA has seemed very much farfetched.  
Nonetheless, even some G-20 leaders recognising these twists and turns in 
the DDA negotiations have called for a new and different approach or even a 
change of strategy to enable a fair and quick conclusion. The economic effects on 
the global economic recovery cannot be underestimated, if the DDA is concluded 
during this period of global economic recession. The impact that the conclusion of 
the DDA would have on the global volume of multilateral trade through new 
market access and renewed hope in further trade liberalisation in general would 
be enormous.  
It is very important that this round is concluded for so many reasons. The 
conclusion of DDA could help in securing limits to domestic trade-distorting 
agricultural support used by both advanced and developing nations alike. This 
would usher in new advanced WTO rules on such things like anti-dumping and 
other domestic regulations that are very important for the smooth operation of 
the multilateral trade system. Its conclusion could also affect the general nature 
and operation of the CRTA.  The CRTA could be given a new dimension, impetus, 
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area of coverage and even duties that were not previously under its mandate, due 
to lots of recent changes in the formation and negotiation of RTAs.  
6.7. The need to Reform the GATT 1994 Treaty: 
From the analyses presented within this work, it is quite clear that in this present 
dispensation, the GATT treaty is becoming out-dated, due to the inadequacy of its 
original provisions in relation to the formation of RTAs. The articles and 
provisions of this treaty, such as GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause of 
1979, which permitted the formation, surveillance and monitoring of all forms of 
RTAs are now grossly inadequate. Generally, the articles and provisions of this 
treaty are now insufficient towards the establishment of a viable MTS. This seems 
very true because the present urge towards the formation of RTAs has 
dangerously departed from the discipline and supervision that GATT Article XXIV 
was supposed to guarantee (Bhagwati, 2008). 
According to Jackson (1993) “GATT Article XXIV is out of date, and some 
would say fatally flawed from the outset (given its inability to impose some GATT 
discipline). This raises the question of what needs to be done in the future.” This 
position of alert by Jackson is an emphatic declaration of the inability of 
GATT/WTO to provide a safeguard for the MTS for the present dispensation given 
the desire for some nations to form RTAs that are dangerously incompatible with 
the present surveillance and monitoring mechanism provided through the GATT 
treaty. Even with the certain draft ‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 
XXIV of the GATT Treaty such as the Dunkel Draft of December 1991; a draft 
agreement in the context of the Uruguay Round.  
Despite all the work that has been done, GATT Article XXIV and its 
provisions are still dangerously ambiguous and could be abused with intent. 
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Jackson (1993) suggested that the Dunkel Draft, which includes the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV, which was aimed at 
establishing some useful principles and benchmarks for providing rigour to the 
language of GATT Article XXIV. One of the examples Jackson (1993) cited was the 
interpretation of length of time in the formation of regional blocs, he said that:  a 
‘reasonable length of time’ is said not to exceed 10 years, except in exceptional 
cases.  And added that this draft agreement would undoubtedly be useful if 
adopted, and one can hope that it will become part of the Uruguay Round package.  
Simply because some experts of international trade law were desperate for GATT 
Article XXIV to be less ambiguous than it is currently (Jackson, 1993). 
In addition, Jackson (1993) suggested that the Dunkel Draft would solve 
certain important issues if it were to be made a part of the package of the Uruguay 
Round, but also admitted that even with the Understanding on the Interpretation 
of GATT Article XXIV, there would still exist some loopholes. Looking at Article V 
of the services Dunkel draft text, he noted that the text included the wordings 
‘economic integration’ or ‘preferential agreements’.  And hoped that it would be 
very important for the services trade to be brought under a clear and rigorous 
discipline, just as the Dunkel draft seemed to have portrayed (Jackson, 1993).  
The Dunkel draft text constituted a very valuable start to changes in the 
way GATT is generally understood and interpreted, and the draft of Article V of 
the services Dunkel drafts text is a great move towards that direction. But the fact 
is that in new era of RTAs the GATT needs to be rewritten or discarded all together, 
for the development of a new multilateral framework to regulate and monitor 
trade and international business (Jackson, 1993). 
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Nonetheless, it would be very difficult to totally discard the GATT for a completely 
new mechanism for the MTS, but before the decision is made by the powers that 
be the out-dated nature of the GATT and the ambiguity plaguing GATT Article XXIV 
would have sufficiently delayed the development of the MTS. However, the WTO 
could influence this situation through certain minimum reforms of the system to 
minimise damage by laying strong emphasis on transparency and fortifying 
GATT/WTO rules on the formation of new RTAs (Jackson, 1993).  
In terms of transparency, as suggested by Jackson (1993), a more detailed 
report on the formation of a new RTA should be presented to the GATT/WTO and 
in addition made available to all the Contracting Parties. Jackson (1993) also 
suggested that regular periodic reviews should be strengthened. Periodic reviews 
of preferential trade blocs could be developed along the lines of the new Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) of the GATT. Noting that the Dunkel Draft 
suggested the availability of the dispute settlement provisions of the GATT to 
challenge the nullification or impairment that is imposed on third parties through 
the formation of RTAs (Jackson, 1993). 
Finally, Jackson (1993) also suggested that the GATT/WTO should create 
an opportunity to develop certain specific rules that would force members to an 
RTA to commit and respect the principles of the MTS. And that such specific rules 
would provide the bases for complaint under a dispute settlement regime. He 
explained that some of these specific rules that should be developed under the 
GATT/WTO should obviously take into consideration many factors already 
addressed by the Dunkel draft text, such as the rule of Origin provision in the GATT 
treaty. In addition, he suggested that such specific rules if developed should 
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incorporate provisions making regulatory actions to be the least trade restrictive 
as possible (Jackson, 1993,).  
6.7.1. Reforms at the WTO:  
If there has been any impact on the proliferation of RTAs through the work of the 
CRTA between 1996 and 2010, the impact would have been rather insignificant. 
Because the total number of RTAs notified to the WTO and entered into-force 
during this period continue to increase steadily (Table of notified RTAs, 
Appendix). This steady increase in the number of RTAs in operation was partly 
because the CRTA has not been able to successfully exert its force (as mandated 
by the WTO) on the formation and establishment of RTAs, under the WTO 
provisions through which RTAs are formed. 
  Studying the pattern of international trade and international trade 
agreement before and after the creation of the CRTA up to 2010, shows that the 
pattern did not changed significantly. In conclusion one could say that the creation 
of the CRTA never influenced the number of RTAs formed or established during 
the period between 1996 and 2010. If there were any changes at all, no matter 
how slight, it was in fact directly linked to natural and other economic factors than 
the work of the CRTA.  
However, if one examines the policy preference of many WTO members 
during the period covering 1996 to 2010, it would be immediately clear that most 
policymakers during this period preferred multilateral free trade. Just as observed 
by Hoekman and Kostecki (2002): The policy stance preferred by most 
economists is unilateral free trade. And most of these Economists would also 
agree that international trade and international trade agreements have always 
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gone hand in hand, judging from historical perspective (Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2002).  
The only exception to this perception could be seen in special 
circumstances such as during the colonial era, where discriminatory trading 
policies could be imposed by a dominant power, without any agreements. 
Hoekman and Kostecki (2002) also suggested that normal trade agreements 
between independent states have often been based on the promotion of trade 
between one another. And these trade agreements have always led to tariff 
reduction and the elimination of non-tariff barriers. This has been undoubtedly 
the main reason for the proliferation of RTAs all over the world, both by DCs and 
industrially advanced economies alike.   
Hoekman and Kostecki (2002) also suggested that generally multilateral 
trade rules still provide the best guarantees to achieving trade liberalisation 
towards free trade, under the auspices of the WTO. Although, WTO rules allow for 
the formation of RTAs, which could lead to regional, political and economic 
integration, the WTO is also aware that the existence of some of these RTAs could 
adversely affect negotiations of multilateral trade arrangements. This is one of the 
reasons that led to the creation of the CRTA by the WTO. For the WTO to be able 
to check adverse impact that could occur from the entering into-force of non-
conforming RTAs.  
If the WTO is to ensure that only RTAs, which conform to WTO rules, were 
to be allowed to enter into-force. The examination of RTAs by the CRTA is the main 
mechanism through which the WTO checks if notified RTAS are compatible with 
multilateral trade agreements.  And in addition, check the conformity to WTO 
rules, after they have been notified to the WTO. In fact, this is the only possible 
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available means through which the WTO could ensure that no incompatible RTA 
formed my WTO member nations would enter into-force. But the CRTA is 
powerless to do this as earlier discussed. However, the CRTA has not truly been 
able to exert any impact on the formation and establishment of RTAs, whether 
negatively or positively. In a nut shell, the CRTA has been unable to exert any 
influence on the formation and establishment of RTAs, due to the lack of adequate 
and proper enforcement mechanism and other minor factors. 
Some trade experts seem to be in unity on the important part RTAs by WTO 
members could play towards trade liberalization. Apparently, RTAs are concluded 
at a faster pace, than multilateral trade agreements, which often take longer to 
negotiate. While others argue that RTAs should be considered complementary to 
multilateral trade agreements, rather than obstacles. Suggesting that both 
agreements are geared towards trade liberalisation (Baldwin, 1995). The 
perception that multilaterally orientated RTAs could help ease the difficulties 
faced in multilateral trade negotiations, seems to be favoured by WTO members.  
 It is assumed that since multilaterally orientated RTAs are being more 
favoured than the old regional RTAs, they could help in achieving faster trade 
liberalisation. The encouragement of such perception by WTO members has 
helped to diminish the work of the CRTA. And this perception might have 
encouraged the CRTA to hold back damning examination reports that could have 
prevented the establishment of certain RTAs considered incompatible to the MTS. 
As previously noted, the CRTA does not seem to have made any noticeable impact 
to prevent the proliferation of RTAs that are incompatible with the MTS. 
The most nagging unanswered question about RTAs has been: Whether the 
proliferation of RTAs is compatible with the WTO’s agenda towards the 
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establishment of an effective MTS and the liberalisation of trade. This question 
could only be answered in the context of whether a specific RTA would result in 
less trade between members and/or non-members of an RTA or not. If the answer 
is NO, it therefore means that the RTA is compatible to WTO agenda (Kemp and 
Wan, 1976)   
Furthermore, a remark by the Director General of the WTO, Mike Moore, at 
the Forty Seventh Sessions of the Trade and Development Board in 1976, stated 
that: “...regionalism can provide an important complement to the multilateral 
system. But it would be a grave mistake for us to use it as an easy substitute. Not 
only could this be burdensome-serving to impede integration and distort world 
trade-but could also jeopardize multilateral efforts to liberalize trade and even 
undermine the huge achievements that have been made...” (Kemp and Wan, 1976, 
p95). Notwithstanding, the purpose of GATT/WTO is for trade liberalisation 
towards global free trade. And furthermore, as many have argued the main 
purpose of RTAs is trade liberalisation, leading to regional free trade 
(traditionally). So therefore, both regimes could be classified as compatible or 
even contradictory at one moment or another.  
Nonetheless, the CRTA has not been able to do its work as it should have 
done. This has been partly because of the lack of proper legal status and means to 
implement its decisions, such as the Dispute Settlement Committee of the WTO. 
Many have argued that the CRTA’s powers and position is rather largely 
ceremonial in nature, although it appears to be a very powerful committee at the 
WTO. It is close to being an irrelevant committee in terms of taking decisions, 
finding solutions and the implementation of possible recommendations. In 
relation to asserting its powers on the compatibility of RTAs to the MTS or RTAs 
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conformity to GATT/WTO rules or to the multilateral trade arrangements, the 
CRTA is powerless. In the present-day arrangement of the WTO, it is worth noting 
here that RTAs such as the EU, EFTA or NAFTA are even above the containment of 
the WTO, meaning the CRTA is even more powerless faced with such RTAs, in 
terms of power and political authority.  
It seems the political authority of the EU makes it impossible for it to be 
examined and monitored by the CRTA. It is even more difficult for some of the very 
powerful RTAs in our world today to accept the recommendations of the CRTA’s 
and to implement them. Even if some of these RTAs accept to be examined by the 
CRTA, it is almost certain that they wouldn’t accept the recommendations that it 
could offer because of the political powers involved in their negotiations. There 
are other factors that point to the political strength and power of these RTAs, in 
relation to the present state of the WTO. Since, these RTAs are becoming supra-
national they are now asserting their hegemonic power even on the WTO and 
other international organisations.  It is surprising that a committee created for the 
examination of RTAs, grants observer status to its meetings to certain RTAs such 
as the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – This seems to be rather a clear 
paradox (Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 1997). 
On the other hand, ensuring additional policy space and flexibility for 
promoting economic development, in the context of RTAs is very necessary, under 
the auspices of the WTO via the CRTA. It is very necessary to recognise the fact 
that since the creation of the CRTA by the WTO, no RTA reported to the WTO by 
member nations has ever been rejected by the WTO through the work of the CRTA. 
However, this is an apparent proof that the proliferation of RTAs is not in any way 
in violation of the GATT/WTO rules, or the rules governing world trade. Because 
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no real or concrete action from the CRTA under the auspices of the WTO to exert 
its power on RTAs that do not conform to WTO rules, this could have led to a 
general assumption by nations that RTAs are in fact not a problem to the WTO that 
the CRTA is just a political forum for the discussion of trade issues related to RTAs. 
They might have developed the belief that RTAs are in many ways compatible with 
the GATT/WTO agenda, since the WTO has never banned any RTA from entering 
into-force, because it does not conform to WTO rules. Since the formation of RTAs 
have been consistent, one could conclude that the CRTA has had no direct or 
indirect impact at all on their formation and establishment between 1996 and 
2010 (Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 1997). 
Some DCs consider RTAs, as one of the sure means of enjoying the 
advantages of comparative cost, advocated in international trade. With market 
harmonisation and ROO, there is less competition within the territory of an RTA 
from products from more advanced countries. The Secretary-General of UNCTAD; 
Rubens Ricupero stated in 2000 at an UNCTAD Trade and development 
conference that: “The Regional and Sub-Regional pact is possibly the only practical 
pact for developing countries or for most of them, to integrate into the world 
economy. Through such mechanisms, they can insert themselves into the global 
economy at a pace that will allow them to be competitive.” Effectively, he was 
reiterating that RTAs could complement multilateral agreement, through the 
enhancement of their potentials to face global competition.        
Finally, the proliferation of RTAs reached its apex in the period covering 
1996 and 2010. The negotiation of many RTAs took place during this period, some 
RTAs were entered into-force even before the WTO/CRTA were notified of their 
existence. This situation puts the monitoring and surveillance of RTAs by the 
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WTO/CRTA in question, because if RTAs could be entered into force before being 
notified to the WTO, it shows that the CRTA and even the WTO was by passed. This 
clearly proves the work of the CRTA is irrelevant to the countries that created the 
RTA. By passing the regulation, monitoring and surveillance of RTAs by parties to 
a RTAs, it means that neither the WTO nor the CRTA could have prevented any 
RTA from entering into-force between 1996 and 2010. Therefore, this means that 
the work of the CRTA could not have prevented the proliferation of RTAs between 
1996 and 2010. 
6.7.2.  The Need for Reforms at International Multilateral Institutions:  
The need to reform some, if not all major international multilateral institutions, 
due to changes in the global trading arena, such as globalisation and the 
emergence of supranational RTAs. The main objectives of the Doha Development 
Round (DDR) that began in the year 2001, in Doha Qatar, was for the re-
organisation of world trade. One of the main purpose of all the negotiations, 
arrangements and meetings of the Doha Development Round was to give priority 
to developing countries (DCs) through the opening-up of the markets of 
industrialised economies.  
The DDR aimed to introduce new trade rules and systems for the 21st 
century. The DDR negotiations were looked upon as very new negotiations, since 
it opened new avenues for DCs. During the DDR negotiations, evolution of RTAs 
and the rapid changes of newly negotiated RTAs, were taken into consideration, 
showing the willingness of WTO member nations to embrace changes. 
Some contenders have argued that the proliferation of RTAs is not only 
because of the failure of multilateral trade agreements. But that this has partly 
been due to the poor state of the global economy. While others have strongly 
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rejected this assertion, and arguing that the rapid proliferation of RTAs is indeed 
indirectly linked to the failure of multilateral institutions to meet the true purpose 
for which they were created. In fact, these institutions have not been able to evolve 
or reform to meet the ever-changing landscape of global business and trade 
(Kemp and Wan, 1976). 
Some contenders feel strongly that the never-ending multilateral trade 
negotiation time-frame and the implicit unwillingness for many advanced 
economies to fully open their markets to the products of DCs and other emerging 
economies have been one of the major reasons for the rapid proliferation of RTAs 
globally. This prevailing situation instigated many DCs and other emerging 
economies to negotiate multiple RTAs to cater for their own individual needs 
(Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 1997). 
One of the major problems of the MTS is not really the proliferation of RTAs 
but rather the out-dated nature and structure of international multilateral 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) popularly known as the World 
Bank and the state of GATT/WTO (Kemp and Wan, 1976). Some have pointed out 
that the state of all these institutions have been a major source of concern for some 
countries for many years. There is a generally acknowledgement that the lack of 
confidence in international multilateral institutions could have led to the 
consistent formation of RTAs by some nations (Krishna, Pravin and Bhagwati, 
1997).  
Some international trade experts have long argued on the necessity to 
reform certain international multilateral institutions, however, others now 
believe that there is the need to reform some of these institutions, this is partly 
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because most of these institutions were created more than half a century ago; and 
some of the operational procedures and administrative structures that were put 
in place then are no longer effective in the present global economic paradigm. In 
fact, there has never been a more urgent time to call for the reform of these 
institutions than in this era, after the global economic crisis. Others have pointed 
out that the situation we face today globally has similarities to that of the 1970s, 
when the failure to forge a new Bretton Woods agreement on currencies, led to 
the breakdown of the Bretton Woods institutions.  
Furthermore, during the G20 summit in November 2008, which took place 
in Washington DC, with the aim of finding ways of resolving the global economic 
crisis that was plaguing the world. The US President at the time, George W. Bush 
purported in an interview that the World Bank and the IMF were out-dated. He 
went further to suggest it because of this they were unable to rescue the world 
from the present crisis. And that if they continue to function in their present state 
they would still be unable to tackle any serious economic crisis in the future. He 
then suggested that the World Bank and the IMF were created based on an 
economic order of 1944. And that all these international multilateral institutions 
need now to modernise their governance, and their various institutional 
structures to make them fit for purpose, in this present day and age.  George W. 
Bush’s statement applies to all international multilateral institutions created after 
the Second World War. And the WTO is certainly one of those institutions needing 
vital reforms in its governance, structure and system, to make it fit for purpose in 
relation to current changes in international trade. 
In much the same light, during the same G20 summit of November 2008, 
the Russian President, Dmitry Mendeleev also said that the present global 
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financial structures created at the end of the Second World War were now 
inadequate. In his statement, he reaffirmed that it would be necessary to rebuild 
the whole international financial architecture, making it open and fair, effective 
and legitimate. Furthermore, the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Singh also added his 
own voice on the debate by saying that whatever economic model would be 
chosen, it would have to be genuinely multilateral and a reflection of the on-going 
changes in the global economic dispensation. 
It seems the Indian Prime Minister was mainly echoing the views held by 
some policymakers of emerging economies. By suggesting that any new 
arrangement towards the reorganisation of some of the major international 
multilateral institutions should significantly take into consideration the growing 
power of emerging economies. This research is also of the view that the failure to 
effectively incorporate the needs and aspirations of DCs and emerging economies 
in international multilateral arrangements and negotiations, indirectly gave rise 
to the rapid of RTAs amongst these countries (Kufuor, 2006). This situation could 
have been much controlled, if the WTO was a well-reformed institution playing a 
more vital role in the international trade arena, than it is currently doing. 
Hoekman and Kostecki (2002) suggested that global integration has 
cultural and social ramifications as well as economic dimensions, and these must 
be recognised and managed. This is quite true, since globalization of trade, culture, 
politics and economics has created a more complex setting for all major 
institutions that were created as world bodies at a time when the world operated 
on internationalisation and protectionism, rather than on multilateralism and a 
push towards globalisation (Kemp and Wan, 1976). 
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The issue of WTO reform is so pressing, thereby proving very frustrating to many 
who would have readily accepted any iota of reform within this organisation. This 
frustration led the chairperson of the Filipino National Rice Farmers Council, 
Jaime Tadeo to criticise the WTO following the conclusion of one of its meetings in 
Geneva, on the 26th of July 2008.  Tadeo suggested that this WTO meeting should 
not be called a development round, if only a few countries are deciding on the 
outcome of a trade deal that will greatly affect the livelihood of billions of poor 
people around the world. Tadeo added that it was grossly unfair that only a 
handful of countries would decide on modalities that could greatly impact on the 
fate of millions of poor farmers in developing countries. He also noted that the 
Filipino delegation including that of other DCs and emerging economies were not 
optimistic that such undemocratic and non-transparent process at the WTO talks 
would yield the needed flexibilities that could reflect the developmental interests 
of the local farming sector of less developed economies (Armstrong and Taylor, 
1993). 
Finally, to discourage the formation of RTAs globally, the WTO could 
ensure that the timeframe for multilateral trade negotiations are shorten, because 
the timeframe of ten years or more for the conclusion of a multilateral trade 
negotiation seems like ages. If the time frame for the conclusion of multilateral 
trade negotiations were to be reduced, RTAs could simply become less attractive 
to WTO members than multilateral trade agreements.  
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6.8. Conclusion:  
Chapter 6 has explored the work of the CRTA in relation to the coverage of RTAs 
between 1996 and 2010, using qualitative research methodology. It also looked at 
the two most important cases on ‘‘Substantially all the Trade’ phrase, which is the 
key WTO provision in the formation of RTAs, for the purposes of trade liberalisation.  
The importance of this provision was explored in these two cases, with the 
arguments that the phrase is ambiguous and does not go far enough to disclose the 
level or degree of trade liberalisation needed to meet the WTO provisions. Thereby 
creating the problem of interpretation and in addition making it hard for the CRTA 
to appropriately examine such RTAs. So, therefore the dispute settlement body is 
where such cases are treated instead of the CRTA. The issue of ‘WTO-Plus-Provision 
RTAs’ are also above the mandate of the CRTA. As a result, the examination process 
of such RTAs at the CRTA is largely ignored because of their coverage.  
Furthermore, discussions on whether RTAs can foster trade or restrict them, 
brought to light the trade creative aspects of RTAs. These discussions and arguments 
seem to point to the fact that RTAs are more trade creating than a trade diverting 
mechanism. Thereby supporting the argument that RTAs could help foster economic 
development in developing countries and that market expansion via RTAs could also 
benefit developed nations, by improving the wellbeing of it citizen through economic 
prosperity. However, further research is still needed in this area. 
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CHAPTER 7.  
7.1. Introduction: 
This is the final chapter and conclusion of my research. It outlines and explores the 
research findings and discusses recommendations and the implications of the 
research findings, which are analysed under two sub-headings, namely: Regulatory 
failures of the WTO and institutional obstacles at the WTO, the findings are vastly 
interrelated and intertwined. Furthermore, this chapter also contains a general 
discussion section, which discusses the present context of RTAs in our global trading 
arena. 
 
7.2.  Research Findings on the Role of the CRTA between 1996 and 2010: 
• The existing monitoring and surveillance mechanism of RTAs by the CRTA 
under the auspices of the WTO is largely an ineffective process. 
• The Examination process of RTAs at the CRTA begins and ends only with a 
‘factual examination’, without the production or publication of final 
reports.  
• There has never been any clear consistency or compatibility assessment 
between any of the existing RTAs or RTAs entered into-force and the MTS 
between 1996 and 2010.  
• Some member nations of the WTO have little, incomplete or no information 
at all about some of the RTAs notified to the WTO. No important RTA 
examination report has ever been finalised by the CRTA due to lack of 
consensus on the interpretation of the provisions of Article XXIV of the 
GATT 1947 treaty. 
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• The work of the CRTA has had no identifiable impact on the proliferation 
of RTAs between 1996 and 2010. 
• The CRTA under the WTO committee system is very limited in power, since 
it acts as an advisory body, just as any other committee system. 
• The CRTA could be described as a moribund committee or body under the 
auspices of the WTO.  
7.3. Regulatory Failures at the WTO: 
The argument put forward by some policymakers and representatives of member 
nations of the WTO against the formation and establishment of RTAs, in the face 
of multiple efforts geared towards the establishment of an effective MTS, 
sometimes seem very ironic and even counter-productive. Since, the WTO permits 
the formation of RTAs through its own provisions. Most RTAs are formed through 
the provisions of Article XXIV of the GATT treaty, GATS Article V and the Enabling 
Clause provision (for RTAs involving only DCs). Apparently, these provisions have 
consistently been abused by some WTO members in their attempt to form and 
establish RTAs. Some WTO members have consistently shown little regard for 
WTO rules in terms of strict compliance to the provisions through which RTAs are 
formed. Some of these nations continue to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, 
whilst also taking active part in on-going multilateral trade negotiations 
(Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
The abuse of these WTO provisions through which RTAs are created, 
constitutes a major area of failure by the WTO in the regulation of RTAs.  This 
failure to regulate RTAs by the WTO was first highlighted by Haight in 1972.  
Haight suggested that If the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is to retain a 
significant influence in world trade policy, a new understanding of the meaning 
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and application of GATT Article XXIV is one of the issues that must be resolved. He 
argued that the Article permitting the formation of customs unions and free-trade 
areas, is probably the most abused in the whole agreement and the heaviest cross 
the GATT treaty bears (Haight, 1972).  
However, before the close of the Uruguay Round, the WTO attempted to 
clarify the misinterpretation ensuing from the provisions of Article XXIV of the 
GATT treaty. This was done through the attachment of the Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XXIV to the GATT treaty. In fact, this attachment of the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of GATT Article XXIV was an elaboration on 
the meaning of the legal implication of the text and it was meant to clear the 
ambiguity relating to the provisions contained in GATT Article XXIV (Bhagwati, 
1992). 
Furthermore, the creation of the CRTA in February 1996 by the WTO 
General Council did not appear to have really helped matters concerning the 
regulation of RTAs. The proliferation of RTAs continued, even with the 
establishment of the CRTA. It is now very clear that the regulation of RTAs before 
and after the establishment of the CRTA has been an abysmal failure. The 
‘Individual Working Parties’ were unable to check the rapid proliferation of RTAs 
through their examination of RTAs. And the CRTA itself, established, as a special 
committee dedicated for the examination of RTAs, has also been incapable to 
control the rapid proliferation of RTAs. The CRTA’s failure to regulate RTAs is 
almost identical to that of the ‘Individual Working Parties’. It seems that nothing 
really changed, in term of the regulation of RTAs. Many had envisaged significant 
changes when the WTO walked away from the “Individual Working Parties” 
procedure in the examination of RTAs to the creation and establishment of the 
 222 
CRTA. But today there are still very substantial concerns on the impact of the 
global proliferation of RTAs to the MTS, and in addition to the abuse of Article XXIV 
of the GATT treaty through which RTAs are formed and established. (Crawford 
and Laird, 2001) 
In November 2001, the WTO recognising the continuous regulation failure 
of RTAs both during the GATT days and after the creation of the CRTA, made an 
attempted move to rectify the situation. In this light, during the Ministerial 
Conference before the launch of the Doha Development Round, WTO members 
agreed to further examine the issue of the regulatory failure of RTAs. Because of 
the commitment to seek a better way to regulate the proliferation of RTAs, in the 
Doha Declaration, the WTO stated that: “We also agree to negotiations aimed at 
clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO 
provisions applying to regional trade agreements. The negotiations shall take into 
consideration the developmental aspects of regional trade agreements” 
(Paragraph 27 of the Doha Declaration, 2001) 
Authors such as Haight (1972) and (Bhagwati, 1992) have identified some 
of the regulatory problems of RTAs facing the WTO. In fact, the advent of new 
regional RTAs, which encompasses multiple regions or continents, could further 
complicate the already difficult regulatory problem the WTO is currently facing. 
Haight (1972) suggested that GATT Article XXIV has been consistently abused in 
the formation of RTAs. Others have argued that the regulatory checks and 
balances found in the provisions of GATT Article XXIV has not been fully respected. 
Many also feel that there has not been any control in the way RTAs have been 
formed. Generally, the formation of RTAs seemed to have been done in the form 
of ‘freedom to act at will’ – meaning WTO members wishing to form RTAs could 
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simply do so at will, simply by invoking the exemptions to GATT Article XXIV to 
their advantage (Bhagwati, 1992). 
From Haight’s (1972) suggestions, one could infer that there has been a 
consistent misapplication and a possible misinterpretation of the provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV. However, Jackson (1998) argued that there is the probable 
misconstruction of the wordings of the provisions found in GATT Article XXIV. 
Jackson (1998) suggested that this misconstruction of the wordings of GATT 
Article XXIV must have led to abuse, misapplication and a general 
misinterpretation of its provisions (Bhagwati, 1992). In addition, Jackson (1998) 
also suggested that it has become increasingly clear that the language of GATT 
Article XXIV is not adequate for the developing international economic practice 
today.  
Furthermore, Jackson (1998) suggestion raises lots of questions/debates 
as to the necessity to revise the provisions of GATT Article XXIV, to make it very 
strict, clear and simple to interpret; thereby removing the possibility of 
misapplication, abuse and misinterpretation. Without which the legal background 
for RTAs and their regulation would be lacking the very important coverage and 
legal status, which it so badly needs to maintain scrutiny under WTO rules 
(Bhagwati, 1992). 
The opinion of this research in this matter is that the wording of GATT 
Article XXIV, and its ambiguity are in fact the source of the regulatory problems 
hindering the work of the CRTA today. Since, RTAs could be created at will by WTO 
members without regards to their suitability and compatibility to the MTS. Some 
WTO members forming RTAs nowadays only seek to prove that the FTA or CU 
they intend to establish conforms in principles to GATT Article XXIV. However, 
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they are not ready to comply with any strict interpretation of the provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV (Kemp and Wan, 1976). 
Finally, necessary adjustment to GATT Article XXIV should be made, in such 
a way that all RTAs formed under the auspices of the WTO should be compatible 
to the MTS, in the most rigorous manner possible. This could very much help to 
avert the negative impact the proliferation of RTAs could have on the development 
of the MTS. And it could also help to regulate the formation of RTAs. The major 
problem now is that most RTAs today have gone beyond the scope of the WTO 
provisions through which RTAs are formed. As a result, this has created multiple 
legal loopholes, which tends to evade any possible scrutiny of such RTAs by the 
WTO, through its general rules and regulations (Bhagwati, 1992).  
7.4. Institutional Obstacles at the WTO: 
All large institutions are burdened with different institutional problems, ranging 
from bureaucracy to system and regulatory failures; the WTO is no exception. In 
fact, there are certain institutional impediments within the WTO that seems to 
have some negative effect on the work of the CRTA, in many ways. One of the 
reasons is the CRTA has no legal bases to enforce its findings or recommendations 
under the auspices of the WTO (Bhagwati, 1992). And institutional and procedural 
weaknesses of the power and authority of the CRTA were not envisaged by the 
WTO at the time of its creation. Moreover, many difficulties have risen from WTO 
rules that exempt certain RTAs from the CRTA process. This has created a 
situation where a great number of RTAs entered into-force, are not compatible to 
the MTS (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
In addition, to all these complexities, some RTAs are also not even notified 
to the WTO during their formation and establishment process and this has been a 
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big problem for the CRTA that has led to situations where some WTO members 
have been deeply unsatisfied with the state of things at various CRTA meetings. 
For instance, even if the CRTA decides that an RTA does not conform to WTO rules 
or is not suitable/compatible to the MTS, the CRTA does not have any set of 
appropriate mechanisms to enforce such decisions. In practice, the CRTA has no 
real powers to sanction an RTA and stop it from entering into force, because it only 
acts as an advisory to the WTO, just like any other committee in a committee 
system. In a situation where the entering into force of an RTA, affects a third-party 
nation or nations, it is only the third-party nation or nations who are affected by 
the operations of the RTA that could seek redress through the Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism of the WTO.  This cannot be done through the CRTA, because the CRTA 
seems completely powerless in this regard (Kemp and Wan, 1976). 
In the process of the creation of the CRTA, the WTO did not give the CRTA 
the necessary legal powers it needed, to ensure that it would be able to enforce its 
decisions and recommendations, this is because the CRTA is just a committee. May 
be the CRTA should have been created as a different body instead of a committee, 
because it seems this is the greatest institutional impediment hampering the work 
of the CRTA. The work of the CRTA has also been genuinely affected by the lack of 
consensus on matters regarding the interpretation of the ambiguous wording of 
the provisions contained in GATT Article XXIV through which RTA are formed 
(Bhagwati, 1992). 
Furthermore, the CRTA has also been affected directly by the fact that the 
WTO has been unable to implement some of it requirements, such as the periodic 
reporting on RTAs to WTO members. And the lack of satisfactory adherence to the 
requirements and rules set forth to make the CRTA effective and reliable, such as 
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biennial reporting on the implementation of RTAs appeared to have been 
undermined or ignored; thereby helping to create considerable negative impact 
on the smooth running of the CRTA process (Bhagwati, 1992). 
Another major factor also contributing to the difficulties faced by the role 
of the CRTA under the auspices of the WTO is the perception by many observers 
that the CRTA is simply another administrative organ of the WTO, with no clear 
legal authority or distinct powers. In practice, such a perception has truly 
hindered the effective operation of the mandate of the CRTA, and has helped to 
make the CRTA appear just as any other administrative unit of the WTO with no 
appropriate legal powers or authority to enforce its recommendations or 
decisions. To be able to change this erroneous perception of the CRTA, much work 
needs to be done by the WTO, to answer some important questions regarding the 
authority, power and position of the CRTA, within the framework its committee 
system (Kemp and Wan, 1976). 
Furthermore, the legal status of the CRTA within the WTO committee 
structure needs to be carefully clarified. In addition to this, the role of the CRTA 
within the framework of the WTO needs also to be carefully defined or redefined, 
to assert its true purpose and objectives (Kemp and Wan, 1976). The fact is that 
the mission of the CRTA and the CRTA process is extremely important for the MTS, 
and if the CRTA process and its duty were well defined and empowered, the CRTA 
would become an effective WTO committee. This could help dismiss the 
perception that the CRTA is merely an administrative organ of the WTO, which 
gathers data on RTAs and conducts factual examination on the compatibility and 
suitability of RTAs to the MTS, on behalf of WTO members.  
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The CRTA should have been regarded as a committee empowered to grant legal 
covering for the entry into force of RTAs all over the world, with binding 
recommendations that must be respected and implemented. Instead the CRTA has 
been presented as a white elephant within the WTO committee system with no 
real powers or authority. The current state of the CRTA provides tangible proof 
that the CRTA has been powerless to stop the entry into force of unsuitable and 
incompatible RTAs and since no conclusive report on RTAs has ever published or 
adopted between 1996 and 2010 makes the CRTA even more irrelevant in the 
exercise of its mandate (Armstrong and Taylor, 1993). 
The CRTA’s position under the WTO is apparently not in the same 
framework as the dispute settlement body (DSB), because unlike the DSB, the 
CRTA lacks the necessary authority to sanction decisions or recommendations it 
makes to member states seeking to form RTAs. And because of these institutional 
obstacles there seem to be no clear demarcation between the CRTA and the DSB.  
In addition, in cases of non-implementation of CRTA’s recommendations, 
there is apparently no clear legal authority backing the CRTA on such matter, 
because there is no enforcement mechanism to help the CRTA enforce its 
recommendations or decisions. For instance, in a situation where the CRTA could 
make a declaration that an RTA does not conform WTO rules, the CRTA would 
have no means to enforce such a decision. As a matter of fact, this has been the 
situation of the CRTA, between 1996 and 2010 (Kemp and Wan, 1976).  
However, even if the CRTA makes recommendations and these 
recommendations are ignored by WTO members involved in the formation of 
RTAs, the CRTA would still be unable to prevent such RTAs from entering-into 
force. This is partly because the CRTA does not have the means to do so. In fact, if 
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the CRTA were to be accorded a distinct and clear legal status and powers by the 
WTO, it would constitute a breach of the GATT treaty. This is because the GATT 
treaty clearly stipulates that recourse on all matters related to trade between 
member states of the GATT/WTO should be resolved through GATT Articles XXII, 
XXIII and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) of the WTO.  
Finally, paragraph 12 of the Understanding on GATT Article XXIV seems to 
reaffirm the notion of the rights of recourse by member states through the DSB, 
on matters relating to RTAs by stating that the provisions of GATT 1994, Articles 
XXII and XXIII as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
may be invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those 
provisions of Article XXIV relating to RTAs. This however, complicates the position 
of the CRTA in terms of granting it a distinct and clear legal powers by the WTO. 
The implication of the provisions of GATT 1994, Articles XXII and XXIII, is that it 
makes the CRTA more like a quasi-judicial body under the WTO (Bhagwati, 1992). 
These institutional obstacles seemed to have helped in making the role of the 
CRTA under the auspices of the WTO, powerless and irrelevant to implement its 
recommendations and/or decisions between 1996 and 2010.  
7.5. General Discussion:   
The current context of RTAs make it imperative for RTAs to be examined and 
monitored by the CRTA. Furthermore, the current impasse in multilateral 
negotiation also points to the necessity for the re-examination and clarification of 
the present WTO rules through which RTAs are formed (Krueger, 1999). The WTO 
really needs to re-assess its rights and obligations in relation to the development 
of the MTS, in retrospect to the true nature of present day RTAs, because for over 
two decades that RTAs have firmly been in operation in the world scene, there still 
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appears to be no clear consensus among WTO members as to whether RTAs 
favours or contradicts the development of the MTS. The nagging question, 
however, has always been whether RTAs function as ‘building blocks’ or 
‘stumbling blocks’ to the MTS (Baldwin, 2006). 
In allowing the formation of RTAs, WTO members seem to have 
entertained the understanding that RTAs that would be formed under the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV would comply with WTO rules, through which 
they are created, thereby helping the development of the MTS. However, the facts 
suggest a different result because the CRTA that was created to ensure the smooth 
running and success of this process has totally been unable to guarantee the 
compliance of RTAs to WTO rules (Bhagwati, 1992). 
However, this research suggests that the proliferation of RTAs and the area 
of coverage of some of the RTAs formed between 1996 and 2010 has made it 
rather harder for the CRTA to monitor compliance to WTO rules. Notwithstanding, 
some policymakers have interpreted the proliferation of RTAs, as representing a 
strengthening mechanism for multilateral trade negotiations (Baldwin, 1997). 
The proliferation of RTAs and the coverage of some RTAs falling beyond the 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV, created enormous regulatory difficulties for the 
WTO/CRTA, leading to the inability of the CRTA to appropriately check the 
compliance of RTAs to WTO rules (Crawford & Laird, 2000). 
On Systemic issues involving the examination of RTAs, the CRTA did work 
on them for over two years. Unfortunately, after this period there were still no 
consensus among member states on these systemic issues (Crawford & Laird, 
2000).  A similar situation was also experienced by the WTO, when negotiators 
revisited certain aspects of GATT Article XXIV, intending to clarify some of its 
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provisions, during the Uruguay Round. The results from these negotiations were 
embodied in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT 
1994. However, the provisions of the Understanding on the Interpretation of 
GATT Article were also considered unsatisfactory by some WTO members, due to 
the interpretation of some elements of its provisions (Crawford & Laird, 2001). 
The integration of DCs into the world economy is often emphasised as one 
of the most positive aspects of RTAs. This aspect of RTAs could have contributed 
in influencing the monitoring work of the CRTA in relation to compliance to WTO 
rules. It seems very likely that the WTO could have over looked RTAs involving 
DCs, in terms of conformity to WTO rules, in its examination process at the CRTA, 
to lessen the burdens in the formation of RTAs among DCs. However, some 
policymakers now believe that to achieve better synergy between RTAs and the 
MTS in today’s circumstances, a redefinition of the relationship between RTAs and 
the MTS is required. Meaning that the WTO needs reforms, because a re-
interpretation of the rules governing RTAs and the MTS drafted over 50 years ago 
would not suffice to take into consideration the fundamental changes in the nature 
and scope of the various RTAs in existence today. RTAs moving away from their 
regional or geographic constraint through their overlapping membership across 
multiple continents has increased the dimension of monitoring. And in addition, 
the verification complexities resulting from the vast coverage of certain RTAs have 
created another enormous difficulty for the WTO, and the CRTA (Frankel, Stein, & 
Wei, 1997).  
Furthermore, certain issues arising from some RTAs are usually plural-
dimensional in nature, because these issues are often interlinked with multiple 
correlated complex legal implications, it is very difficult for the CRTA to 
 231 
appropriately monitor such RTAs. For instance, GATT Article XXIV requires that 
‘substantially all the trade’ between member nations should be covered in the 
negotiation of RTAs (Feketekuty, 2000). In fact, conditions of a similar nature are 
also laid down in Article V of GATS, where there is a requirement for ‘substantial 
sector coverage’ in trade in services (Frankel, Stein, & Wei, 1997).  
The difficulties resulting from the wordings of GATT Article XXIV and GATS 
Article V, makes it impossible for an agreement to be reached amongst WTO 
members on the exact meaning of the words used in GATT Article XXIV – 
‘substantially all the trade’. Or that used in GATS Article V – ‘substantial sector 
coverage’. In addition, some large and sensitive areas of trade, such as agriculture 
and textiles are sometimes omitted from the coverage of some RTAs, making the 
fulfilment of these provisions impossible to monitor by the WTO (Feketekuty, 
2000) 
Notwithstanding, lots of other issues arising from the proliferation of RTAs 
are more institutional in nature than resulting from problems with WTO rules. 
Most often, they highlight possible discrepancies between rules by which RTAs 
are formed and the WTO provisions by which these RTAs are assessed. And 
sometimes maybe they result from the whole WTO system in general.  It is worth 
noting that trade rules have never been stagnant at any time in the history of 
international trade and commerce, rather they have always been evolving at both 
regional and multilateral levels. The evolution of trading rules has always seemed 
to be consistent with trade expansion, ranging from tariff reduction to a complete 
overhaul of the regulatory trading system (Ito & Krueger, 1997). 
Furthermore, at one of WTO’s Ministerial Conferences in 1999 in Seattle, 
USA, some WTO members wanted to include a review of Article XXIV of GATT and 
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Article V of GATS to be put on the agenda of the conference. Arguing that there 
were lots of discrepancies in their interpretation, which needed to be addressed. 
One of the reasons for this urgency to review GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article 
V was because of the existence of a continuous backlog in examination reports at 
the CRTA. The existence of this backlog was simply due the fact that WTO 
members could not agree upon a way forward in relation to the interpretation of 
GATT Article XXIV (Crawford & Laird, 2001). 
There is also the probability of a future development of critical systemic 
issues that could result from the relationship between regionalism and 
multilateralism, since, so many RTAs are now being negotiated in abandonment 
of regional constraint or geographic proximity. Systemic issues that would arise 
from some of these RTAs would require considerable political initiative in their 
resolution. The WTO would be incapable of resolving such systemic issues 
because of the lack of an appropriate mechanism for their resolution (Crawford & 
Laird, 2001) 
In today’s world, one must take into consideration the economic dimension 
of RTAs that goes far beyond the effects of tariff preferences amongst member 
states; because the present development, success and expansion of world trade in 
general, has largely been through the increasing number of RTAs established by 
WTO members. It seems that the current state of world trade has been facilitated 
through the overlapping intercontinental memberships of RTAs. The apparent 
continental impact of RTAs has been one of the glaring contributions to world 
trade by regional blocs (Ito & Krueger, 1997). 
Furthermore, it would be important for the WTO to take into consideration 
the final content of negotiations at the completion of the Doha Round of trade 
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negotiations. Because this would pose further challenges to policymakers in all 
continents, in addition to existing challenges. Trade in general, regional or 
multilateral has proven to be a very controversial and a non-stop evolving domain 
with multiple facets posing different sort of problems on monitoring and 
regulation. However, there is no clear or sufficient scientific evidence to suggest 
that RTAs would help solve the peculiar problem of development plaguing some 
DCs. However, multilateralism seems to be the best option forward for both DCs 
and developed economies (Frankel, Stein, & Wei, 1997). 
In short, to make the work of the CRTA easy and effective, whether it being 
RTAs involving only DCs or those involving DCs and developed nations, all RTAs 
henceforth, should fall under the jurisdiction of the CRTA. In short, all RTAs, no 
matter what they are, should be subjected to the same examination process at the 
CRTA. In fact, this should be the case if full transparency of the CRTA process is to 
be ensured.  
Henceforth, if all RTAs formed were henceforth subjected to the rigorous 
provisions of GATT Article XXIV, without exceptions, this could help to reduce the 
ambiguity in the interpretation of the article and thereby help to eliminate some 
of the existing legal loopholes of this article. Furthermore, by subjecting all RTAs 
to the examination process of the CRTA and checking their conformity to 
GATT/WTO rules found in GATT Article XXIV, (Bhagwati, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
 234 
7.6. Conclusion: 
This chapter has explored the research findings and analysed their implications on 
the future of the CRTA and the WTO.  Furthermore, it has also explored the need to 
reform the WTO and its committee system, and the necessity for reforms in other 
multilateral trade institutions with considerable global influence. However, there is 
a need for further research on the WTO’s CTRA, since there exists a gap in literature 
on the CRTA as compared to RTAs and the WTO. 
Although this work has mainly studied the role of the CRTA under the 
auspices of the WTO committee system, however, it only covers between the years 
1996, when the CRTA was created to the year 2010.  As a result, more research is 
needed to cover the complete work of the CRTA to the present day. The findings of 
this work could help reshape future policy development for the CTRA and the WTO 
in general, probably through the regeneration of scholarly interest in the WTO and 
the CRTA. Nonetheless, this study has been able to raise issues that should lead to a 
general reassessment of the achievements of the CRTA, and the re-examination of 
the place of the CRTA within committee system of the WTO.  
The recommendations contained in this work is to support the notion that 
the WTO needs meaningful reforms. The relevance of the CRTA and its functions in 
the 21st century, need to be reassessed by the WTO. Studying the impact of the work 
of the CRTA on the formation, and establishment of RTAs from the year 1996 to the 
year 2010, has brought to light some of the difficulties hindering the work of the 
CRTA and the relevance of the CRTA to the MTS.  
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APPENDIX 
1. Some Essential Definitions and Explanations: 
 This section clarifies certain words that may seem confusing to people, who may 
not be conversant or familiar with such words as used in international trade. 
There are words used in this discipline that may mean different things than they 
are supposed to mean in ordinary English. Some of these words or phrases may at 
different times refer to the same condition of trade. This however makes their uses 
sometimes more or less confusing to non-experts of international trade 
agreements. This is one of the main reasons I decided to add this section to this 
work.   
a.) Bilateral Trade Agreements: (BTAs) 
BTAs could be defined as a trade agreement between two parties or two sides. 
BTAs could be between two nations or between two trading blocs or between two 
groups of nations. They could also be called bilateral free trade agreements. Trade 
agreements between England and France constitute BTAs, similarly trade 
agreements between the EU and the AU also falls under BTAs. 
b.) Preferential Trade Agreements: (PTAs) 
Preferential Trade Agreements: (PTAs) could be defined as trade agreements that 
accord some degree of favouritism in relation to the reduction of tariffs and non-
tariff barriers to its member-states. Some trade agreements are classified as 
preferential because favour in the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade 
is given to each negotiating party to the trade agreements. Vivid examples of PTAs 
are trading blocs. However, free trade areas, common markets, economic unions, 
customs and monetary unions are all considered as different forms of PTAs. 
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c.) Multilateral Trade Agreements: (MTAs) 
Multilateral trade agreements could be defined as trade agreements entered into 
by more than two nations. That is a trade agreement between many nations. It is 
worth noting that multilateral trade agreements are very complicated to 
negotiate. One of the primary benefits of multilateral trade agreements is that all 
member nations are given equal treatment. Most of these agreements aim to 
liberalize trade. The Doha round of trade negotiations is a multilateral trade 
agreement between all 149 members of the WTO. 
d.) Multilateral Trade System (MTS) 
Multilateral Trade System comprises the body of rules that govern world trade. 
These rules are the world trading principles of the WTO. The WTO agreements are 
lengthy and complex because they are legal texts covering a wide range of 
activities. They deal with: agriculture, textiles and clothing, banking, 
telecommunications, government purchases, industrial standards and product 
safety, food sanitation regulations, intellectual property, and much more. 
However, certain simple fundamental principles are found throughout these 
documents. These principles are the foundation of the multilateral trading system. 
e.) Free Trade Areas (FTAs): 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs) could be variously defined as economic free zones or 
special economic zones; most often governments of certain countries establish 
FTAs to attract FDI. However, one of the reasons for the establishment of these 
zones is the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of and non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Most FTAs are established by developing or emerging economies, they are 
often accorded special status. This means that normal trade restrictions applicable 
within the nation do not apply in these zones, since they are established as 
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separate legal entities from the rest of the country. Most often FTAs are 
established incorporating rule of origin (ROO), which deals with the origin of a 
product or a produce. The incorporation of ROO helps to prevent goods from non-
member states from entering the zone. Many of the RTAs negotiated among 
developing countries are FTAs, due to the advantages arising from ROO. The 
ASEAN Free Trade Area is the best example of FTAs. 
f.) Customs Unions: 
Customs unions are a free trade agreement in which member states conduct free 
trade among themselves, within the union and in addition, maintaining a common 
tariff and trade policies. Generally, customs unions require a country to surrender 
some of its independence to the union in matters relating to customs and trade 
policies, both internally and externally. The wide acceptance of FTAs over customs 
unions is because they are concluded faster and requires a lower degree of 
political co-ordination. For FTAs, each member-states to the agreement, preserves 
their individual trade policy, from third countries.  
g.) Common Markets: 
 Common markets are economic arrangements in which the markets of a specific 
region are liberalized. In this situation, the countries involved in this agreement 
go beyond a customs union arrangement, by eliminating most barriers to trade. 
They also guarantee free movement of labour and capital, within the confines of 
the integrated market. The EU is still the very best example of a common market 
in this era.  
h.) Economic Unions: 
Economic Unions are arrangements where member countries merge their 
economies together. In this arrangement, there is also a merger of all institutions 
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and common economic policies and the unification fiscal and monetary policies. 
The EU is also a true example of an economic union. 
i.) Doha Development Agenda (DDA):  
This meeting and negotiations are a continuation of the round Started in Doha, 
Qatar; The Doha Round of negotiations for global trade deals were launched in 
November 2001 with the aim of boosting the world economy and help in the fight 
against poverty. 
2. The WTO Secretariat:  
The WTO Secretariat is in Geneva, Switzerland. Indeed, the WTO is a well-known 
international organization in good standing.  Institutions such as the WTO 
normally operate using at least one or many of the well-known organizational 
concepts. The WTO however, operates through the committee system; the CRTA 
is one of the committees of the WTO and the main object of this research.  Many 
international organizations big and small are mostly bureaucratic in nature and in 
their operations. In our present-day organisational structure bureaucracy is the 
norm or the affected and appropriate method for the functioning and operation of 
big organizations due to its legal rational tag; the WTO is not an exception. 
The WTO operates as bureaucratic organization; it functions through a 
committee system. As per regional agreements, the CRTA is one of its most 
important committees. The current chairperson of the CRTA is H.E. Mr. François 
Riegert of France. The WTO has around 630 staff and is headed by a director-
general. Its responsibilities include among others: Administrative and technical 
support for WTO delegate bodies (councils, committees, working parties, 
negotiating groups) for negotiations and the implementation of agreements; 
Technical support for developing countries, and especially the least developed; 
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Trade performance and trade policy analysis by WTO economists and 
statisticians; Assistance from legal staff in the resolution of trade disputes 
involving the interpretation of WTO rules and precedents; Dealing with accession 
negotiations for new members and providing advice to governments considering 
membership. It is worth noting that some of the WTO’s divisions are responsible 
for supporting specific committee. For instance, the Agriculture Division assists 
the committees on agriculture on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. 
Notwithstanding, other divisions of the WTO provide broader support for WTO 
activities. These activities include among others technical cooperation, economic 
analysis, and information. The WTO budget is over 160 million Swiss francs, with 
individual contributions calculated based on shares in the total trade conducted 
by WTO members. Part of the budget of the WTO is used for the operation and 
management of the International Trade Centre. 
3. Observer Status in International Law: 
Observer status could be defined as a passive participation in the proceedings of 
an organization or at meetings. The person, group or organizations or nations 
exercising observer status are permitted to participate in meetings but do not 
normally have voting rights or powers and do not participate in decision making.  
In fact, observer status could simply be referred to a secondary role in any 
organization that permits the existence of members exercising such a status. 
Observer status however, grants its recipients an advisory role in the organization 
involved. This status simply means that any individual, group or groups, 
organization, organizations, nation or nations exercising observer status an give 
advice but cannot partake actively in decision making. The role of observer status 
is that exercised by an individual, group or groups, an organization or 
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organizations, a nation or nations who are not members of a specific organization 
but are permitted to partake in its proceedings or meetings. The status of an 
observer is the position occupied by mostly non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in many international organizations such as the United Nations (UN). In 
some organizations and regional integration schemes observer status is 
sometimes obtained by nations. Observer status developed from the position of 
consultative arrangements successfully fought for by NGOs at the creation and 
drafting of the UN charter in 1945 at the San Francisco conference in the USA. 
Through the efforts and lobbying of NGOs Article 71 of the UN charter covers the 
position of observer’s status within the UN, notably the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC). Over the years, NGOs have been very instrumental in many 
reforms and social changes through their networking and lobbying. As a group, 
they now occupy a very strong position in the UN general assembly and always 
lobbying at the corridors of the Security Council in relation to human rights issues 
in times of conflict and in countries where war is going on. There are over 1700 
recognized NGOs all over the world with ever expanding coverage. NGOs are very 
prominent in debates and lobbying in areas such as the distribution of wealth in 
the economy and social justice. They have now made human rights and 
environment issues their main areas of expertise and advocacy. Increasingly they 
are also taking over arms control and issues relating to the supply of weapons in 
conflict zones. In fact, one could say that there is no aspect of UN life that is devoid 
of the advocacy, activities and participation of NGO in an observer or consultative 
status. In addition, observer status could be granted on an ad hoc basis that is 
participation in specific meetings like in the UN. It could also be granted on a 
permanent basis, such as in regional integration schemes, which includes regional 
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and bilateral trade agreements. Observer status became very important and sort 
after very hotly in the 1990s, when NGOs began playing active advisory roles both 
in local and international politics especially on human rights issues. But some 
NGOs, such as Amnesty international have become so powerful that they seem to 
be participating in UN deliberation above what an ordinary observer status should 
be. The ECOSOC has even called the UN to make clear in its charter the true 
position in deliberations by those exercising observer status in the council, to 
avoid any conflicting interest among members. 
4. List of Notified RTAs under GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V:  
As of the 31st of December 2010, the following RTAs had been notified to the WTO 
and are in-force (www.wto.org) 
 
Table 1: 
 
 
NAMES OF 
RTAs 
 
 
 
TYPES 
 
 
 
 
COVERAGE 
 
 
NOTIFICATION 
 
DATE 
NOTIFIED 
 
DATE 
OF 
ENTRY 
INTO 
FORCE 
STATUS 
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Union 
(WAEMU) 
CU Goods Enabling Clause 27-Oct-
1999 
01-Jan-
2000 
In Force 
US – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
17-Dec-
2003 
01-Jan-
2004 
In Force 
US – Peru FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Feb-
2009 
01-
Feb-
2009 
In Force 
US – Oman FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
30-Jan-
2009 
01-Jan-
2009 
In Force 
US - Morocco FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
30-Dec-
2005 
01-Jan-
2006 
In Force 
US – Jordan FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
15-Jan-
2002 
17-
Dec-
2001 
In Force 
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US – Israel FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 13-Sep-
1985 
19-
Aug-
1985 
In Force 
US – Chile FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
16-Dec-
2003 
01-Jan-
2004 
In Force 
US – Bahrain FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
08-Sep-
2006 
01-
Aug-
2006 
In Force 
US - Australia FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
22-Dec-
2004 
01-Jan-
2005 
In Force 
Ukraine -
Turkmenistan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
04-
Nov-
1995 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Uzbekistan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
01-Jan-
1996 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Tajikistan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
11-Jul-
2002 
In Force 
Ukraine - 
Russian 
Federation 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
21-
Feb-
1994 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Moldova 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
19-
May-
2005 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Kazakhstan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
19-Oct-
1998 
In Force 
Ukraine - 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
05-Jul-
2001 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Belarus 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
11-
Nov-
2006 
In Force 
Ukraine – 
Azerbaijan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Aug-
2008 
02-
Sep-
1996 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Tunisia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 01-Sep-
2005 
01-Jul-
2005 
In Force 
Turkey - Syria FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Feb-
2007 
01-Jan-
2007 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Serbia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 10-Aug-
2010 
01-
Sep-
2010 
In Force 
Turkey - 
Palestinian 
Authority 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 01-Sep-
2005 
01-Jun-
2005 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Morocco 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 10-Feb-
2006 
01-Jan-
2006 
In Force 
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Turkey – 
Montenegro 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 12-Mar-
2010 
01-
Mar-
2010 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Israel 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 16-Apr-
1998 
01-
May-
1997 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Georgia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 18-Feb-
2009 
01-
Nov-
2008 
In Force 
Turkey - 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 05-Jan-
2001 
01-
Sep-
2000 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Croatia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 02-Sep-
2003 
01-Jul-
2003 
In Force 
Turkey - 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 29-Aug-
2003 
01-Jul-
2003 
In Force 
Turkey – 
Albania 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 09-May-
2008 
01-
May-
2008 
In Force 
Trans-Pacific 
Strategic 
Economic 
Partnership 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
18-May-
2007 
28-
May-
2006 
In Force 
Thailand - 
New Zealand 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
01-Dec-
2005 
01-Jul-
2005 
In Force 
Thailand – 
Australia 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
27-Dec-
2004 
01-Jan-
2005 
In Force 
Southern 
Common 
Market 
(MERCOSUR) 
CU & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
Enabling Clause 
& GATS Art. V 
17-Feb-
1991 (G) 
05-Dec-
2006 (S) 
29-
Nov-
1991 
(G) 
07-
Dec-
2005 
(S) 
In Force 
Southern 
African 
Development 
Community 
(SADC) 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 02-Aug-
2004 
01-
Sep-
2000 
In Force 
Southern 
African 
Customs 
Union (SACU) 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 25-Jun-
2007 
15-Jul-
2004 
In Force 
 258 
South Pacific 
Regional 
Trade and 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
(SPARTECA) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 07-Jan-
1981 
01-Jan-
1981 
In Force 
South Asian 
Preferential 
Trade 
Arrangement 
(SAPTA) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 21-Apr-
1997 
07-
Dec-
1995 
In Force 
South Asian 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(SAFTA) 
FTA Goods Enabling Clause 21-Apr-
2008 
01-Jan-
2006 
In Force 
Singapore – 
Australia 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
25-Sep-
2003 
28-Jul-
2003 
In Force 
Protocol on 
Trade 
Negotiations 
(PTN) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 09-Nov-
1971 
11-
Feb-
1973 
In Force 
Peru – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
30-Jul-
2009 
01-
Aug-
2009 
In Force 
Peru – China FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Mar-
2010 
01-
Mar-
2010 
In Force 
Pan-Arab Free 
Trade Area 
(PAFTA) 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 03-Oct-
2006 
01-Jan-
1998 
In Force 
Panama and 
the Separate 
Customs 
Territory of 
Taiwan, 
Penghu, 
Kinmen and 
Matsu 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
28-Jul-
2009 
01-Jan-
2004 
In Force 
Panama – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
04-Apr-
2007 
24-Jul-
2006 
In Force 
Panama - 
Honduras 
(Panama - 
Central 
America) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
16-Dec-
2009 
09-Jan-
2009 
In Force 
Panama - El 
Salvador 
(Panama - 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
24-Feb-
2005 
11-
Apr-
2003 
In Force 
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Central 
America) 
Panama - 
Costa Rica 
(Panama - 
Central 
America) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
07-Apr-
2009 
23-
Nov-
2008 
In Force 
Panama – 
Chile 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
17-Apr-
2008 
07-
Mar-
2008 
In Force 
Pakistan - Sri 
Lanka 
FTA Goods Enabling Clause 11-Jun-
2008 
12-Jun-
2005 
In Force 
Pakistan – 
Malaysia 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
Enabling Clause 
& GATS Art. V 
19-Feb-
2008 
01-Jan-
2008 
In Force 
Pakistan – 
China 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
18-Jan-
2008 (G) 
20-May-
2010 (S) 
01-Jul-
2007 
(G) 
10-Oct-
2009 
(S) 
In Force 
Pacific Island 
Countries 
Trade 
Agreement 
(PICTA) 
FTA Goods Enabling Clause 28-Aug-
2008 
13-
Apr-
2003 
In Force 
North 
American 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
29-Jan-
1993 (G) 
01-Mar-
1995 (S) 
01-Jan-
1994 
In Force 
Nicaragua and 
the Separate 
Customs 
Territory of 
Taiwan, 
Penghu, 
Kinmen and 
Matsu 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
09-Jul-
2009 
01-Jan-
2008 
In Force 
New Zealand – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
04-Sep-
2001 
01-Jan-
2001 
In Force 
Mexico – 
Nicaragua 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
17-Oct-
2005 
01-Jul-
1998 
In Force 
Mexico - 
Honduras 
(Mexico - 
Northern 
Triangle) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
10-Jul-
2006 (G) 
20-Jun-
2006 (S) 
01-Jun-
2001 
In Force 
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Mexico - 
Guatemala 
(Mexico - 
Northern 
Triangle) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Jul-
2006 
15-
Mar-
2001 
In Force 
Mexico - El 
Salvador 
(Mexico - 
Northern 
Triangle) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
23-May-
2006 
15-
Mar-
2001 
In Force 
MERCOSUR – 
India 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 23-Feb-
2010 
01-Jun-
2009 
In Force 
Melanesian 
Spearhead 
Group (MSG) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 03-Aug-
1999 
01-Jan-
1994 
In Force 
Latin 
American 
Integration 
Association 
(LAIA) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 01-Jul-
1982 
18-
Mar-
1981 
In Force 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic – 
Thailand 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 26-Nov-
1991 
20-Jun-
1991 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic – 
Uzbekistan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jun-
1999 
20-
Mar-
1998 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic – 
Ukraine 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jun-
1999 
19-Jan-
1998 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic - 
Russian 
Federation 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jun-
1999 
24-
Apr-
1993 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic – 
Moldova 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jun-
1999 
21-
Nov-
1996 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic – 
Kazakhstan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 29-Jun-
1999 
11-
Nov-
1995 
In Force 
Kyrgyz 
Republic – 
Armenia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 12-Dec-
2000 
27-Oct-
1995 
In Force 
Korea, 
Republic of – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
21-Feb-
2006 
02-
Mar-
2006 
In Force 
Korea, 
Republic of – 
India 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
  01-Jan-
2010 
In Force 
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Korea, 
Republic of – 
Chile 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
08-Apr-
2004 
01-
Apr-
2004 
In Force 
Jordan – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
07-Jul-
2006 
22-
Aug-
2005 
In Force 
Japan - Viet 
Nam 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
01-Oct-
2009 
01-Oct-
2009 
In Force 
Japan – 
Thailand 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
25-Oct-
2007 
01-
Nov-
2007 
In Force 
Japan – 
Switzerland 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
01-Sep-
2009 
01-
Sep-
2009 
In Force 
Japan – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
08-Nov-
2002 
30-
Nov-
2002 
In Force 
Japan – 
Philippines 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
11-Dec-
2008 
11-
Dec-
2008 
In Force 
Japan – 
Mexico 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
31-Mar-
2005 
01-
Apr-
2005 
In Force 
Japan – 
Malaysia 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
12-Jul-
2006 
13-Jul-
2006 
In Force 
Japan – 
Indonesia 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
27-Jun-
2008 
01-Jul-
2008 
In Force 
Israel – 
Mexico 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 22-Feb-
2001 
01-Jul-
2000 
In Force 
India - Sri 
Lanka 
FTA Goods Enabling Clause 17-Jun-
2002 
15-
Dec-
2001 
In Force 
India – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-May-
2007 
01-
Aug-
2005 
In Force 
India - Nepal PSA Goods Enabling Clause 02-Aug-
2010 
27-Oct-
2009 
In Force 
India - Bhutan FTA Goods Enabling Clause 30-Jun-
2008 
29-Jul-
2006 
In Force 
India – 
Afghanistan 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 08-Mar-
2010 
13-
May-
2003 
In Force 
Iceland - 
Faroe Islands 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
10-Jul-
2008 
01-
Nov-
2006 
In Force 
Hong Kong, 
China - New 
Zealand 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Jan-
2011 
01-Jan-
2011 
In Force 
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Honduras - El 
Salvador and 
the Separate 
Customs 
Territory of 
Taiwan, 
Penghu, 
Kinmen and 
Matsu 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
06-Apr-
2010 
01-
Mar-
2008 
In Force 
Gulf 
Cooperation 
Council (GCC) 
CU Goods   01-Jan-
2003 
In Force 
Global System 
of Trade 
Preferences 
among 
Developing 
Countries 
(GSTP) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 25-Sep-
1989 
19-
Apr-
1989 
In Force 
Georgia – 
Ukraine 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
04-Jun-
1996 
In Force 
Georgia - 
Turkmenistan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
01-Jan-
2000 
In Force 
Georgia - 
Russian 
Federation 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
10-
May-
1994 
In Force 
Georgia – 
Kazakhstan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
16-Jul-
1999 
In Force 
Georgia – 
Azerbaijan 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
10-Jul-
1996 
In Force 
Georgia – 
Armenia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 08-Feb-
2001 
11-
Nov-
1998 
In Force 
Faroe Islands 
- Switzerland 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 12-Feb-
1996 
01-
Mar-
1995 
In Force 
Faroe Islands 
– Norway 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 12-Feb-
1996 
01-Jul-
1993 
In Force 
European 
Free Trade 
Association 
(EFTA) 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
14-Nov-
1959 (G) 
15-Jul-
2002 (S) 
03-
May-
1960 
(G) 
01-Jun-
2002 
(S) 
In Force 
European 
Economic 
Area (EEA) 
EIA Services GATS Art. V 13-Sep-
1996 
01-Jan-
1994 
In Force 
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Eurasian 
Economic 
Community 
(EAEC) 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 21-Apr-
1999 
08-Oct-
1997 
In Force 
EU – Serbia FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 31-May-
2010 
01-
Feb-
2010 
In Force 
EU - San 
Marino 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 24-Feb-
2010 
01-
Apr-
2002 
In Force 
Egypt – 
Turkey 
FTA Goods Enabling Clause 05-Oct-
2007 
01-
Mar-
2007 
In Force 
EFTA 
accession of 
Iceland 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 30-Jan-
1970 
01-
Mar-
1970 
In Force 
EFTA – 
Turkey 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 06-Mar-
1992 
01-
Apr-
1992 
In Force 
EFTA – 
Tunisia 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 03-Jun-
2005 
01-Jun-
2005 
In Force 
EFTA – 
Singapore 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
14-Jan-
2003 
01-Jan-
2003 
In Force 
EFTA - Serbia FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 24-Nov-
2010 
01-Oct-
2010 
In Force 
EFTA – SACU FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 29-Oct-
2008 
01-
May-
2008 
In Force 
EFTA - 
Palestinian 
Authority 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 23-Jul-
1999 
01-Jul-
1999 
In Force 
EFTA – 
Morocco 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 20-Jan-
2000 
01-
Dec-
1999 
In Force 
EFTA - Mexico FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
25-Jul-
2001 
01-Jul-
2001 
In Force 
EFTA – 
Lebanon 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 22-Dec-
2006 
01-Jan-
2007 
In Force 
EFTA - Korea, 
Republic of 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
23-Aug-
2006 
01-
Sep-
2006 
In Force 
EFTA - Jordan FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 17-Jan-
2002 
01-Jan-
2002 
In Force 
EFTA – Israel FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 30-Nov-
1992 
01-Jan-
1993 
In Force 
EFTA - Former 
Yugoslav 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 11-Dec-
2000 
01-Jan-
2001 
In Force 
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Republic of 
Macedonia 
EFTA - Egypt FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 17-Jul-
2007 
01-
Aug-
2007 
In Force 
EFTA - Croatia FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 14-Jan-
2002 
01-Jan-
2002 
In Force 
EFTA – Chile FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Dec-
2004 
01-
Dec-
2004 
In Force 
EFTA - Canada FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 04-Aug-
2009 
01-Jul-
2009 
In Force 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Organization 
(ECO) 
PSA Goods Enabling Clause 10-Jul-
1992 
17-
Feb-
1992 
In Force 
Economic 
Community of 
West African 
States 
(ECOWAS) 
CU Goods Enabling Clause 06-Jul-
2005 
24-Jul-
1993 
In Force 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Community of 
Central Africa 
(CEMAC) 
CU Goods Enabling Clause 21-Jul-
1999 
24-Jun-
1999 
In Force 
EC Treaty CU & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
24-Apr-
1957 (G) 
10-Nov-
1995 (S) 
01-Jan-
1958 
In Force 
EC (9) 
Enlargement 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 07-Mar-
1972 
01-Jan-
1973 
In Force 
EC (27) 
Enlargement 
CU & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
27-Sep-
2006 (G) 
26-Jun-
2007 (S) 
01-Jan-
2007 
In Force 
EC (25) 
Enlargement 
CU & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
26-Apr-
2004 
01-
May-
2004 
In Force 
EC (15) 
Enlargement 
CU & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
15-Dec-
1994 (G) 
22-Dec-
1994 (S) 
01-Jan-
1995 
In Force 
EC (12) 
Enlargement 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 11-Dec-
1985 
01-Jan-
1986 
In Force 
EC (10) 
Enlargement 
CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 24-Oct-
1979 
01-Jan-
1981 
In Force 
EC - Turkey CU Goods GATT Art. XXIV 22-Dec-
1995 
01-Jan-
1996 
In Force 
 265 
EC - Tunisia FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jan-
1999 
01-
Mar-
1998 
In Force 
EC – Syria FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 15-Jul-
1977 
01-Jul-
1977 
In Force 
EC - 
Switzerland - 
Liechtenstein 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 27-Oct-
1972 
01-Jan-
1973 
In Force 
EC - South 
Africa 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 02-Nov-
2000 
01-Jan-
2000 
In Force 
EC - 
Palestinian  
Authority 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 29-May-
1997 
01-Jul-
1997 
In Force 
EC – Overseas 
Countries and 
Territories 
(OCT) 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 14-Dec-
1970 
01-Jan-
1971 
In Force 
EC - Norway FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 13-Jul-
1973 
01-Jul-
1973 
In Force 
EC – Morocco 
 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 13-Oct-
2000 
01-
Mar-
2000 
In Force 
EC  -
Montenegro 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
16-Jan-
2008 (G) 
18-Jun-
2010 (S) 
01-Jan-
2008 
(G) 
01-
May-
2010 
(S) 
In Force 
EC - Mexico FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
25-Jul-
2000 (G) 
21-Jun-
2002 (S) 
01-Jul-
2000 
(G) 
01-Oct-
2000 
(S) 
In Force 
EC - Lebanon FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 26-May-
2003 
01-
Mar-
2003 
In Force 
EC - Jordan FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 17-Dec-
2002 
01-
May-
2002 
In Force 
EC - Israel FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 20-Sep-
2000 
01-Jun-
2000 
In Force 
EC - Iceland FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 24-Nov-
1972 
01-
Apr-
1973 
In Force 
EC - Former 
Yugoslav 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
23-Oct-
2001 (G) 
01-Jun-
2001 
In Force 
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Republic of 
Macedonia 
02-Oct-
2009 (S) 
(G) 
01-
Apr-
2004 
(S) 
EC - Faroe 
Islands 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 17-Feb-
1997 
01-Jan-
1997 
In Force 
EC - Egypt FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 03-Sep-
2004 
01-Jun-
2004 
In Force 
EC - Croatia FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
17-Dec-
2002 (G) 
12-Oct-
2009 (S) 
01-
Mar-
2002 
(G) 
01-
Feb-
2005 
(S) 
In Force 
EC - Côte 
d'Ivoire 
FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 11-Dec-
2008 
01-Jan-
2009 
In Force 
EC – Chile FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
03-Feb-
2004 (G) 
28-Oct-
2005 (S) 
01-
Feb-
2003 
(G) 
01-
Mar-
2005 
(S) 
In Force 
EC - 
CARIFORUM 
States EPA 
FTA & 
EIA 
Goods & 
Services 
GATT Art. XXIV 
& GATS V 
16-Oct-
2008 
01-
Nov-
2008 
In Force 
EC - Cameroon FTA Goods GATT Art. XXIV 24-Sep-
2009 
01-Oct-
2009 
In Force 
 
